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ABSTRACT

Beast-Gods, Bandits, and Beggar-Kings:
The traveler in political thought
by
Nader Sadre

Advisor: Uday S. Mehta

In this dissertation, I use texts by Plato, Locke, Homer, and Gandhi to explore the
political dimension of travel. I argue that travel is a proxy for practices and conditions
that exceed “normal” politics. In this capacity, travel reveals what normal politics is, or is
assumed to be. Travel marks a boundary of the political realm in a double sense: it may
conceal or point to a pre-political source of authority; and it may provide an intimation of
new political modes and orders. My analyses suggest that there is no single or
consistent relationship between travel and politics. Rather, the political meanings of
travel are tethered to the political visions of their texts. In this sense, my argument is
about the function of travel in political argumentation, not about its trans-textual
meaning.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The Old Testament, writes Arnold Eisen1, gives us two traditions of exile. The
first belongs to the story of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden.
This exile is existential: they are cast out of God’s presence and out of the condition of
innocence and perfection, “destined to seek their creator.” And they are doomed to
perceive their existence as disaggregated, blind to the unity of being. The second
tradition of exile comes from the story of Cain. After murdering his brother, Cain loses
his clan membership and his bonds to society are severed. Consequently, anyone he
meets in transit may kill him. For this reason, God marks Cain as his own, heralding the
status of the Jews as a chosen people. Eisen calls this tradition of exile political.
Both traditions are among the “founding narratives” that have shaped Jewish
thought, according to Eisen2. Taken together, they also capture the paradox of the
traveler for political thought. On one side, we have the idea of travel as a kind of
metaphysical departure that is also productive of civic community. When Adam and Eve
are cast out of God’s presence, they are cast into the presence of other people. Losing
sight of God, they see one another, for better or worse. In this sense, travel connects
the moral realm to the realm of civic and political order and casts the traveler as a moral
figure within politics. On the other side, we have the idea of travel as a departure out of
the political realm and into the realm of the divine. Cain’s violation of clan rule throws

Eisen (1972) “Exile”, in Cohen, Arthur A., and Paul R. Mendes-Flohr. 1988. Contemporary Jewish
Religious Thought : Original Essays on Critical Concepts, Movements, and Beliefs. New York: Free
Press.
2 Eisen, 221.
1
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him out of the realm of politics and into the company God. In this tradition, politics
generates the divine realm to accommodate the excesses of the political realm, namely,
violence.
Together, these two traditions express the paradox of travel as both a source of
political orders and a suspension of politics. Each expresses the idea of travel as a
passage between two realms that are fundamentally opposed. The traveler herself
comes to symbolize the condition of liminality, of straddling two realms and properly
belonging neither. As both stories suggest, the traveler is a figure who is out of place,
who comes from another realm, and who bears the traces of that realm, a figure of both
longing and promise. For this reason, she is, like Cain, both beneath political
consideration and, as God’s companion, above politics. She is, like Adam and Eve, the
source of political order and, like Cain, an exception to that order.
I cite the Bible to suggest the deep roots of our ideas about travel and its
relationship to politics. This deep-rootedness can make our ideas appear natural and
self-evident, an appearance that I wish to contest. For this reason, I propose to
undertake the following investigation into the meaning of travel for politics. My
dissertation makes two claims. The first is that travel constitutes the political realm as
part of its excess. In this sense, travel is like every other boundary; it indicates what is
inside and must be traduced as outside. But travel does more than this. Though it is a
container for excess, travel also has its own structure of liminality. My second claim is
that, when the excesses of politics are metaphorized as travel, the effect is to render
that excess native, so to speak, to the realm of politics, to make it familiar and even
necessary to normal politics. My intent in this project is to read for travel as an
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expression of excess, and to consider the ways in which this enables us to conceive of
that excess as also interior to the political realm, to see political order as the
aggregation of its interior and exterior.
My argument stands in contrast to more familiar views about travel, as for
instance that travel is an extension of the political realm, or that travel is a suspension of
politics. The former view has been embraced by writers in the cosmopolitan tradition,
from Stoics like Chrysippus to Enlightenment rationalists like Kant, and more recently to
Martha Nussbaum (2002), Seyla Benhabib (2006), and David Held (2009). Some
version of the latter view, meanwhile, has been expressed by writers like David Miller,
Will Kymlicka, and Thomas Nagel. Their arguments range from the necessity of
recognizing minority cultural claims (Kymlicka, 1995), to the value of democratic selfdetermination (Miller, 1995, 2016), to the inherently political nature of justice (Nagel,
2005). In all cases, though most clearly in the work of Miller, the legitimacy of political
borders is affirmed and the free movement of the traveler is correspondingly
circumscribed by the state. Though there is tremendous variation and nuance in the
work of all these writers, crudely speaking, they differ on the question of whether
political status stops at the border. Rather than pick a side in this debate, I work from
the premise that the political realm is constituted both by what it claims and what it
disavows. By this view, travel constitutes the political realm as part of its essential
excess, its necessary exterior. By reframing the relationship between travel and politics
as one of essential opposition, I hope to offer another vantage from which to think about
our own visions of politics.

3

I have undertaken this project with two goals in mind. The first is to widen and
deepen our understanding of the tacit knowledge that gives meaning to experience.
Travel forms part of the constellation of concepts that structure our experience and
allow us to make sense of, and draw meaning from, those experiences. Analysis of how
we think with and through travel could and should enrich our understanding of the often
implicit sources of our political visions. The second goal, more provisional, is to seek a
more distant perch from which to think about the categories that structure our political
visions and that define what is possible within those visions.
This introduction does not proceed along a linear path; I am not building towards
any grand synthesis or conclusion. Rather, I intend a kind of fattening out of the above
points, and of clarification through expansion and illustration. The intent is to offer a
limited review of the theoretical literature on this topic as a prelude to presenting my
own argument.

Political travel: Locke and his critics

Travel as a political idea may seem a peculiar topic of study. Politics implies
presence and participation; travel implies absence and a suspension of obligation. The
opposition is woven into the fabric of political thought. Socrates tells us that the sophists
are ignorant of statesmanship because they are "only wanderers."3 Aristotle calls the
man who lives outside settled society a beast or a god: "he is no part of a state."4 And

3
4

Plato, Timaeus, in Jowett, s19, 5.
Aristotle, Politics, Bk1, 4.
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when Machiavelli digresses to consider the subject of the traveler in Book Two of the
Discourses, he emphasizes the unreliable nature of exiles. They cannot be trusted as
one trusts a fellow countryman because their allegiances lie elsewhere. He writes,

…their desire to return home is so intense that they naturally believe many things
which are false, and to them they add many things with guile, so that between
the things they believe and the things they say they believe to fill you with hope,
they fill you up with so much hope that if you rely upon it you either incur
expenses or undertake an enterprise in which you are ruined.5

Whereas Aristotle’s traveler is above (or beneath) reason, Machiavelli’s traveler
misuses it, confounding both self and host to yield poor political judgment. Whereas
Aristotle’s traveler has no need of politics, Machiavelli’s is simply bad for politics.
Of the many writers who have shaped our views about travel and politics, John
Locke merits special consideration. The political subject that populates Locke's vision of
civil society in the Two Treatises on Government is radically de-situated. Both natural
rights and the purchase of knowledge attained through reason are unconditioned by
place and time. These universalized features of Locke’s subject entail a devaluation of
location and, by extension, movement. Through reason, Locke’s subject may claim a
kind of knowledge unmediated by the distorting lens of local custom and instead see
with the divine vantage captured in Donna Haraway's image of the "eye from nowhere."

5

Machiavelli, Discourses, 240.
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Kotef refers to this version of the Lockean subject as “disembodied”; as a result,
its place and movement are rendered “politically insignificant.”6 By this she means that
the physical location of Locke’s subject does not condition her obligations to natural law,
nor does it affect that knowledge which is acquired through reason. But as Kotef argues,
this is an incomplete characterization; Locke’s text suggests a thicker, more embodied
notion of subjectivity. She claims that realizing the capacity for reason, and with it the
capacity to recognize and adhere to the obligations of natural law, depends upon being
settled. The broad contours of the argument are well known. In Kotef’s version, Locke
makes productivity in the land a moral duty; the failure to enclose and cultivate signals a
larger failure to organize society according to natural law. By inferring from the failure to
enclose and cultivate property a more general failure to live according to natural law,
Locke demonizes nomadism–and mobility more generally–as a condition unconducive
to reason. Building on Basset’s ‘Myth of Nomadism’, Kotef finds in the Second Treatise
an ‘entanglement of nomadism and irrationality’7 that precludes the nomad from making
contracts and, by extension, from gaining political standing.
These nomadic entanglements have another side, namely, the positive
association between settlement and reason, as well as settlement and civic order. Citing
Mehta (1999), Kotef argues that for Locke, “freedom is thus dependent upon some
confinement of the individual, upon adhering to a ‘sedentary injunction to sit in quiet
ignorance of those things beyond our reach.’”8 What is described here is a kind of
education, one that shapes the passions and cultivates the faculty of reason. In doing

6

Kotef, 62.
Ibid., 105.
8 Ibid., 77.
7
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so, this education delivers the student to a condition of maturity and fitness for civic
engagement. It is, however, a situated process; one cannot become so in the manner of
Aristotle’s traveling beast-god. By situating the cultivation of reason and the taming of
the passions, Locke also situates the political education of his subject, and makes the
attainment of freedom contingent upon immobility. One implication of which is to make
mobility unconducive to the cultivation and exercise of reason, thereby casting the
nomad and his like outside of the political realm.
The influence of this Lockean notion of travel as a condition both opposed to
politics and politically insignificant has been far-reaching.9 One effect is that travel has
become an infrequent topic of explicit political consideration in the canon of political
philosophy. At the same time, however, this notion has enabled others to travel without
consideration of political consequences. According to Pratt (1992), the Lockean notion
of travel underlies the scientific mindset of the 18th and 19th century, exemplified by Carl
Linnaeus' Systema Natura, a grand attempt to organize all life forms, known and
unknown, under a single classificatory system conceived in the mind of a Swede
working with the empirical evidence available to a Northern European in the mid-18th
century. Movement drained of political significance also underwrites the quest for what
Pratt calls “global-scale meaning”,10 illustrated by the French-led expedition to measure
the shape of the world and prove its geometric conformity to Euclidean principles. Each
of these examples illustrates a moment in time when “the world” was reduced to a
mirror of the Western European mind. Within this intellectual context, the primary

9

Though I am calling this the Lockean notion of travel, I do not mean to suggest that Locke is its sole
source. As I will suggest in a later section, a similar idea can be found in Machiavelli’s work. I use Locke
here because I find his expression of this idea to be the clearest among available sources.
10 Pratt, 15.
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purpose of travel was to affirm the European understanding of reality. What these
European scientists of the 18th and 19th century promoted, upon the foundation of
Locke’s universal subject, was a devaluation of the world and, under the guise of
scientific observation, the capacity to travel without effecting the world or being changed
by the journey.
The Lockean entanglement of travel and rationality took another form amongst
the generation of Romantic poets of 18th and 19th century England. These writers
implicitly accepted the entanglement of mobility and irrationality and sought to exploit
the potential for travel to deliver them from reason and civil society alike. For Lord
Byron, travel was infused with the promise of danger, exemplified by the practice of
what Carl Thompson calls “Romantic Anti-Tourism” (2007). Eschewing the tourism of
the masses, poets like Byron travelled according to a script that viewed travel as
suffering.11 Byron, Thompson writes, "cast himself in a role that resonated powerfully in
the Romantic imagination: that of the hapless voyager profoundly marked, transformed
even, by a terrifying ordeal at sea."12 The point of Romantic anti-tourism was to provoke
a confrontation with death that stripped the traveler of his resources, material and
otherwise, and threw him upon the mercy of the elements. The goal of which was to
attain a vision of the True and the Beautiful, which lay shrouded beneath layers of social
convention. Thompson writes, "Suffering in travel is often a route to certain sorts of
profound insight and knowledge,"13 by which he means a kind of unmediated revelation.
What Thompson captures here is the aesthetic incarnation of the scientific impulse
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Thompson, 108.
Thompson, 60.
13 Thompson, 106.
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described by Pratt. In this case, it is the poet’s training and vision that elevates the
voyage to a condition for the attainment of knowledge that is unbounded.
There are contemporary successors to this Lockean traveler, a figure for whom
travel is an affirmation that the world can be conformed to one’s own system of
classification. Publications like the New York Times and other newspapers, along with a
vast and expanding selection of travel magazines and online travelogues, filter their
destinations through “rational” categories for the western traveler: places to stay, places
to eat, things to see. They also impose a kind temporal order that shapes destinations
to the categories of the reader.14 Armed with the rational, self-evident categories of
home, the traveler can experience the “new” through familiar terms and thereby
reproduce the exotic in the language and logic of “home.” This repeated conformity of
the world to familiar categories for the consumption of the reader invites her to imagine
that her categories are universal and natural. And it also invites her to imagine travel
itself as lacking any political dimension. All of which justifies the assumption that when
we travel, we leave behind our political identities and the structures of power in which
they are embedded. In a recent travelogue by Paul Theroux, for example, the author
writes, "I had no status except my age, but in a country where the old are respected,
that was enough — more than enough."15 Theroux claims his only inescapable attribute:
age. He might have added, among other things: sex, skin color, and native tongue.
Instead, the illusion conveyed here is that by leaving behind home, the traveler sheds
his identity as well, and with it the mediating lens of “home”, which, because that lens is

The New York Times’ “36 Hours in…” series, for example, offers the reader an experience of the exotic
that fits within the limits of a long weekend.
15
"Paul Theroux’s Mexican Journey", published on Sept. 23, 2019 in the New York Times.
14

9

naturalized, does not mediate anything at all. Like Linnaeus, Theroux also aspires to
see without being seen.
But familiarity breeds contempt, suggested by the rise over the past several
decades of a critical orientation towards the genre of travel writing. In his review of
Naipaul’s travelogue, Among the Believers, Edward Said accuses Naipaul of practicing
a form of travel writing that tacitly devalues its subject matter as an object of passive,
scientific observation, and that elevates its author to the status of a disembodied,
politically neutral, objective observer. Naipaul’s fault, according to Said, is not simply
that he sees through the imperialistic lens of the West; it is that his way of traveling
inures him to this perspective and prevents him from seeing his subjects as fully human.
Said asks, "Does he live among them, risk their direct retaliation, write in their presence,
so to speak, and does he like Socrates live through the consequences of his criticism?
Not at all. No dialogue. He snipes at them from the Atlantic Monthly where none of them
can ever get back at him."16 Naipaul meets strangers in transit but instead of risking
conflict, he takes notes and recreates confrontation from afar. (Naipaul might have
responded that this is what writers are supposed to do, that is, observe and report. To
which Said might have replied, how convenient for the writer.) This allows him to
experience a kind of disembodied travel, untouched by his encounters, unchallenged in
his assumptions, and therefore affirmed in his prejudices. A better traveler would have
embraced confrontation in transit and, by doing so, come to recognize, understand, and
perhaps even gain a measure of respect for those he encountered. In doing so, he

16

Said, 116.
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might have diluted the chauvinistic ideology that has underwritten centuries of
exploitation.
Said’s larger point is that the genre of the travelogue that Naipaul works in
implicitly denies the political standing and agency of the “hosts.” By depicting the world
beyond our borders (howsoever defined) as a destination for our travels, we reconfigure
the world as an object for us, as a receptacle meant to receive us in our condition as
traveler. In the process, we neutralize, or freeze, the politics of our destinations as a
precondition for our own apolitical adventures. When we report back about these
destinations–to our friends, to our readers–we transform our experiences into objects
for us. This is to say that we press our experiences through the conceptual sieve of our
own culturally specific context to render them legible to our audience. In this way, we
domesticate the “exotic”, even as we produce it as such, discarding the excess and
retaining the familiar. In doing so, we make our hosts and destinations objects for us,
which is to say that we subordinate them to our categories of understanding. When
paired with military advantage, this mode of travel and travelogue becomes a powerful
aid to imperialism.
For Said, culture is implicated in politics. As a result, we cannot read a work in
the genre of travel writing without asking after its politics, both in its production and its
effects. But, as evident in his criticism of Naipaul, to criticize travel writing is also to
criticize travel. Specifically, it is to criticize a way of traveling and being amongst
strangers that fails to acknowledge the power dynamics that structure those encounters.
To travel as Naipaul does–as though one might transcend his socio-political identity–is
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to travel in a fantasy. Contra Linnaeus, Byron, and Theroux, it is to travel without
seeing.
If this point is implicit in Said, it is explicit in the work of Roxanne Euben. Her
stated aim in Journeys to the Other Shore is to argue that the body of ideas that have
come to be claimed as the tradition of Western political thought are in fact the product of
a vast intellectual transfer between individuals brought into confrontation within the
hazily defined terrain of inter-border spaces. The “Western tradition” of political
philosophy, in other words, is the product of travel and of the inter-cultural exchanges
facilitated by travel. Moreover, the fluidity of identity within these spaces produces the
conditions in which this exchange is most apt to occur. For Euben, it is not only the
movement of ideas facilitated by travel but also travel’s subjective effects and its
capacity to produce a more fluid form of identity that creates the conditions of
intellectual exchange and development, and that yields what we inaccurately call the
Western political-philosophical tradition. For Euben, travelers are "embodied... with a
sense of self, knowledge, time, and space [that] at once emerges and is transfigured by
the doubled mediation between rootedness and distance, familiar and unfamiliar." 17 The
baggage borne by the traveler structures her engagements in transit and yields
knowledge that is partial and constrained. The knowledge produced through these
constrained engagements is by extension incomplete, provisional, and reflective of the
baggage of traveler and host alike. Travel is political not because we escape power but
because we cannot escape it.

17

Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore, 11.
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Said shows us what is wanting in conventional travel writing; Euben shows us
what another practice of travel might look like and how it might be described.
Specifically, she suggests how travel might produce mutually constitutive encounters
between strangers in transit. At the core of her vision of travel are two assumptions:
first, that travelers are encumbered with the baggage of their assumptions; and second,
that the various understandings produced in transit are always already political. But this
understanding of travel sets up a tension in Euben's account. Identity, she argues, is
part of the baggage of the encumbered traveler; it is partial and contingent, both
produced and productive of our transitory encounters and of the understandings yielded
through those encounters. As a result, the categories through which we grasp our
identity have no ontological basis; Islam and the West are not things in the world, they
are discursive constructions that emerge through our confrontations in transit. At the
same time, however, that same contingent identity is productive of the conditions of our
encounters, and of the understandings that follow from them. In other words, identity
straddles the production of understanding; it is both cause and outcome. In the former
case, it is experienced by the traveler as essential and even primordial. In the latter
case, it is partial and provisional.
Euben acknowledges this tension and embraces it by advocating for a
“consistently agonistic engagement with the world... an inescapably rooted
estrangement akin to what Walzer has characterized as the 'ambiguous connection' of
those 'in but not wholly of their society.'"18 By drawing our understandings of self and
other into the domain of politics, by making all understandings a product of conflict and

18

Euben, 28.
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contestation, she deprives us of Haraway’s divine vantage, and of any understanding
untainted by power. As a result, the identities through which we attain our
understandings of self and other lose their rootedness in the world. The West and Islam
lose their fixed, stable, and unitary qualities. Euben erases the grand, civilizational
identity categories and replaces them with a more generic experience of difference. In
this vision, everyone is a kind of nomad and no border is stable or fixed. Travel is
rendered political, but in the process, it loses its connection to movement.
Just what is lost becomes evident when Euben writes, "So understood, such
'journeys' need not be across vast distances; indeed, depending upon where and how
one lives, they might entail simply crossing the street... In some instances, they do not
even require physical movement."19 In effect, by diluting the grandiose, civilization
identity categories that would differentiate strangers in transit, Euben reduces the
stakes of these confrontations across the boundaries that differentiate us. By making
every encounter a transgression, travel loses political significance because the quality
that gave it distinction–confrontation produced by and through distance from home–
becomes trivialized.20 It would seem that to cleanse travel of its essentializing impulses,
we throw out the concept with the bathwater.
This is not to endorse concepts like “the West” but rather to say that while they
have distorting and frequently oppressive effects, they also give meaning to difference,
and give the traveler her felt sense of being away-from-home. If there is no coherent,
felt distinction between places or peoples, then travel’s transgressive quality is lost. It is

19

Euben, 12.
Adorno makes a similar point when he writes that the measure of knowledge is not how systematically
it has been derived from first principles, but how far it travels from what is currently known and thought:
“measured by its distance from the continuity of the familiar” (Adorno, 1978: 80).
20
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no doubt true that by challenging these categories we make a political intervention that
deprives them of their force. It is also the case, however, that these categories deepen
the experience of difference. When we discredit these categories, we deprive travel of
its meaning as a condition in which we are brought into confrontation with strangeness.
A world without these essentializing distinctions is a world of infinite shades of
difference. And it is one in which travel loses its distinction from settled life.
For travel to have a political dimension, the boundary between self and other
must be thick, the transgression across that boundary dangerous. When boundaries do
not appear as boundaries, that is to say, as bounding something substantial, fixed, and
worth preserving, then the felt sense of self as opposed to and different from the other
cannot be discerned. By extension the sense of solidarity core to political life is denied.
But Euben's politicization of knowledge tacitly diminishes these distinctions by
discrediting the knowledge upon which they are based, even as she insists that they
enable us to make sense of the world and our place within it. The effect of discrediting
these categories is to muddy the familiar borders and to draw new ones reflecting so
many micro-distinctions. In doing so, travel loses its potency as a condition that draws
us into confrontation with difference, and in the process affirms our sense of same-ness,
the shared identities upon which political life is predicated. The experience of difference
produced by travel comes to resemble the micro-differences encountered at home, in
our situated existence. This is not to say that Euben reduces the world to one unitary
cosmopolitan terrain, but rather that in erasing the thick lines and replacing them with so
many thin ones, she trivializes travel. In the end, she so thoroughly discredits those
identity categories that make geographic distances meaningful that travel as we know it
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loses distinction as a practice among other forms of mobility. Euben, in effect, dilutes
the significance of travel by dissolving every movement into the night in which all cows
are black, as Hegel would put it.
My analysis of Euben appears to end at an impasse. If Locke obscures the
political significance of travel, Euben restores it to view. But by discrediting the
categories that give difference its significance, she deprives travel of its quality of
movement and transgression. In doing so, she deprives us of the distinctions that
structure political life: us/them, interior/exterior. These categories can lead to oppression
but they also produce solidarities that empower the oppressed. Euben’s work is
excellent epistemology but it leaves us with an impoverished politics because it
delegitimizes the categories that set the stakes of political life. Encounters in transit are
not simply corrupted by the dichotomous thinking of travel metaphors like us/them,
we/they, host/guest; as Honig (2001, 2014) argues, these oppositions are also
productive of politics. Deployed towards more inclusive ends, they may yield more
inclusive outcomes.21 The task before us is to neither essentialize these differences nor
trivialize travel as any encounter across difference. Rather, it is to accept the
essentializing nature of its metaphors and dig beneath their construction. This is to say
that, in response to Euben, we should not mourn the loss of travel in the grand sense of
civilizational confrontations but rather dig more deeply into the sources of our
conceptualizations of travel to better understand how this concept is discursively

Honig writes, “… the best way to counter the xenophobic is not by invoking the xenophilic, which
precisely feeds the thing it seeks to oppose, but rather by attenuating and pluralising the national
attachments that underwrite both xenophobic and xenophilic politics” (2014: 209). I take this to mean that
we cannot escape metaphors that carry the inclusions and exclusions of membership. We can, however,
complicate the sources of membership categories and thereby change boundaries and bend the rules of
inclusion towards more democratic ends.
21
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produced, with and without political dimension. Over the next few pages, I take a more
critical orientation towards travel as a discursively contingent concept and explore its
function in political texts as a prelude for the analyses to follow.
Travel as a political idea

In the previous section, I considered the Lockean understanding of travel as well
as some criticisms of this view. Following Kotef, I take Locke to mean that travel is both
unconducive to politics and also politically insignificant. Critics of this understanding,
namely Said and Euben, argue that travel is inescapably political; all encounters are at
a foundational level structured and constrained. And while I noted that this produces a
tension in Euben’s analysis, it also prompts further inquiry into the discursive
construction of travel.
This leads me to the substance of my dissertation and, over the next several
pages, an elaboration of my method of analysis. As I have noted, the topic of my
dissertation is travel as a political idea. Though I am interested in a wide range of
practices and figures all of which fall under the capacious heading of travel and the
traveler, I have elected to study, as it were, canonical texts. Specifically, I consider how
travel is invoked in texts, whether as metaphor or as a narrative tool, to advance an
argument or to make a narrative turn more plausible. Though the study of travel as an
empirical practice can yield deep insights about the political effects of being in transit, I
follow Wolin (1969) in assuming that empirical observations are mediated by a fabric of
structuring ideas that give these observations meaning. What he means is there are
always background conditions, or what he calls “tacit knowledge”, that endow
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phenomena with meaning. This knowledge allows us to draw the boundary lines that
make phenomena discernable in the first place. In this vein, my goal is not to
understand the politics of tourism, for instance, but rather to understand the tacit
knowledge that allows us both to see such practices as a form of travel and to sketch in
its political dimensions. By doing so, I hope to better understand both how we think
about, and think with, travel.
There are two inter-connected senses in which we may approach the theme of
travel as a political idea, both of which can be illustrated by a passage from
Machiavelli’s Prince. The first entails reading for travel as a rhetorical device to aid the
making of arguments. We see this, for example, when Machiavelli casts himself as an
advisor to princes by imagining himself as a traveler. In the Dedicatory Letter to that
text, he writes,

For those who draw maps place themselves on low ground, in order to
understand the character of the mountains and other high points, and climb
higher in order to understand the character of the plains. Likewise, one needs to
be a ruler to understand properly the character of the people, and to be a man of
the people to understand properly the character of rulers.22

Machiavelli has been to the valley, has seen royal power from the vantage of the
people, and has also surveyed the people from the vantage of princes. Through his
“travels” – a sanitizing euphemism for an exile scarred by torture – he has acquired
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Machiavelli, The Prince, 4.
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multiple perspectives. Travel has elevated Machiavelli above his situated reader and
revealed a new source of knowledge produced through the aggregation and synthesis
of vantages. What Machiavelli is suggesting is that the prince should take his counsel
because he has the experience or perspective from below and above.23
This passage is famous not simply for its rhetorical flourish but because the
travel metaphor provides an interpretive key to the rest of the text. On the surface,
Machiavelli uses travel to redeem his exile from the halls of power by painting that
experience as productive of knowledge relevant to politics. For this metaphorical move
to seem coherent, however, one must understand the practice of governance in a way
that not only values travel but requires the very experience that Machiavelli has
endured. And indeed, throughout the Prince, Machiavelli depicts successful governance
as a practice that requires the projection of power to a new audience: the people. To
rephrase the point in Kantian terms, for Machiavelli’s travel-knowledge to be valid
requires that political power flow bilaterally between the prince and the people. A
knowledge of the people and how they perceive the prince thereby comes to seem
essential to both seizing and exercising power. To have traveled, and to have done so
amongst the people comes to seem essential not simply to the acquisition of political
knowledge but to successful governance. In this way, the travel metaphor requires and
promotes a political vision in which power flows bilaterally, and wherein the people
complete the prince as a source of political authority.
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Similar claims to authority are made by other political writers based on some unique insight afforded by
their explorations, whether intellectual, historical, scientific. Plato belongs to this group for his views that
philosophical knowledge, attained through dialectical journeys, entitled him to advise kings like Dionysus
and Dion (Seventh Letter). Hobbes too claims a similar authority to advise those with power on the basis
of his psychological insights, gained through self-analysis. (Leviathan, Author’s Note). The common
thread here is idea that travel endows the political thinker with some extra-political authority, whose
purchase is a function of its distance from conventional knowledge.
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I am not suggesting that this reading of the Prince is definitive or that it applies
across the range of Machiavelli’s political works. Rather, I cite this passage because it
offers an instance of a political argument, in this case about the foundations of political
knowledge, that draws its plausibility from the effective use of a travel metaphor. There
is, however, a second aspect of this same metaphor that illustrates the bilateral,
dialectical relationship between travel and politics. To get at this aspect of the metaphor,
we may begin by noting the obvious, namely, that the “cartographic” notion of travel
invoked by Machiavelli does not reflect any empirical reality. In light of his experiences
(or what we know of them, at least), the type of travel depicted by this metaphor is
neither necessary nor obvious. Rather, Machiavelli invokes this understanding of travel
and of the experience of being in transit to make plausible the insinuation that, through
travel, he has qualified himself to advise princes.
This is important because the choice of metaphor has conceptual entailments.
Implicit in the cartographic notion of travel is, for instance, the idea of the traveler as a
dogged expeditioner, driven by a single, fixed purpose and who accommodates himself
to the hardships of travel but is not transformed by them. Another entailment of the
cartographic metaphor is that vantage points acquired in transit are additive rather than
exclusive. The more seen, the more known, with the end-goal of painting a
comprehensive map of vantage points, one whose truth is a function of its many views.
Together, these aspects of the cartographic notion of travel imply that Machiavelli’s new
vantage does not displace his original, royal vantage with the vantage of the people;
rather, he accumulates a new perspective that extends and deepens his understanding.
It is for that reason that he can return to the castle bearing this new knowledge without
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raising suspicions of disloyalty. And it is for this same reason that so many have found
in The Prince evidence of hidden motives.24
But there is a third facet of the cartographic notion of travel that deserves note.
The Prince is offered to its audience as a gift; specifically, it is a gift of the knowledge
that Machiavelli has gained “in the valley”, howsoever defined. The very possibility of
gifting this knowledge, however, implies that one may re-package experiences for
others and that others thereby may come to own those experiences for themselves. In
this case, Machiavelli re-packages his travel knowledge, his knowledge of elsewhere,
and makes it a gift for those ‘at home,’ namely, the reader. Moreover, he may do so
such that the experiences of ‘elsewhere’ remain both authentic to their original form and
intelligible to the recipient. This is an assumption with rippling consequences; it requires,
above all, that the world ‘out there’ can be made sense of through the categories of
‘home.’ This assumption effectively recreates the categories of travel–i.e. “home” and
“away”–as categories that are fundamentally compatible but that are also hierarchical,
that subordinate “away” to “home.”
This is no doubt an intuitive understanding of travel, and one that is echoed in
Locke. As tourists, we are meant to visit some unfamiliar ‘elsewhere’ and bring some
authentic representation of that experience ‘home’ for our families and friends to reexperience. The point I wish to make is not that this is a false understanding of travel
but rather that the notion of travel evoked by the mapmaker is neither obvious nor
inevitable. Whether deliberate or not, it is one choice among many. Alternatively,
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I am referring to the esoteric analysis of Leo Strauss (1958), though Mary Dietz (1986) and Louis
Althusser (1999) have also argued for esoteric interpretations of this text with democratic and
revolutionary implications, respectively.
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Machiavelli may have analogized his experiences to that of a pilgrim, or a gypsy, or a
bandit, or, perhaps most appropriately, a merchant; there are many ways to travel.
Every metaphor entails a different relationship between knowledge and power, and
between rulers and subjects. To make an argument about the nature of politics,
Machiavelli draws on the mapmaker; in doing so, he tacitly makes an argument about
the meaning of travel, and in doing so anticipates the shape and substance of his
political vision.
The larger point here is that we produce meanings of travel and politics in
tandem. This dialectical entwinement makes it exceedingly difficult to tease them apart,
much less to use one to make normative statements about the other. This is apparent
when we try to talk, as we do today, about the politics of tourism-travel. For a popular
travel writer like Rick Steves (2009), as well as a critical travel writer like Elizabeth
Becker (2013), the goal is often to say something about the ‘right’ way to travel, whether
with greater cultural sensitivity, for Steves, or ecological and economic awareness, for
Becker. But to speak of travel as a practice defined by leisure, that entails transporting
oneself to an exotic ‘elsewhere’, and one which, through travelogue and photography,
we may repackage into an experience for others back ‘home’, is to also recreate
political categories like us, the travelers, and them, the hosts. At the same time, these
‘hosts’ become the conditions for ‘our’ leisure, while this ‘elsewhere’ is encoded as
exotic for the sake of making our experiences sufficiently unfamiliar as to mark them as
something new and corporeal, without risking corporeal inconvenience, let alone death.
To use these concepts to produce a vision of the ‘right’ way to travel is to tiptoe through
a minefield of coded language.
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It might seem to some that my approach to these questions confuses more than
it clarifies and leads to the kind of indeterminacy that prevents us from saying or
knowing anything. I agree with this point and take it as a feature rather than a bug. By
reading for travel in this way, that is, as a condition or practice that is discursively
produced in tandem with our conception of politics, I hope to better understand not only
the political dimension of travel, but also how the categories of traveler and host
become coherent to us. I do not merely wish to learn how Plato would treat a foreigner,
or supply the terms to help others argue for looser (or tighter) borders; I instead hope to
understand how the traveler becomes a meaningful figure in the Republic, one with or
without political qualities, and how she does the same in the work of immigration
theorists like Carens (2014) and Miller (2016). Moreover, I hope to understand how our
political categories–citizenship, civil and political society, property–acquire their own
coherency in opposition to figures and practices of travel. My intent is not to provide
definitions from which to make arguments about borders and movement; it is, rather, to
explore how we find ourselves capable of making such arguments in the first place. The
advantage of this way of reading for travel is that we allow ourselves the critical distance
from which to consider not only what travel means, but how that meaning is produced in
relation to a set of political meanings.
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Travel as excess

My first point is that travel and politics are mutually constitutive. We cannot speak
of travel or, quite often, politics without conjuring some notion of the other. And though
we may bootstrap our way to a conclusion, we never enjoy the comfort of solid ground.
Building on that argument, the point I wish to make next is that travel and politics are
produced in mutual opposition. To be more precise, travel is produced as an extrapolitical condition, as a condition that draws us out of the political realm. This opposition
may take any number of forms: travel may appear as a source of wisdom and
corruption, of violence and morality, as the source of institutions and the cause of their
downfall. In each case, travel is a proxy for anything that we would oppose to politics.
As an idea produced in opposition to politics, travel marks the boundaries of the
political realm in ways that give shape and meaning to the political. A passage in
Locke’s Second Treatise illustrates this point. In the course of a discussion on the limits
of royal power, Locke invokes the figure of the highway robber to enrich his depiction of
the abusive monarch. The outward effect of the passage is to analogize the illegitimate
king to a common thief. With the invocation of the highway robber, however, Locke also
marks a boundary between civil (settled) society and a natural (unsettled) state. The
boundary is meant to distinguish two orders and define the one as governed by the
legitimate exercise of power and the other as ungoverned. In this example, the dividing
line between these orders is the spatial metaphor of the highway.
But there is another sense in which the highway robber is a proxy for an excess
that is productive of the political realm. In the same passage, Locke makes the claim
that, because we cannot know the intentions of the robber, nor the limits of what he
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aims to seize, we are entitled to assume the worst. In doing so, we may kill the highway
robber. The passage is infamous because it would seem to give license to commit
murder at one’s discretion and upon the merest of suspicions. In this way, the treatment
of the highway robber would seem to signify the peak of travel-as-excess, insofar as the
highway is coded as a space in which individuals may commit murder with little cause or
consequence. I would like to suggest, however, that the license to murder the highway
robber (if that is what Locke indeed has in mind) is a proxy for a different kind of excess.
It is not an excess of violence that is extraneous to and thereby incompatible with
politics. Rather, highway murder proxies for an excess that is incompatible with and
essential to civic and political order, and without which Locke’s vision would not be
coherent. This is so because the violence of the highway reproduces the violence, or at
least the threat of such violence, that exists at the origin of civil society, out of which civil
society emerges, and which persists beneath the veil of the contract, giving the
institutions of civic orders their sheen of necessity. Murder committed on the highway is
not an excess, in the sense of something which is extraneous to politics; it is rather the
irruption of extra-political violence that burns at the core of civic society. To kill is to
reanimate the original “excess” at the core of Locke’s political vision.
We can find a similar understanding of the relationship between politics and
excess in the work of the legal scholar, Francescomaria Tedesco (2018). Describing the
struggle over the limits of sovereign power in 16th century England, Tedesco writes,

The State that kills the citizen does not deny the law but gives vent to the bridled
violence that is at the very origin of the State and law: it is a sovereign excess. …
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The fictio of contractualism does not manage to wholly disguise this return of the
State to the pre-juridical dimension that the State itself has reserved as a discard,
a remnant of animality that also provides the condition which makes it possible.
[Italics in the original] (3).

Tedesco argues that the political realm is not corrupted by the transgression of law, but
rather by the state’s maintenance of the law in the form of the death penalty. The
criminal act releases a primordial, pre-political–“animal”–element that, according to
Tedesco, is discarded by the formality of the contract and yet continues to reside just
beneath the surface, tacitly underwriting the authority of the state by guaranteeing its
claims to enforce its law. According to Tedesco, the power to kill exceeds the
constitutional, contractual power that officially belongs to it. It is also, however, an
excess that constitutes official power and that is the condition for the legitimacy of that
official power. In this way, the violent excess in Tedesco’s example of the death penalty
is also a necessary excess because it is the condition for the legitimacy of official
power. I would like to suggest that Locke’s passage on the highway robber conjures
excess in both senses, as a boundary marker and an expression of original violence,
that is for the need of political order in the first place.
The example of Locke illustrates how reading for excess can reveal hidden
dimensions of the political visions of the texts that I have chosen. In each instance,
travel provides a durable vessel for smuggling these excesses into our political
discourse and a powerful interpretive key to unlocking those texts. What is revealed in
each case has as much to do with the political vision of the text itself as it does with the
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theme of travel. In some cases, as with Plato and Locke, the excesses of travel
complicate the wider political visions by revealing the extent which the political orders
depicted in those texts depend upon apolitical sources of power. In other cases, as with
Homer and Gandhi, the excess expressed through travel produces the very conditions
that we have come to associate with the political realm, suggesting latent political
dimensions within otherwise apolitical contexts. Travel need not conceal nefarious, or
“animal” violence, to use Tedesco’s word. It may instead conceal an ethical orientation,
one whose infusion into the political realm dilutes the role of naked force by imbuing this
realm with compassion, or generosity, or solidarity. At a minimum, I hope to persuade
the reader that the theme of travel in political discourse is the source of both narrative
and conceptual excess that escapes the boundaries of these texts and at the same time
reveals the conceptual boundaries of the political visions within these texts, whether
latent, in the case of Homer and Gandhi, or explicit, in the case of Locke and Plato.
Travel, in other words, is an interpretive key to a kind of counter-text, a reflection that
parallels the original, that draws its limits, and that gives some shape and substance to
its inverse. In this way, each of these texts produces, in a dialectical sense, its opposite.
Travel is the key to uncovering and reading this counter-text.
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Restatement and chapter outline

My dissertation concerns the theme of travel in political thought; my aim is to
understand the ways in which politics shapes our understanding of travel and travelers, and to
understand how being in transit shapes our visions of politics. My view is that the concepts of
travel and politics do not exist in a tidy causal relationship; travel is not simply derivative of
political ideology. Rather, these concepts are mutually constitutive, and they are frequently
constitutive in opposition to one another. Because of this opposition, travel is often made to
contain that which exceeds the realm of normal, everyday political life, howsoever defined. But
because of their mutually constitutive relationship, this opposition frequently belies a deeper
co-dependency, so that travel becomes an interpretive key to unlocking the ways in which a
given political vision depends upon the very thing that it eschews. In Locke, one form of excess
is the extra-political violence of the highway; in Machiavelli, it is the people and their
perspective that both exceeds and underwrites in politics power. My hope is that by reading for
travel, and for the themes of excess and exclusion, I may gain some insight into these texts
and the constellation of ideas that make them coherent. Insofar as the theme of travel is made
to provide cover to unsanctioned or illegitimate forms of political authority, I hope that my study
might help us to contemplate new and more democratic practices and direct ourselves towards
more inclusive visions of politics.
With this agenda in mind, I have organized this dissertation around readings of
three texts: Plato’s Laws, Locke’s Second Treatise, and Homer’s Odyssey. In the first
chapter, I consider the meaning of the theoros in Plato’s final dialogue, the Laws. The
theoros was a political figure who traveled to foreign cities to observe customs and
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practices, and then returned home to share his observations. Though the theoros would
have been a familiar figure to Plato’s audience, his appearance in the Laws is
unexpected, not least because it challenges the view of Plato as a political idealist.
Following Bobonich (2002), I argue that the appearance of the theoros indicates a shift
in the relationship between virtue and knowledge in Plato’s texts and, by extension,
between knowledge and politics. This view supports a liberal democratic reading of
Plato but finds its most potent expression in the Laws rather than the Republic. To
illustrate my point, I offer a reading of another theoros: the Spartan legislator, Lycurgus.
By casting his story as one of paradox, and by reading Plato’s Republic and Laws as
two opposed solutions to that paradox, I argue that the Laws marks a departure from
the illiberal, frozen order of the Republic and plants the seeds for an emerging liberal
democratic vision. The theoros, and travel more generally, become necessities for the
city of the Laws because they facilitate the reproduction of knowledge–and with it the
reproduction of the political order–across generations, the very thing that the ideal city
of the Republic, and Sparta, failed to do.
In the second chapter, I consider the meaning of the highway in Locke’s Second
Treatise. I argue that the tendency of the highway to produce violence undermines
Locke’s depiction of ungoverned space as productive of new civic bonds. By extension,
highway violence casts doubt upon Locke’s larger project of envisioning an ideal
political order in which political power is rooted in consent. By curtailing opportunities for
strangers in transit to make contracts, Locke limits the possibility for the emergence of
consent-based political authority to those conditions in which men already live together.
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As a result, the inequalities that structure settled life carry over into civil and political
society.
To better illustrate the problems that arise from Locke’s characterization of the
highway, I contrast the Second Treatise with two texts: Walt Whitman’s The Song of the
Open Road and Gandhi’s Autobiography. Whitman’s poem inverts Locke’s depiction of
the highway to render the road a space of liberty and social harmony. In doing so,
Whitman obviates politics by dissolving interpersonal conflict. The stories in Gandhi’s
Autobiography, on the other hand, depict spaces of transit–trains and stagecoaches
especially–in ways that preserve an ambiguity of power and show how that ambiguity
can generate conflict as well as solidarity. By preserving ambiguity in transit, Gandhi
makes room for the emergence of the very civil and political orders that Locke’s political
vision promises but that Locke never quite creates the conditions for the emergence of.
Inspired by the insights from Gandhi, I propose to draw a line between his work
and what I believe to be an early forebearer: Homer. The Odyssey is frequently
overlooked as a source of ideas about politics. The societies depicted are pre-political,
oriented around family and household. Moreover, the story culminates in the triumph of
a traditional, patriarchal form of power and in the affirmation of heroism as the source of
political authority. But buried within this story is a counter-text, an anti-heroic theme that
gives expression to an emergent political form and practice, one that more closely
resembles the political order of Homer’s own time. I use Weber’s concept of the
charismatic leader to interpret the emergence of a post-tribal political form that is
facilitated by travel, and by the experiences of shared estrangement and displacement
that travel and travel stories produce. The vision is not, however, a salutary one.
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Instead, Homer shows us the awesome force of the traveler’s power, one that can
create and destroy orders, and that is conducive to a form of monarchy for a coming
age of colonialism.
While my interpretations may offer some insight into the texts that I have
selected, my project relies on a method that some readers may find undisciplined. And
in fact, I do not limit myself to any one definition of travel or politics to guide my
readings. Rather, I take each text as a world unto itself, with its own notion of politics
and its own conceptualization of travel. Within those loose constraints, I allow any
departure and return to constitute an instance of travel and I allow any relationship
marked by power to constitute an instance of politics. One consequence of this is that
any insight that I may offer is tethered to its text. This will no doubt disappoint those
readers who wish to understand not only Plato but the world beyond the academy. As a
consolation, I would simply say that, insofar as we still think with the aid of Plato’s ideas,
insight into the Republic, the Laws, or the Statesman may also grant insight into our
own ways of thinking about politics, as well as the limits and possibilities of what we
may think.
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CHAPTER TWO: BEAST-GODS
THE TRAVELER AS LEGISLATOR: THEOROS AND EXCESS IN PLATO’S LAWS

Consider Lycurgus. You may recall from Plutarch’s Lives that Lycurgus was the
legendary lawgiver of Sparta. His legislative code yielded a regime that persisted,
according to Thucydides, for five hundred years. Plutarch writes that Plato, Diogenes,
and Zeno (Plutarch, 31) used his laws as a template for their own musings on the ideal
state. What all these writers admired, he suggests, was the internal unanimity among
the Spartans and the virtue of ordinary citizens, both of which were achieved by an
arrangement of laws and institutions that cultivated courage and temperance, and that
curbed avarice and self-interest. Through these arrangements, Plutarch writes, the
Spartans enjoyed centuries of freedom, autonomy and self-discipline.
Alongside measures to cultivate unity and virtue, Lycurgus enacted two more
laws: a prohibition on Spartan travel and restrictions on foreign visitors. According to
Plutarch, these measures ensured social harmony by limiting exposure to strange
ideas. But they also present a puzzle. Lycurgus attained his knowledge for legislation
and institution-building by traveling; Sparta was itself the product of strange ideas. How
then should we reconcile the necessity of travel as a source of knowledge with the risks
that it brings to social harmony? How can we balance the need for strangeness, on the
one hand, with its destabilizing effects?
Plutarch would respond that the puzzle is easily solved: divine prudence inured
Lycurgus to corruption; exceptional wisdom guided him in the codification of Spartan
laws. In short, his virtue excused him from the laws that bind ordinary men. Plutarch, in
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effect, does not solve the puzzle so much as dismiss it. There are, however, alternative
solutions that do not hinge on the preternatural qualities of the legislator. No less than
two are suggested by Plato. Though the ideal city described in the Republic is not
Spartan in governing structure, Socrates borrows many laws and institutions from
Sparta in its design (Futter, 2012). Like Lycurgus, Socrates’ philosopher-kings attain
their knowledge for legislation through a kind of “dialogical” displacement; they journey
into the realm of ideals and return home with new, foreign knowledge. And like
Lycurgus, this knowledge brings authority but also estrangement; neither Lycurgus nor
the philosopher-kings are at home in their regimes. Finally, like Sparta, the ideal city
relies upon institutions like noble lies to secure the obedience of subjects and ensure
social harmony, institutions that entail limits on exposure to foreign ideas. The ideal city,
it seems, is not inured to the threat posed by innovation. Even utopia cannot travel.
Despite these shared qualities, however, Socrates is no Spartan. The solution to
the Lycurgan puzzle suggested by the Republic does not hinge on the exceptional
character of the legislator. Rather, it hinges on the mistaken belief that geographic travel
produces knowledge for politics. If Plutarch’s biography resolves the paradox of the
traveling legislator by appealing to Lycurgus’ exceptionalism, Plato resolves it by
another means: stripping geographic travel of its capacity to educate. The laws of
Sparta are ideal by chance, not by design.
This solution belongs to the Republic; another solution can be inferred from
Plato’s second major political work, the Laws. The Republic has been described as a
purified expression of the Spartan state; the Laws, by contrast, might be described as a
repudiation of Sparta and its legal code (Stalley, 1983; Bobonich, 2002). This is
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apparent throughout the text but is especially clear on the subject of travel. In a
sequence of passages about the regulation of the movement of foreigners and citizens,
Plato’s Athenian Stranger acknowledges the risks of travel and then unequivocally
endorses it. He does so not merely for the sake of human happiness but for political
stability and longevity. To this end, travel is institutionalized through the office of the
theoros, an ambassador of sorts who ventures abroad to observe the religious customs
and practices of governance of other states. The knowledge gained abroad is then
integrated into the knowledge of the city and used to improve upon its laws and policies.
Through travel, the city advances, slowly, incrementally, towards perfection.
The figure of the theoros and his role in the legislative process of the city suggest
a second, alternate resolution to the puzzle posed by Lycurgus. It is not that he was
exceptional, nor that he discovered the right laws the wrong way. Travel does yield
knowledge for legislation; Lycurgus’s education abroad is redeemed. The laws limiting
travel, on the other hand, are neither practical nor wise. By this view, the paradox of the
legislator who legislates against travel is resolved not by discrediting his education but
by discrediting his laws. Lycurgus was correct in method but erred in the substance of
his legislation.
While the story of Lycurgus offers a rich illustration of the paradox of political
authority, the aim of this chapter is not merely to understand Sparta but to better
understand Plato, and the relationship between his two major political texts, the
Republic and the Laws. The two Lycurgan solutions I’ve sketched above hint at a
deeper rift between those texts, a rift that I hope to chart by first exploring the meaning
of travel in the Spartan context. By understanding what travel meant to Lycurgus, and
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why it posed a risk to Sparta, I hope to shed some light on the shifting meanings of
travel in Plato’s texts. In the process, I hope to tell a coherent story about the
relationship between the Republic and the Laws, and about Plato’s political vision more
broadly.
My argument tacks between two prevailing views of Plato. The first, passed down
from Popper (1945) and Wolin (1960), stresses the explicit political program advanced
in the Republic to argue that Plato advocated for a closed, illiberal form of politics.
According to Popper, Plato is the seminal figure in a tradition of political thought that
seeks to subordinate the practice of politics to a body of transhistorical knowledge by
which to order and govern subjects. This transhistorical knowledge begets a body of
laws and regulations that are immune to change, and that reach into every sphere of
human experience. Wolin paints Plato in similar hues, describing the plan of the ideal
regime as one that subordinates the practice of politics–specifically a vibrant, speechbased, democratic form of politics–to the knowledge of the political philosopher. Wolin
echoes Popper’s view of Plato as advocating a frozen political order, a vision that is
incompatible with the values of innovation and multiplicity that define our own
conception of politics.
Another view of Plato stresses instead the form of the dialogues and the method
of inquiry followed by Socrates. The seminal figure of this approach is Leo Strauss
(1964), who argued that one must give attention to the arguments as well as their mode
of presentation. Doing so, he argued, revealed latent meaning disclosed through the
action of the dialogues, as well as various rhetorical techniques like elisions,
contradictions, and repetitions. Though not all agree with Strauss’ conclusions about the
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elitist meaning of the Republic, nor that the text harbors obscure, esoteric meanings, the
influence of his reading method is widespread and has elicited a variety of
interpretations. Bloom (1968), for one, has followed Strauss to advance a reading of the
Republic as ironic, interpreting the more radical proposals of the text as deliberate
attempts to undercut or sabotage the larger argument about the fitness of philosophers
to rule. But students of Strauss, like Bloom, hardly mark the limit of his influence.
Countless scholars have adopted more holistic approaches to the text; in doing so, they
have yielded widely divergent interpretations of the text, many of which undercut the
illiberal, Popperian view of the Republic. Writers including Smith (2000) Berger (2015),
and Frank (2018) point to the Socratic method of inquiry to argue for critical democratic
readings of Plato. Smith (interpreting Strauss) finds in Plato's dialogic form a method
premised on the incompleteness of knowledge that both demands skepticism and
provides the resources for thinking towards liberal democracy. Others, including
Saxonhouse (2009) and McWilliams (2014), have emphasized the dramatic aspects of
the dialogues, including the action and setting, to yield liberal democratic, and even
cosmopolitan readings of the text. Saxonhouse has emphasizes the role of Socrates as
the sole speaker in the Republic, portraying multiple diverse characters, to be itself an
expression and even endorsement of democracy. McWilliams, meanwhile, in a reading
of the Laws, has emphasizes the spatial aspect of that dialogue, and its setting on the
road between Crete and Corinth, to emphasize cosmopolitan aspects of Plato’s
arguments.
The conflict between those theorists like Strauss, Smith and Saxonhouse, on one
hand, and Popper and Wolin, on the other, hinges on whether to stress the practice of

36

inquiry depicted in the dialogues, or rather the substantive policies described by
Socrates. In this sense, my analysis falls in line with those of Strauss and Bloom, as
well as Smith and Saxonhouse. There is indeed a disjunction between what is said and
how it is discovered. Unlike these writers, however, I do not go so far as to use this
discontinuity to argue for an ironic Plato, nor for an esoteric or coded interpretation, nor
for a liberal democratic view of the Republic. Rather, my claim for the Republic is that it
depicts a disjunction between method and substance that is resolved – if only in part
– in the Laws. And that, through this partial solution, the Laws leans towards something
like democracy.
It merits mention here that the discussion of travel in the Laws is part of the
notoriously obscure and much-debated section on the Nocturnal Council. This section is
infamous for its apparent inconsistency with the rest of the text and has proven a
formidable obstacle for Plato scholars seeking a unified interpretation of his political
texts. Some, like Stalley (1983) and Fraistat (2015), have deemphasized these
passages to yield a more familiar, illiberal reading of the text. Others, like McWilliams,
have emphasized it, yielding a more liberal, or even cosmopolitan, Plato at the expense
of the rest of the text. The resolution of this debate lies beyond my scope. My aim is
merely to explore the consequences of these passages for the practice of legislation
and for the rest of Plato’s political vision. I am not intending to solve the mystery of the
Nocturnal Council but merely to situate the statements on travel, however awkwardly
and ill-fittingly, within the broader depiction of the second-best city.
My intent, and the reason for including this study in my dissertation, is to explore
one of the ways in which a political vision begets excess. In the case of Plato, excess
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takes the form of both knowledge, and of a Socratic mode of inquiry (Saxonhouse,
2009); the latter serves the paradoxical role of both defining–through negation–normal,
ordered politics, as well as underwriting the very authority that produces and governs
that order. Lycurgus and Plato both offer examples of this paradox, and both do so as
travelers. To travel, in each case, is to both ground authority and make an exception for
oneself in the process of doing so. My intent in this chapter is to explore how this works.

The Lycurgan Paradox

In this first section, I offer a sketch of Plutarch’s biography of the Spartan
legislator, Lycurgus, and the political and social reforms that he brought to Sparta. I
suggest that all his reforms ultimately pointed towards the goal of limiting internal
discord by cultivating obedience to authority and a deep and unwavering loyalty to
country and people. The paradox of Lycurgus’ injunction against travel boils down to the
conclusion that laws and institutions–even the very best–are incapable of permanently
forming men to virtue, or at least to obedience and loyalty. The kind of virtue that his
laws cultivate is adequate for obedience and warfare, but not for the reproduction of
virtue within the social body. Travel always remains a risk because men are too easily
corrupted. The political education that would yield good laws and strong states is, by
extension, poorly distributed, meaning internal discord is common and interstate conflict
inevitable. The only hope for peace is the emergence and divine guidance of
exceptional men like Lycurgus.
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Plutarch’s biography of Lycurgus depicts a noble Spartan who was driven from
his homeland over a dispute about succession rights (Plutarch, 3). He departed in haste
to avoid capture and certain death, and spent the subsequent decade roaming the
Mediterranean and Central Asia, visiting foreign nations and learning from their laws
and modes of governance. After some length of time, and for no clear reason, Lycurgus
returned home and launched an armed assault upon the forces of the king. Because the
king was corrupt, and because Lycurgus enjoyed the support of the people and the
nobles, he quickly defeated the king’s men and claimed the power both to govern and to
remake the laws of Sparta.
Lycurgus was both wise and benevolent and so he did not remake the laws to his
or his family’s advantage but instead with a view to the long-term prosperity and security
of Sparta. The reforms he undertook were informed by his exposure to the other states
encountered during his exile and reflected both the good and the bad of what he
observed. His aim was to realize a maximally durable state that could mitigate internal
discord, such as succession battles, which exposed states to external risks such as
foreign invasion. To this end, Lycurgus enacted laws and institutions that cultivated the
virtues of obedience, camaraderie and courage in citizens, all meant to achieve the goal
of long-term stability. Sparta was to be a permanent state.
The reforms introduced by Lycurgus reshaped every aspect of Spartan life. He
installed a senate to moderate the power of kings (s5); he repartitioned the land into
equal allotments, giving every citizen an identical share of property (s8); he mandated
that meals be taken in common to curb excess (s10); he devalued the currency to
impede trade and other commercial activity (s9); and he imposed rules to regulate the
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reproduction of the household (s15-16). Each of these reforms aimed, either directly or
indirectly, at the cultivation of virtue and civic unity. The senate was meant to temper the
“fiery genius” of the monarch. It was also meant to have a moderating effect on the
passions of the people and mitigate their natural impulses towards either tyranny or
democracy (s7). By imposing restraints on property and commerce, Lycurgus

Set about ridding the state of useless, superfluous professions… Once luxury
was deprived of the things that enliven it and nourish it, it gradually wasted away
of its own accord, and there was no advantage in owning a great deal of property
because wealth had no means of displaying itself in public. (s9)

Instead of craftsmanship wasted on luxury, the Spartans would focus their energy on
cultivating excellence at what was essential: better drinking-cups, utensils, beds and
chairs. This emphasis on curbing excess is echoed a few lines later in defense of the
prohibition against eating meals in private: “This stopped them spending time at home
reclining at table on expensive couches, fattening themselves up in the dark like
insatiable animals on the produce of craftsmen and cooks, and ruining themselves
morally as well as physically by indulging every whim and gorging themselves until they
needed long sleeps…” (s10). Based on these passages, the cultivation of virtuous
behavior worked mainly by removing the incentives for greediness as well as, in the
case of the common dining halls25, relying upon social pressure to penalize unvirtuous
behavior like greed and slothfulness.

Plutarch writes, “For when the rich and poor went to the same meal, the rich could not even use or
enjoy, let alone gaze upon or display, all their paraphernalia… It was not even possible for a rich man to
25
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But in addition to cultivating virtue, these reforms also aimed to dilute factional
bonds. As noted above, the senate served as a “ballast” (s5) that prevented the
government from veering too far towards either tyranny or democracy. Limits on wealth
and commerce impeded the accumulation and concentration of wealth, and thereby of
class divisions. And common meals, along with the reforms to education, described
below, and reproduction, undermined traditional familial bonds. Though the latter
reforms, in particular, which regulated the selection of mates and the process of
mating26, seem not only bizarre but also inhumane by today’s standards, they also
reveal Lycurgus’ strategy: to reproduce the thick bonds of familial loyalty across state
institutions, yielding a state in which obedience and loyalty was achieved by redirecting
familial affection to the state.27
Alongside reforms to political and social institutions, Lycurgus also transformed
education. The principal innovation was to effectively remove the child from the
oversight of his or her parents from the earliest possible age, enrolling both boys and
girls into “herds” as a means of breeding conformity and encouraging fraternity. Plutarch
writes, “he did not allow people to decide on their own how to bring up and educate their
sons: as soon as the children were seven years old, Lycurgus personally took them all
in hand and enrolled them in various ‘herds’ so that they became used to playing
together and learning together under the same rules and régime” (s16). These boys

eat at home first and then go to the common mess with a full stomach, because everyone else was alert
to the possibility, and they used to watch out for people who would not drink or eat with them and taunt
them for their lack of self-control and for being too delicate for the common diet.” (s10)
26 This practice, which begins with the “forcible abduction of the woman”, is detailed in section 15.
27 This point is reinforced when Plutarch describes the older men who would “hang around” while the
young men participated in their physical competitions. He writes, “… in a sense they all regarded all the
boys as their sons, pupils, and wards…” (s17). This feeling of collective responsibility seems to flow from
the fact that, as Plutarch puts it, “children did not belong to their fathers, but to the state in common”
(s15).
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would live and sleep in common lodgings and undergo the same training. In addition to
reading and writing, children underwent training aimed at acclimatization to deprivation
and harsh living conditions. He writes, “their education was geared towards inculcating
ready obedience, the capacity to endure hard work, and the ability to win in battle”
(s16). The goal of these arrangements was to, in effect, militarize the youth: education
would habituate children to hardship and impart a deep sense of “herd” loyalty, as well
as breed values of subservience to authority. The view was that a state modeled upon
the military would be maximally obedient, courageous, and moderate in their appetites.
It would also pose a formidable obstacle to external threats, discouraging conflict with
its neighbors by reputation alone.
The living arrangements of the Spartan youth were reinforced by an education
that relied upon song and storytelling. The songs and verses sung by the youth
provided them with examples of courage in battle and allegiance to the state (s21 and
s27). Plutarch writes of these songs,

The style of them was plain and without affectation; the subject always serious
and moral; most usually it was in praise of such men as had died in defense of
their country, or in derision of those that had been cowards… (s21)

These were stories that first “inflamed and possessed men’s minds” and then imparted
lessons on the benefits of acting with courage and temperance. By couching moral
lessons in aesthetic form, they rendered virtue a quality beyond question. To sing about
virtue was make it a lesson absorbed uncritically, known through repetition rather than
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by reason. Far from seeking to develop critical thinking, the Spartan education worked
by assimilation. Spartan youth gradually absorbed, through a variety of social
institutions, the values required to thrive in a militarized society.
The goal of these educational reforms was to socialize Spartan youth into a
militaristic social order. The repetition of this educational into adulthood, however,
suggests pessimism about its efficacy. Namely, it suggests that education failed to
produce citizens capable of reproducing those same values. Plutarch says this about
the rearing of children in the traditional setting of the household: “Nor was it in the power
of the father to dispose of the child as he saw fit… Nor was it lawful, indeed, for the
father himself to breed up the children after his own fancy …” (s16) Children became, in
effect, orphaned to the state. It was a policy which suggested that the institutions
through which Spartan citizens were raised, and by which they were “formed” to virtue,
in the end failed to yield citizens capable of reproducing that same virtue by the
traditional methods of children-rearing. This pessimism about the ability to produce
virtuous citizens in turn compelled the state to raise its youth to ensure the transmission
of those values that it believed essential to its stability. The point is further supported by
the fact that the discipline of Spartan citizens continued well into adulthood. “No one
was allowed,” Plutarch writes, “to live after his own fancy” (s24). Even in adulthood,
Spartans required the guiding hand of the state to maintain their obedience and virtuous
behavior. There was no expectation that adults would ever attain a condition of
“durable” virtuousness or mature into fully developed, self-directed subjects.
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The same pessimism about human nature that required the continuous
disciplining of citizens also prompted Lycurgus to restrict travel and limit foreigners.
Plutarch writes:

With strange people, strange words must be admitted; these novelties produce
novelties in thought and on these follow views and feelings whose discordant
character destroys the harmony of the state. [Lycurgus] was as careful to save
his city from the infection of foreign bad habits, as men usually are to prevent the
introduction of a pestilence. (s27)

This explanation builds on a description, a few passages earlier, about the care taken
by Lycurgus to ensure that the youth of Sparta were exposed to “proofs and examples
of good conduct; with the constant sight of which from their youth up the people would
hardly fail to be gradually formed and advanced in virtue” (s27). The Spartans believed
that exposure to correct examples was essential to the cultivation of courage,
moderation, and prudence, and of obedience to authority. By contrast, counterexamples
celebrating avarice, individualism, and glory-seeking would necessarily dilute that
education and yield an imperfect subject. Too many imperfect subjects would amount to
a corrupted people and a weakened state.
The prohibition on travel is justified, then, by two related assumptions: first, the
tendency of ordinary men and woman to stray from virtue, and, second, the failure of
laws and institutions to mold subjects to virtue in a lasting and durable way. This latter
point could also be described as a belief in the permanence of character, that
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individuals can be institutionally constrained to act with virtue, but that in-born character
is not so easily changed. If we join the Spartans in these assumptions, then Lycurgus is
a realist: he knows he cannot rely on naturally occurring virtue to replenish his Spartan
state with new leadership. The best he can do is craft laws and institutions that will
constrain men to the performance of virtue. To “form men” to virtue, as Plutarch puts it,
does not mean to make a society of Lycurguses; rather, it means to constrain them to
virtue by force. Because their virtue depends upon their institutional setting, travel
becomes an inherently dangerous proposition. To leave home is to enter a realm of
alternative ideas, laws and institutions, any of which may yield the very behaviors least
conducive to courage, temperance and prudence. It is an understanding of human
nature that recalls Auerbach’s interpretation of the Odyssey. In the epic poetry of
Homer, characters do to grow or change; twenty years abroad has no effect on the
Ithacan king. Men are born with an innate character that does not waver. In the same
way, institutions do not produce virtuous souls. To “form” Spartans to virtue means
nothing more than applying the right social incentives and legal constraints, binding
them to the mast as it were, so that men and women cannot challenge the values that
they have been raised to live by.
But if the travel laws are logical from the standpoint of wishing to achieve stable
governance, they are problematic in the context of the biography of Lycurgus. This is
because Lycurgus himself had to travel to acquire the knowledge required to write his
own legal code. According to Plutarch, Lycurgus traveled extensively during his long
political exile, first to Crete and then for a time to visit with Thales (s4). He later visited
Ionia before heading farther east to Asia and south to Egypt. In each location, he
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encountered ideas that were, to him, unfamiliar. On Crete, and in Lacedaemonia with
Thales, he studied the laws that made states healthy and resilient to attack; in Ionia and
further east, he discovered the laws that rendered states weak and unstable. According
to Plutarch, the breadth of examples was essential to his education in statecraft. It was
not simply the good laws that instructed him. Rather, it was the sum of his experiences–
good and bad–that yielded an understanding of the relationship between laws and
states, and that informed the legal code that would guide Sparta for five centuries.
Strangeness made Sparta.
How can we reconcile the laws of Lycurgus with his own actions and experience?
One important difference, Plutarch would likely point out, is that Lycurgus sought out
foreign ideas and smuggled them into Sparta at a time when the Spartan state was itself
corrupted by faction and greed. There was no harmony to disrupt; strangeness cannot
corrupt what is not already purified. The laws, therefore, would not have applied to him.
But this creates a puzzle. If the principle is that healthy states are justified in prohibiting
travel, then by extension those travelers from unhealthy states, including Lycurgus,
would be denied access to the very states, such as Crete, whose laws and institutions
could deliver Sparta from corruption to health. If we wish to acquire the knowledge for
legislation, travel is essential. And yet once that knowledge is acquired, and once the
rightly order state is founded, travel can only corrupt and destroy. Lycurgus is left
legislating against himself.28

28

It is worth noting that the problem of the exceptional legislator has a more generalized form in
democratic political contexts, which Bonnie Honig describes in Democracy and the Foreigner. Among her
examples is Rousseau, who invokes the figure of the foreign lawgiver who appears out of nowhere,
bestows a body of laws, and then departs from the political scene. According to Honig, this foreignerfounder trope is politically useful because it preserves the formal equality of Rousseau’s radical
democratic vision while solving the chicken-and-egg problem of a people and its laws. Though the
foreigner-founder myth would seem to alienate the people from their laws, Honig argues that the foreigner
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But Plutarch would have another retort: the risk posed by travel depends on the
traveler. While it may be true that the knowledge required for legislation and institutionbuilding must be attained in transit, most men lack the capacity to move through the
world untouched by ignoble ideas. Lycurgus, however, was no ordinary Spartan.29 Like
the wandering philosopher of Plato’s Sophist, men like Lycurgus hover above the cities,
uncorrupted by exposure to strange customs. Because they seek out the true nature of
things, they are not swayed by novelty. They can test unfamiliar ideas against
philosophical standards of judgment and thereby distinguish right from wrong. There is
no contradiction, in short, between the actions of Lycurgus and the prohibition on travel
simply because travel has two distinct meanings: it is an education for the virtuous and
a corruption for the rest.
The code of Lycurgus ultimately rested on one crucial assumption: that men like
Lycurgus are born, and that they cannot be formed by man-made institutions. No
institutional setting or educational system can produce a man who is the match of
Lycurgus, who can travel with judgment and prudence, and who can govern with
knowledge of the true principles of statecraft. Lycurgus’ Spartan state, with its virtueconforming institutions and its limits on travel (and with it, the knowledge attained in

actually serves to bind a people more tightly in opposition to their founder. Meanwhile, the gap between a
people and their “foreign” laws gives them the space in which to practice a transgressive politics that is
essential to a healthy democracy.
The comparison to the story of Lycurgus is instructive both in its similarities and its differences.
As in Rousseau, Lycurgus enjoys a kind of elevated political standing because of the foreign provenance
of his ideas. Unlike Rousseau’s lawgiver, however, Lycurgus is and remains a Spartan and derives
political standing from that fact. Additionally, the Sparta that Lycurgus founds bears little resemblance to
the radical democracy that Rousseau describes. The idea of creating a gap between the laws and a
people, much less cultivating a transgressive ethos as a means of instilling the people with a sense of
political agency, would have been rather far from the mind of Lycurgus. Rather, the foreign quality of his
ideas served to insulate them from change, either by the senate or the people.
29 Plutarch refers to Lycurgus as a “natural leader” (s5), distinguishing him from the kings of
Lacedaemonia, who rule merely by title.
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transit), reflects an acceptance of the inability of institutions to make virtuous citizens.
Lycurgus founded a state that thrived by the maintenance of ordinary men rather than
individual brilliance. More to the point, with its prohibition on travel, Sparta thrived by
limiting even the possibility of great men; it thrived by ensuring that Lycurgus was its last
great man, the last man to know. Should a new Lycurgus have emerged, the laws and
institutions of Sparta would have needed to be remade in his image. For if they were to
be made wisely, he would first need to travel. And in so doing, he would have defied—
and excepted himself from-–the laws of his state.

The Frozen Republic
The conclusion from Plutarch’s biography of Lycurgus is that travel threatens
political order because it exposes us to strange ideas. These ideas threaten political
order because institutions cannot permanently instill the values of temperance, courage,
and judgment into ordinary peoples. Men and women are thus left susceptible to
influence and corruption. In the Republic, Plato expresses a similar attitude towards the
danger of foreign ideas. As it did for Lycurgus, travel threatens the political order of
Socrates’ ideal city because education, particularly of the auxiliary and guardian
classes, relies in part upon storytelling and socialization. Unlike Lycurgus, however,
Plato takes a brighter view of education and of the capacity of institutions to shape men
to virtue. As a result, the Republic offers a political formula that borrows many laws and
conventions from Sparta but that appears to bear one crucial difference: it can
reproduce the wisdom and virtue of its founder, thereby liberating (a few) men to travel.
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Plutarch’s observation, cited above, that Lycurgus’ Sparta served as a template
for Plato’s own musings on the state is actually rather misleading. As Futter (2012) has
argued, Sparta and the Kallipolis of the Republic are structurally distinct. The former is
best described as a mixed constitution; the latter, a meritocratic aristocracy at best,
authoritarian at worst (Futter, 50, 42). Sparta achieves stability through institutional
mechanisms that balance the competing class interests and prevent power from
concentrating amongst any one group. This mode of governance could be described as
aiming at permanence through the management of men’s vices. The Kallipolis of the
Republic, meanwhile, attempts the opposite: an ideal state governed by laws and
institutions that conform as closely as possible with their perfect forms. There is no need
to balance power between competing factions because the ideal state has harmonized
the interests of its people, the masses and kings alike, and directed their passions away
from self-interest and towards the common good. The pessimism of Lycurgus, in other
words, is replaced by radical optimism.
But a focus on regime type obscures continuities between the cities. Though their
structures of government differ, the socio-economic institutions and the laws that govern
those institutions have much in common. These similarities have led that same
interpreter of Plato to call the ideal city of the Republic a purified or idealized version of
Lycurgus’ Spartan state. As he puts it, the Kallipolis is an “extension and idealization of
Plutarch’s Lycurgan Sparta” (Futter, 50). The similarities are best illustrated by the laws
and institutions that discipline and educate the auxiliary and guardian classes. Rules
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limiting private property30, requiring common meals31, and delegating household
reproduction to the state32, all echo practices from Sparta. Additionally, Plato describes
an approach to education that imparts virtue by example, both through stories and
socialization33. Stories that contradict state-sanctioned messages, such as myths of
gods misbehaving, are prohibited. And though Socrates does not explicitly link
education to travel, the extent to which the social harmony of the city depends upon a
careful maintenance of the stories to which men are exposed, implies similar restrictions
on movement. The problem is put most boldly by Adeimantus in Book II when he
describes the ill-effects of stories that depict the gods as acting in ways that are less
than virtuous, and that might therefore lead some men into unvirtuousness by
imitation34. Socrates would have these myths banned in an ideal state, as indicated by
this passage,

We must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make a fine tale, it must be
approved, but if it’s not, it must be rejected. We’ll persuade nurses and mothers

Socrates says, “First, no one will possess any private property except for what’s entirely necessary.
Second, no one will have any house or storeroom into which everyone who wishes cannot come. The
sustenance, as much as is needed by moderate and courageous men who are champions of war, they’ll
receive in fixed installments…” (416d-e).
31 Socrates says, “They’ll go regularly to mess together like soldiers in a camp and live a life in common”
(416e).
32 A long discussion begins at 449c on “begetting of children” (449d) and continues through 460. The key
passage is here: “All these women are to belong to all these men in common, and no woman is to live
privately with any man. And the children, in their turn, will be common, and neither will a parent know his
own offspring, not a child his parent” (457c-d).
33 Socrates says: “’Don’t you understand,’ I said, ‘that first we tell tales to children? And surely they are,
as a whole, false, though there are true things in them too’” (377a). And a few lines later, “’Don’t you know
that the beginning is the most important part of every work and that this is especially true with anything
young and tender? For at this stage it’s most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose
stamp anyone wishes to give to it’” (377a-b).
34 Adeimantus says, “’With all these things being said–of this sort and in this quantity–about virtue and
vice and how human beings and gods honor them, what do we suppose they do to the souls of the young
men who hear them?’” (365a).
30
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to tell the approved tales to their children and to shape their souls with tales more
than their bodies with hands. Most of those they now tell must be thrown out.
(377b)

Travel presents a risk because it produces encounters with strangers who live without
such bans, and who therefore would freely refer to these myths and their virtuecorrupting morals. With travel, in other words, comes a loss of control over the stories
that men hear and the ideas from which they draw their lessons of good behavior.
While there are many echoes of Sparta in the Republic, Plato and Lycurgus part
ways on the education of the rulers, and specifically on their preparation for
governance. For the Spartans, training future statesmen follows the model of all other
education: example and apprenticeship. Conspicuously absent from this curriculum is
an education in the principles of statecraft and lawmaking. Instead, Lycurgus organizes
his state so that it can be maintained by ordinary men trained over time by constant
exposure to examples of virtuous behavior. That this training would deprive men of the
knowledge required for grasping the rationale of the laws is irrelevant. Sparta does not
need more legislators; it needs leaders capable of constraining citizens to good laws,
and capable of constraining themselves to those same laws. Socrates channels
Lycurgus when he says, in a later dialogue, “Because it is rare for something to have
the true knowledge of statesmanship, the next best thing is to follow just laws”
(Statesman, 328).
For his own ideal state, however, Plato expresses greater aspirations. After their
foundation in music, poetry, athletics and mathematics (376e, 424c), future leaders of
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the ideal state of the Republic are apprenticed in politics and then given final training in
discursive reasoning and philosophy. This philosophical training culminates in receiving
what could be described as a vision of the form of the Good. This vision supplies the
philosopher-king with a standard by which to judge projections of the Good. This insight
enables the philosopher-king to govern not simply according to a given body of laws but
to grasp the underlying rationale of those laws. This is essential insofar as politics is a
worldly practice. Governance therefore requires not simply an obedience to law, but an
understanding of its justification so that the philosopher-king may suspend those laws–
which are after all merely projections of the abstract form, and therefore inherently
imperfect–for the sake of the Good.35 Attaining the status of a true statesman, in other
words, requires not simply an aptitude for governance but also the knowledge to govern
as a philosopher, which is to say to be constrained by the Good rather than by its
projection in existing laws.
As the last point indicates, Plato’s innovation is therefore not simply pedagogical.
The view that guardians can be trained not simply to enforce the laws but also grasp
their underlying rationale stems from the view that it is possible to ground political
orders and a body of laws upon philosophical rather than experiential knowledge. For
Plato, this is possible because there is a body of knowledge-–philosophical
knowledge—that exists independently of the material world. This knowledge is acquired
not from experience but rather through a process of guided dialectical reasoning. It is
not experience or confrontation with foreign ideas, either at home or abroad, that brings

Plato makes the point most clearly in the Statesman: The true statesman “will do many things within his
own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws, when is of opinion that something other than
that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better” (Jowett,
328). Jaeger (1960) also discussed the right of the statesman to suspend the laws at his discretion.
35
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us to this knowledge. Though any of these confrontations may prompt us to question
the truthfulness of our perceptions, they are at best prompts to pursue this higher form
of knowledge, shadows on the walls of other caves. By contrast, the knowledge attained
from ascending out of the cave is neither illusory nor contingent. There is but one sun,
to reprise Plato’s analogy, and the knowledge of it applies equally everywhere. 36 The
knowledge that emerges from Plato’s dialectical education is valid not just for the cases
observed but for all cases. By extension, the laws upon which that knowledge is based
are true laws insofar as they are informed by unmediated knowledge of the Good. This
foundation in abstract forms guarantees, as far as possible, the stability of the city. And
to the extent that its laws fail to pursue the Good, its philosopher–statesman will ensure
their wise suspension.
The effects of this education on the mobility of the student are two-fold. First,
knowledge of the true form of the Good enables him to judge projections of the Good
against the ideal, and thereby correctly distinguish what is true (or truer) from what is
false (or falser). The philosopher-statesman traveling abroad will be able to look upon
foreign customs and laws and evaluate them not simply for their exotic qualities—for
their difference—but also for their adherence to the true form of the laws. He will
correctly distinguish the attributes of Cretan law that contribute to its flourishing, rather
than simply praise the legal code as a whole. Moreover, he will see how the laws have
been molded to respond to various factors—geography, modes of production, primary

Socrates’ exposition and defense of his metaphysical theory of the forms comprises the latter half of
Book Six. It is difficult to find one passage that captures the nuance and complexity though this comes
close: “What provides the truth to the things of knowledge and gives power to the one who knows, is the
idea of the good” (508e). And later, “once seen, it must be concluded that [the idea of the good] is in fact
the cause of all that is right and fair in everything” (517c).
36
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industry—so that he may adapt those ideas suited to a goat-herding people’s harsh dry
climate, for instance, to better suit low-lying farmland. The point being that Plato’s
philosophical education endows this figure with the capacity to see and judge with a
clarity that would shield him from the allure of pernicious ideas and would furthermore
aid him in the application of those ideas at home. That this vision of the paradigmatic
form of the Good endows the student with a sudden and inalienable virtuousness only
further inoculates the philosopher-statesman against foreign influence. Since knowledge
of the Good compels goodness, those unvirtuous habits and customs of foreigners have
no adverse effect on the philosopher. Anyone who has attained this level of education is
therefore beyond the influence of pernicious ideas.
In this way, Plato solves the core problem that prompted Lycurgus’ travel bans in
the first place. In offering a path to philosophical knowledge, Plato provides a path to
virtue. And not simply to virtue as a condition of institutional restraints, but as a facet of
one’s character. To attain virtue through philosophy is to attain it in an inalienable
sense, and thereby to dissolve the risks of travel. Based on this assessment, it would be
fair to say that Plato diminishes the risks of travel by proposing an educational path to
endow philosophical knowledge. The risks of travel–exposure to strange ideas, dilution
of virtue, and infection of the city–vanish once a person has completed his philosophical
education. But if Plato mitigates the risks of travel, he also denies its benefits.
Philosophical knowledge is attained not in transit but by a process of inquiry that is
position-less and is valid irrespective of location. Because of this, travel is drained of its
pedagogical potential; it no longer serves as a training ground for legislators and
statesmen. Experience of the customs and institutions of other states brings no benefit
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to the traveler. The consequence of this for political order is profound: in effect, Plato
creates an institutional path to the production of leaders who bear the knowledge not
just for following the laws but for understanding them as well. He creates a means, in
other words, to produce a leadership class endowed with the knowledge and virtue of a
founder. If Lycurgus achieved political stability by a class of care-taker statesmen, Plato
achieves it through the perpetual reproduction of leaders who are also legislators.
By this analysis, Plato’s celebration of the Spartan lawgiver amounts to poisoned
praise. Physical travel has no connection to the acquisition of genuine philosophical
knowledge. What I have been calling the paradox of the traveling legislator, Plato would
resolve by simply arguing that travel had nothing to do with it. The political education
that Lycurgus attained in transit yielded wisdom by chance; he produced wise legislation
by luck, not by design. Lycurgus only appears to be legislating against himself because
he, and Plutarch, falsely attribute his legislative wisdom to his adventures abroad. The
real mystery, Plato might say, is that the wrong education yielded so many wise laws.
But if Plato repudiates Lycurgus’ Spartan laws because they are rooted in
experiential knowledge, his solution of grounding political order in philosophical
knowledge has the same consequences for the status of the laws and the lawgiver visà-vis the general public. When Lycurgus establishes his Spartan regime, he does so
based on political knowledge that he has attained in transit. The legitimacy of this
knowledge and of the laws derived therefrom, stem from the fact that it comes from
elsewhere. The elsewhere-ness of his political knowledge endows it with a kind of
unimpeachable status, first, because it is untainted by politics, and by the tendency for
politics to foreground self-interest, greed, and factionalism, and thereby cloud one's

55

ability to reason clearly. Lycurgus away from home is disentangled from this web of
political relations and is therefore able to observe and judge without the distorting
effects of political calculation. The elsewhere-ness of his political knowledge is also
beyond contest because, in describing a world beyond the boundaries of Sparta, it
claims universal validity. By observing patterns between political orders and social
stability across multiple settings, Lycurgus’ transitory knowledge is valid not just for
Sparta but for polities everywhere. These factors underwrite the authority of his laws
and tacitly affirm the view that travel, rather than the practice of statecraft, yields the
best knowledge for lawmaking. Situating oneself apart from the political realm and at a
distant vantage point, like Machiavelli’s painter in his valley, allows one to grasp
patterns across multiple polities and offers insights that cannot be attained at home.
Plato achieves the same effect when he places true knowledge for legislation in
the realm of the forms. We see this most clearly in the cave allegory, which describes
the education of the philosopher-king. To seek knowledge is to enter into a
fundamentally non-political condition; it requires removing oneself from the state as well
as from society. To attain this knowledge requires something like a loss of one’s public
identity, a purification of the self that prepares one to receive knowledge untainted by
worldly affairs. Once attained, this knowledge estranges us from home. Only Plato’s
philosopher-king can return to the cave to govern, and even then, he can do so only
because the city he governs is an ideal city. For all other polities, achieving political
stability entails, conversely, not knowing the knowledge that underwrites political order.
It entails a distance from the source of ideas that form the foundation of an education in
the true principles of statecraft. Indeed, Lycurgus seems to embody one half of this
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opposition. Having established the Spartan state, he withdraws, not simply into exile but
into death. He sacrifices his own life, and the knowledge that he bears, to ensure the
continuance of the state.
From this view, Plato does not fully resolve the paradox of the traveling legislator
because he relies on the same exceptionalism that allowed Lycurgus a free pass. The
philosopher-king depends no less than Lycurgus did on a departure from the political
realm to attain his political education. Plato’s city succeeds where Sparta did not
because it creates the conditions internally for a kind of knowledge that is untainted by
politics. But while Plato drains travel of its special pedagogical status, he does not
relinquish the fundamental requirement that the philosopher-king leave the political
realm for his education. And by requiring that departure, by placing the knowledge for
politics in a realm beyond that of ordinary men, Plato grants an exception for his leaders
to those laws by which he would have other men live. By granting insight into the
foundation of the law, he liberates philosopher-kings from the law. The paradox is once
again resolved by the exceptionalism of the leader. Whereas Plutarch appeals to
Lycurgus’ virtue for his exceptional status, Plato instead appeals to the wisdom of the
philosopher. But the effect is the same: put the knowledge for legislation outside the
political realm, make its attainment a function of distance and estrangement, and yield a
body of laws beyond question and a legislator (or philosopher-king) beyond reproach.
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The Theoros and Laws

I argued above that, in the Republic, Plato resolves the paradox of the traveling
legislator by claiming that travel is not, and cannot be, a source of Truthful knowledge
about politics, nor of anything else, for that matter. Though I went on to dispute whether
this amounted to a genuine resolution of the paradox, it is fair to say that Plato would
find nothing paradoxical about the story of Lycurgus because he would have seen no
educational value in travel, at least not on par with a philosophical education.
It is not, however, entirely accurate to say that Plato denies any educational
value for travel. This is certainly an overstatement if we look across his dialogues but is
apparent even in the Republic. As I noted at the outset of the discussion, Plato seems
to invite us to read in at least two registers: the substantive proposals and the method of
inquiry. It is by reading in the first register that we may interpret Plato as discarding the
pedagogical value of travel. But if we read in the second register, the situation is more
nuanced. Consider that the entirely of the dialogue takes place when Socrates is in
transit; he has traveled down to the Piraeus to observe a festival in celebration of
deities. Additionally, clues to the value of foreign knowledge are peppered throughout
the dialogue, such as the off-handed mention that the story of the metals is a
“Phoenician thing.” Moreover, if we examine the origins of the first and second cities, we
find that politics not only has its origins in the confrontation between strangers but that
the events that trigger the transformation of the city, first into sickness and then back
into health, are caused by travel. The first city originates from the needs of individuals
who, limited by their insufficiencies, join together to form partnerships and primitive
societies (369b-c). This first, healthy city of utmost necessity grows so as to enable
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commerce, and through its commercial activity produces a class of merchants who
move from city to city, bringing with them luxuries as well as, one may presume, foreign
ideas (371d). It is the luxuriousness brought about by commerce, enabled by these
traveling merchants, that in turn gives rise to the sickness that precipitates the fall of the
second city–the city of sows–and brings about its resurrection and reincarnation as the
well-ordered Kallipolis.
The latent role of travel in Plato’s Republic has been noted by many scholars.
Honig (2001) suggests that Plato would have us think that justice is “occasioned by
engagement with foreignness” (3), that is, that the investigation of the Republic is
facilitated precisely by its marginal setting and characters. In a similar vein, McWilliams
(2014) has argued that Plato wishes for us to read travel as a practice or condition
uniquely conducive to philosophical inquiry. She writes, “Their words bring seemingly
distant polities and policies together under the umbrella of organized conversation. In
doing so, they effectively lessen the distance between different cities and systems of
law” (McWilliams, 2:5). Lemoine (2014) echoes that point and argues that travel is in
fact essential to philosophical insight, writing, “For Plato, it is not so much that
foreigners—or those with cultural horizons different from one’s own—have truths to
impart to us or vice versa. Rather, it is that conversations with foreigners can provoke
us to philosophize together, an activity at once conducive to the quest for wisdom and
generative of friendship” (Lemoine, 6).
All these scholars identify travel as an occasion for philosophy, and in doing so
suggest Plato’s tacit endorsement of democratic values, including plurality and dialogue.
But they do so while necessarily marginalizing the substance of the dialogues, including
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the laws and policies meant to curtail dialogue, limit exposure to new ideas, and
constrain political contestation. The exceptions to this – e.g. scholars like Saxonhouse
and Bloom – interpret the contradiction as either intentional and therefore ironic, or else
treat the tension as productive, as though the composition and performance of a
dialogue like the Republic was itself an exercise in democracy. Which is a compelling
argument but also makes the text dependent on some external factor – namely, its
performance – for completion.37
While there are compelling reasons to follow both the paths charted by both
Bloom and Saxonhouse, I would like to propose that we take this contradiction as a
facet of the Republic and seek its resolution elsewhere. Building on McWilliams’
reading, I argue that method and substance harmonize in Plato’s final text, the Laws. To
speak of the Laws is, however, to invite frustration. The first challenge posed by this text
is how to reconcile it with Plato’s other political texts, and in particular, with the
Republic. The divergences are numerous and deep. The most apparent, for readers of
the Republic, is the diminished standing of philosophical knowledge. The Republic
describes an ideal polity that elevates philosophers to the rank of kings and whose laws
and institutions are informed by philosophical wisdom. The Laws, meanwhile, makes no
mention of philosophers and evinces a greater respect for a more contingent and
experiential form of knowledge. Equally significant is the view that no authority is just if it
does not have the consent of those governed, a view given substance by the use of the
“preambles” meant to persuade citizens as to the value of laws before they are made
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Dean Hammer makes a similar argument about the tragedies and the Homeric epics, namely, that
these texts acquire a political dimension through their public performance. In the case of those texts,
however, their orality gave the bards leeway to adapt the stories to reflect and criticize contemporary
politics.
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official. These are not just deviations from an earlier political vision; as political values,
they are irreconcilable with those of the Republic.
One response to these discrepancies has been to argue that the Laws is
perfectly consistent with the Republic, a view held by so-called unitarian theorists like
Paul Shorey (1960). This view is given support by Aristotle and Cicero, each of whom
suggest that the Laws is in fact a detailed account of the laws of the ideal city of the
Republic. Tidy as this explanation might be, the texts do not support it. The structures of
government of the two cities, to begin with, are completely different, one being ruled by
an aristocracy, and the other ruled by an elaborate network of magistracies. There are,
however, more nuanced efforts at reconciliation. Morrow (1960) has called these texts
two sides of the same coin, a duality whose divergence is explained by the gap between
the paradigm of the ideal city and its projection in time. Laks (1990) concurs with
Morrow and argues that the Laws can be understood as a polity descended from that of
the Republic, one inhabited by men rather than gods. More recently, Bobonich (1992,
2002) has argued that the divergence reflects a change in Plato’s moral psychology and
his view of the capacity of ordinary mortals to achieve virtue. Each of these
interpretations gives confidence to efforts at finding meaning in the relationship between
these texts.38
But the Laws is not merely puzzling in its relationship to the rest of Plato’s work;
its internal consistency presents another mystery. Jowett, in a now famous criticism,
describes the Laws as marked by tautology, as well as lacking in eloquence and
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I am leaving aside the biographical explanation, which seems to have been abandoned by Plato
scholars. The view that Plato’s idealism was shattered by his experiences in Syracuse, prompting his turn
to a more “practical” mode of politics, has been called into doubt, not least by Bobonich (1992) and
Stalley (1983).
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suggesting of a failure of intellect in the aging philosopher. Morrow (1960), Klosko,
(1988), Rowe (1995) and Schofield (2006) have all taken positions on the question of
the completeness and coherence of the text, and whether one can make a unified
interpretation of it. Morrow is famous for rescuing the Laws from the dungeon of
Jowett’s remarks by drawing a delicate line between what Plato wrote and what he
intended us to understand. Schofield and many others support this view, arguing that
the Laws has sufficient internal coherence as to compel the interpreter to solve its
puzzles without excessive dependence upon other sources. This is a view that Klosko
rejects in favor of the more likely explanation that Plato simply changed his mind and
died before he could finish text, leaving it to an overwhelmed Philip of Opus to finalize
the wax tablets. The debate continues, however, with Rowe among others arguing for
the radical incompleteness of the Laws and Fraistat (2015) reviving the unitarian view
by arguing that the Laws elaborates the point made in the Statesman that because it is
rare for someone to have true knowledge of statesmanship, the next best thing is to
follow just laws.39
I bring this up to indicate the appropriate level of caution for offering any
interpretation of the Laws. This is especially true when considering Book Twelve, which
presents the most challenging passages to anyone seeking internal unity within the text.
At this point in the story, the Athenian Stranger has nearly finished describing the laws
that should regulate the proposed Cretan state that his interlocutor, Cleinias, has asked
him to help found. The Cretan city, in the broadest strokes possible, is to be a relatively
small agricultural settlement rather far off from the shore. The city is, in many ways,
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Jowett, 328.
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more Spartan than the city of the Republic. Stripped of its philosopher-kings, Magnesia
is to be ruled according to a body of laws that are sacrosanct and unchanging, derived
from reason and meant to shape the people to virtue. Magnesia is, in this sense, much
closer to the Spartan political order: a state governed according to wise laws bestowed
upon a people, guaranteeing social harmony by conforming its subjects as much as
possible to virtue.
And then we arrive at the passage on travel. The first point to note is that the
Laws, unlike the Republic, makes a subject of the topic at all. Like Lycurgus’ Sparta, the
city described in the Republic is sealed off from the outside world; people neither arrive
nor depart. Even the journey of the philosopher-king, up from and down into the cave, is
metaphorical. Like the forms themselves, the acquisition of knowledge is a-positional. In
the Laws, meanwhile, travel and strangers are not merely tolerated; as I will describe
below, they are in many ways required for the maintenance and health of the state.
Before the Athenian Stranger makes the case for travel, however, he
aggressively makes the case against it. He says,

The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of
manners; strangers, are always suggesting novelties to strangers. When states
are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury…
(950a)

The passage echoes Plutarch’s own warning about travel and the justification he gives
for Lycurgus’ restrictions on the practice. Strong states maintain their health by keeping
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out strange ideas which may in turn produce strange habits and behaviors. Domestic
harmony is a function, in other words, of a kind of narrowness of experience and
exposure.
The proximity of this view to arguments of the Republic makes the subsequent
argument in favor of travel even more surprising. Despite the concern that travel
undermines domestic stability, the Athenian Stranger argues that an outright ban on
travel, whether into or out of the state, is neither practical nor wise. The practical
argument stems from the material needs of a city whose geographical location is ten
miles from harbor. Cities that live from “the cultivation of soil” and have no foreign trade
will not be able to accommodate the expanding needs of their own subjects, nor will
they be able to meet their own needs through agricultural production alone (949e).
According to Bobonich, “Slaves and foreigners are an economic necessity for the city
for they will carry on the trading, manufacturing and menial occupations that are barred
to citizens,” (Bobonich, Plato on Utopia, SEP). In addition to the needs that he cites,
limits on acquisitiveness and property require the existence of foreigners to supply the
city with various products and enable it to thrive despite its distance from an active
seaport. Travel into the city allows a steady supply of foreigners who perform useful
functions, mainly economic, that sustain the city and liberate the citizenry to focus on
their own, presumably agricultural, tasks.
If foreign travel into the city is required as a practical necessity, travel out of the
city is required to protect its reputation. According to the Athenian Stranger,
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[A ban on travel] to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and
uncivilized; it is a practise adopted by people who use harsh words, such as
xenelasia or banishment of strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways, as
men think. (950b)

And a few lines later,

The generality of cities are quite right in exhorting us to value a good reputation
in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this-that he
who is really good (I am speaking of the man who would be perfect) seeks for
reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. (950c)

To paraphrase, it benefits a city to have a reputation for magnanimity towards its own
and towards its guests. This magnanimity is itself a sign of the goodness of the city and
its laws and leaders. The main benefit, not clearly spelled out, seems to be reputational:
the city will be admired by its neighbors for its generosity of spirit. And since the
reputation for goodness often accompanies genuine goodness, we arrive at the
somewhat underwhelming conclusion that the city of the Laws should allow travel
because that’s what good cities do.
Whatever we make of the Athenian Stranger’s reasoning, implicit in his argument
is the view that travel, as a liberty extended to one’s own citizens and a hospitality
extended towards one’s guests, constitutes a core component of human existence and
human happiness. It is of such a nature that to deny it is to appear “churlish and
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uncivilized,” “truculent and surly” (950b). Even an “absolute villain” should be able to
recognize the wickedness of such a ban. Why should this be? What is it that men travel
for that makes it worthy of the risks entailed? The Athenian Stranger gives almost no
consideration to the merits of travel, only to the consequences of its prohibition. In fact,
the only substantive justification he gives is translated by Saunders as “wanderlust.”
And even this is a poetic departure from the original; Jowett’s translation omits the
phrase, and idea, entirely.
To judge by the text, then, it is essential to allow travel because it is morally
reprehensible to do otherwise. And yet the justifications for travel fail to rise to the
challenge of offsetting the risks posed by visiting other states and allowing strange
guests with dangerous ideas. There is, however, another explanation that appears a
few sections later, but that discards the original basis of justification in wanderlust, or
any private individual motive. And this justification is the pursuit of knowledge for the
practice of politics, both for an understanding of statecraft and to grasp the reasons for
the laws and institutions by which citizens are governed.
In the course of describing the laws to regulate the foreign travel of ordinary
citizens, the Athenian Stranger distinguishes among several types of travelers. One of
these types is called the Observer (951a-b), or what the Athenians would have called a
theoros. The traditional function of the theoros was to visit foreign cities and acquire
knowledge about the political institutions and legal codes of other cities. The goal of his
travels was both to expand existing knowledge of statecraft and to improve upon his
city’s own legal code. This is what the Athenian Stranger describes when he details the
role of the Observer: men of a certain age and with a degree of distinction in battle may

66

be chosen by a special council to embark as emissaries of the state and seek out
knowledge from foreign states on the subject of statecraft. These Observers may travel
for as long as ten years, after which time they must return home and share what they
have learned with a carefully selected council. This council then considers the newly
obtained knowledge and whether it can improve upon the existing laws of the state.
I would like to suggest that these ideas are in fact connected, that the
reputational justification for allowing travel depends upon the office of the Observer.
Initially, the Athenian Stranger attaches paramount significance to reputation:

… The soundest and most important rule is this: if you mean to be perfect, you
should seek to live in good repute only if you are really good in the first place, but
not otherwise. (950c)

This advice tells us, in other words, to cultivate the reputation appropriate to one’s true
nature. The primary benefit of travel is that, for good states, a benevolent attitude
towards foreigners and towards the free movement of one’s citizens, accurately
conveys this nature to others. Only after having established the reputational benefits of
the free movement of subjects does he introduce the Observer and the possibility of
importing ideas and customs from other lands. If the reputational benefits are important
for cultivating a positive, and accurate, image amongst one’s neighboring states, the
value of the Observer is of another order. Plato writes, “Without this observation and
research a state will never stay at the peak of perfection…” (951c). It is the office of the
Observer, and a competent Observer no less, that makes a state reputable, and that
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guarantees the reputation that it advertises to surrounding states. This is because the
Observer is the guarantor of good laws; insofar as his education is the source of ideas
for legislation, it is the basis upon which existing laws and amended and new laws are
drafted. If we pair this line with the prior quote, we may conclude that the Observer
makes the reputation for magnanimity towards foreigners well-deserved and therefore
worth promoting. The Observer, by enabling the state to learn from foreign knowledge,
makes the policy of free travel true and therefore worth securing. A policy of learning
from travel underwrites the broader practice of travel.
This sequence of ideas of marks a radical departure from both the Republic and
Lycurgus’ Sparta. The words of the Athenian Stranger read as a repudiation of
Lycurgus:

No state will ever be able to live at a properly advanced level of civilization if it
keeps itself to itself and never comes into contact with all the vices and virtues of
mankind; nor will it be able to preserve its laws intact if it just gets used to them
without grasping their raison d’etre. (951b)

This passage is striking because of what precedes it. The key to political stability, social
harmony, the advancement of civilization, and the emergence of virtue, or, in other
words, the flourishing of polities and their citizens, is to send men into the world to
observe the customs of foreigners, to learn their habits, their institutions and their laws,
and to live among them for a significant stretch of time. It is, then, to take these
experiences and draw from them knowledge about the world, to distill experiences of

68

the world into a body of knowledge capable of adding to one’s own understanding of
statecraft and enhancing citizens’ knowledge of the rationale for the laws by which they
are made to live. It is a reversal of Lycurgus’ position to prohibit travel, and by extension
the knowledge of travel. The Athenian Stranger effectively rejects both the Spartan laws
that limit travel as well as the state that its yields, arguing instead that obedience to law
requires an understanding of that foundation; obedience requires knowledge as a
precondition of consent.
The Athenian Stranger’s assertion that political stability is achieved through the
absorption of strangeness is premised on one crucial assumption that Plato appears to
have embraced in the Laws: that a city of men cannot attain perfect knowledge of the
forms, much less govern by such knowledge. It therefore benefits the city to replenish
its knowledge by exposure to foreign ideas and by an effort to reconcile the knowledge
of those ideas with one's own understanding of legislation and statecraft. If there is an
implicit criticism of Lycurgus in this text, it is that he legislates as a god for mortals; he
should have legislated as a man for mortals. His philosophical nature enabled him to
legislate more wisely than most, but ultimately Sparta could not sustain itself because
its laws were not wise enough.
The Athenian Stranger makes further claims for the benefits of travel that are at
odds with Lycurgus’ entire political vision. For Lycurgus, political stability is achieved by
sealing off the state, by banning travel out of, and severely limiting travel into, Sparta.
Like in the Republic, stability is threatened when foreign ideas dilute state-sanctioned
examples of virtue. By rejecting that argument, Plato does more than point out
Lycurgus’ flawed reasoning and challenge the immutability of his laws. He also tacitly
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argues that no state which exists in the world can thrive without the ability to add to its
own knowledge. To achieve permanence, to persist in the world, a state must be able to
augment its understanding of the world and of statecraft and legislation. Moreover, it
must have the capacity to add to its store of knowledge, to reproduce itself by
reproducing the knowledge of statecraft and legislation. What the Athenian Stranger
proposes, through the institution of the Observer, is the ability for the city to reproduce
itself through political means, to produce new political knowledge and new statesmen
and legislators, through institutions that are firmly within the realm of the state. In this
sense, the authority of laws and institutions come to be grounded upon something that
is no longer beyond the practice of politics. The office of the Observer signals a rupture
from a political vision in which laws are grounded outside of the political realm. The
Observer instead signals that a city’s laws are legitimized through a political process
itself.
The means by which the city does so is the absorption of that which is strange.
And it is not simply the absorption of that which is strange and also good. It is not simply
virtue, as he puts it, but virtue and vice that are required. The very thing that Lycurgus
seeks to exclude becomes, for Plato’s Athenian Stranger, the means to achieve social
harmony, political stability, and human happiness. It is engagement with plurality and an
embrace of strangers and strangeness, and the knowledge that comes from this
experience, that has a civilizing influence. The fear of strangeness lingers, as evidenced
by the myriad restrictions. Nevertheless, by making travel not only acceptable but
necessary and beneficial, Plato turns a corner from the Sparta political vision. Here we
discover the seeds of a pluralistic, even liberal (Smith, 2000), political orientation, and
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one that is capable, if not assured, of delivering a more lasting political order. Just as his
Athenian Stranger breaks from his Spartan interlocutor, so Plato repudiates his own
Spartan models. Politics in the process becomes something new: engagement with the
world, engagement with multiplicity and by the reconciliation of multiplicity with unity, the
reconciling of the world with home.
Reconciling these impulses towards plurality, on one hand, and the order of the
forms, remains a challenge. The question boils down to whether, by abandoning the
ideal forms – either ontologically or epistemologically – must Plato must also abandon
the notion of a progressive state moving ever closer towards a condition of perfection.
Phrased another way, is there any guarantee that the council of Magnesia will be
improved by the innovative ideas of the theoros? Or merely changed? Is Thrasymachus
and the sophist creed correct? Does naked power, in the end, win?
Though Popper would likely say yes, others, including Mara (1988), offer a more
nuanced take. Through readings of the Theaetetus (about knowledge) and the
Protagoras (about virtue), Mara describes a non-dogmatic but also non-relativistic
version of Plato. His claim is that Plato puts the learning subject somewhere between
the condition of absolute ignorance and perfect knowledge, so that there is both the felt
sense of something lacking as well as something to aspire to know. This version of
Plato, Mara argues, does not disparage all learning which is not about the perfect/final
thing. Rather, what he does disparage is teaching opinion as though it were the
True/final thing, and thereby rejecting the possibility of perfect/final/True knowledge.
Along the same lines, this Plato rejects the Protagorean view that virtue is what a city
says it is, thereby refusing the possibility of perfect virtue. He rejects the claim that
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virtue is unproblematic; it is a kind of formal demand, not a substantive demand. Plato is
a dogmatist, but only against relativism, not in favor of some substantive position, be it
about virtue or knowledge.
Mara’s Plato offers the possibility for qualified, intermediate, incomplete action,
and for forms of knowledge and virtue that participate in the ideal but are not diminished
by their failure to attain the ideal. This is a kind of incrementalistic anti-relativism that
makes Plato neither a liberal (because he believes that there some transcendent idea of
the good life) but also not a totalitarian (because he accepts that life and politics are, of
necessity, lived in between these extremes of ignorance and perfect knowledge, or
perfect virtue). Though Mara does not address the Laws and the theoros, his nondogmatic but also non-relativistic reading indicates how we might reconcile these
conflicting registers of the text as they pertain to Plato’s political vision.
To make these claims for the Laws, of course, is to gloss over what precedes the
section the theoros. The passages about travel cited above sit next to passages
insisting upon the necessity of a fixed body of laws that are meant to withstand time and
contest. The fact that the Athenian Stranger makes room for a Nocturnal Council, socalled guardians of the law, and endows this body with the authority to consider the
laws of other states and recommend changes to its own laws, does not suddenly
transform the underlying vision of a society that is, at heart, closed and illiberal. For the
sake of concluding our discussion of Lycurgus, what we may say is that, by
acknowledging both the necessity and the benefits of travel, Plato pointed to the flaw of
the Spartan model, which sought to make permanence out of the imperfect material of
mortals. In doing so, Plato provides a third resolution to the paradox of the traveler:
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whereas the Republic would suggest that Lycurgus stumbled upon wise laws in spite of
his education, the Laws and its passages on travel suggest that Lycurgus in fact had the
right education but that, in his desire to attain perfection, applied false laws.

Conclusion

Lycurgus is one of the earliest political figures of whom we know to struggle with the
need to balance the opportunities and the risks posed by travel. His solution, to ground
his Spartan regime upon knowledge attained in transit and then to seal his state from
that same knowledge by banning travel, amounts to a legislative sleight of hand. The
Spartan state is premised upon the exceptionalism of its founder, its laws underwritten
by his virtue. This is a solution that acknowledges the potential of travel to dissolve
political orders. A ban on travel is a rational course of action for the legislator who
wishes to control exposure to corrupting ideas and who has little hope for the moral
maturity of his citizens.
In the Republic, Plato conceptualizes a purified version of the Spartan state
grounded not in knowledge gained from experience but in knowledge gained through
philosophical inquiry. That it has so many laws in common with Lycurgus’ Sparta is,
Plato might say, a testament to that lawgiver’s philosophical character. And on the
question of ensuring stability by obedience, Plato seems to agree with Lycurgus that
exposure to strange ideas must be limited as far as possible. To the extent that he can
be called optimistic about the potential of education to form souls to virtue, Plato limits
this optimism to a vanishingly small group of elites. For these men alone, true
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knowledge of legislation and statecraft is possible. At the same time, travel is rendered
superfluous by the dislocated process of philosophical inquiry.
It is only when we come to the Laws, and specifically, to the treatment of travel in
the Laws, that we find Plato’s renunciation of Lycurgus and his Spartan model. It is a
renunciation that requires travel for the achievement of what Lycurgus set out to attain
by regulating travel, namely, the virtue of his citizens, the flourishing of his state, and
political stability. These ends are achieved, according to Plato’s Athenian Stranger,
through the office of the theoros, by whose work strange ideas are confronted and
reconciled with familiar ideas. It is by this kind of institutionalized estrangement that the
ideal state that Lycurgus aspired to found is truly attained. Through the
institutionalization of travel and its knowledge–by de-exceptionalizing it–Plato
neutralizes its dangers, which, strictly speaking, are not found in the experience of travel
itself but rather in the power attendant upon any man who would claim the exceptional
status of the traveler.
We are left with two ways of interpreting the story of Lycurgus. The first, found in
Plutarch’s Lives and Plato’s Republic, treats politics as the work of exceptional men
doing work that is fundamentally extra-political. A second understanding of the story of
Lycurgus emerges from Plato’s Laws. Here, the travel restrictions are shown to be a
fundamentally misguided means for freezing the Spartan state in time so that citizen
virtue will go uncorrupted. The story of Lycurgus, in other words, is a political tragedy
where abstract principles of governance, meant to achieve a perfect and permanent
state, are undone by the imperfections of mortals. The five hundred-year reign of
Lycurgus’ Spartan state and its prominence in battle is overshadowed by the
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regimentation of ordinary life and the limited aspirations for its leaders (not, however, by
the injustice of the treatment of the Helots). In this interpretation, travel remains a risk
but a worthwhile one, and moreover, a risk that is essential to the political flourishing of
the state and its citizens.
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CHAPTER THREE: BANDITS:
THE TRAVELER AS CRIMINAL: LOCKE AND GANDHI ON VIOLENCE AND ORDER

In the last chapter I argued that, for Plato, travel is a rough substitute for
philosophical inquiry as a practice capable of producing knowledge for the improvement
of laws. Though it brings risks, these are outweighed by the benefits to political life. In
this next chapter, I consider depictions of travel to understand how we think about the
conduciveness of spaces of transit to the practice of politics. If the first chapter centers
the state to consider the traveler, the second chapter inverts this relationship, asking
what kind of orders might arise from transitory engagements. To answer this question, I
consider three depictions of transitory spaces: John Locke’s highway, Walt Whitman’s
open road, and Mohandas Gandhi’s stagecoach. By contrasting Locke and Whitman to
Gandhi, I make an argument about the conceptual and methodological commitments
that produce these spaces as more or less conducive to politics.
Of course, Locke’s Second Treatise is not about highways, per se. It makes an
argument about the foundations of legitimate political power. Legitimate power, he
argues, must be rooted in the consent of the governed. The initial expression of consent
is the social contract, an agreement among free men living in a state of nature who
voluntarily abdicate their right to execute the laws of nature. The original contract is
never explicitly depicted in the text, which has prompted some early readers (Hume,
1985) to interpret it as a symbol rather than an act, or as a normative standard (Kant,
1970; Rawls, 1971) rather than an event. Others (Simmons, 1998) have argued that the
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state of nature is best understood relationally.40 It refers to a condition between men
wherein the power to execute the laws of nature has not been delegated to a third party.
The contract simply changes this relationship, inserting a sovereign authority between
men.
If we take seriously Locke’s historical digressions into the origins of political
society, however, as well as the passages on tacit consent, then the symbolic and
relational interpretations are insufficient. Locke explicitly describes actions by which
consent is given and received.41 My view, following Waldron (1989), is that Locke
intends for us to understand the contract as both a normative standard and a practice
with historical precedent. Because of this dual meaning, it is fair to pose the question:
where do men contract? And how does the space in which men contract structure the
subsequent civil and political orders?
The obvious–and tautological–answer is that men contract in the state of nature.
That is, they do so in the unitary and undifferentiated space in which men live prior to
entering civil society. But as it turns out, the state of nature is not unitary and
undifferentiated. Men live together in households and in settlements. They work the land
and acquire property. They take slaves and wives, and have children. And they travel.
As we learn, the material conditions that emerge from life lived in the state of nature can

Simmons calls the state of nature “a relational concept describing a particular set of moral relations that
exist between particular people, rather than a description of a geographical territory.”
41 See for instance, s119: “… whether this his Possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a
Lodging only for a Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches
as far as the very being of any one within the Territories of that Government… (14-21). Locke argues
elsewhere that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, suggesting that the instability of early
societies made the keeping of historical records less likely (s100).
40
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be more and less conducive to making contracts. Moreover, the contracts men make
can reflect and perpetuate the power structures of the spaces in which they contract. 42
One of these spaces is the highway. The highway comes up several times in the
Second Treatise, most notably in a discussion of tacit consent (s119) and again in a
discussion of just uses of force against a monarch (s207). Locke never gives us an
interpretation of the highway; he does however describe what happens when two
individuals meet in this space. The resulting portrait makes clear that, whether or not a
given highway falls with the jurisdiction of a state, the highway belongs to the
ungoverned realm, beyond the reach of any sovereign power. For this reason, men who
meet on the highway are thrown into the state of nature.
As a part of this pre-political (or extra-political) realm, the highway shares
qualities with other ungoverned realms in the Second Treatise. Among these shared
qualities is its instability; there is a constant threat of violence. The threat of violence is
not a defect, however. Rather, the violence, and the instability that it creates, is critical
for Locke’s vision. For if violence is inevitable, then all men fall into a state of war and
there is no opportunity to make new contracts. On the other hand, if peace is too easily
sustained, there is no incentive to contract. Instability, and the possibility of violence,
makes society possible.
It is therefore both surprising and problematic that Locke takes this ungoverned
space of the highway and imposes upon the traveler a violence so extreme, and a
corresponding logic of self-preservation so rigid that any instability is instantly resolved,
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On this point, see Pateman (1988) on the exclusions of women; Mills (1997) on the exclusions of nonwhites. In a similar vein, Strauss (1952) and Cox (1960) rejects the contract as a fiction because the
instability of the state of nature acts dilutes the consensual dimension of any expression of consent.
Against this view, see Ashcraft (1968) and den Hartogh (1990).
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in this case, through maximal violence. Confronted with the highway robber, Locke
insists that the slightest provocation–even the slightest suspicion of provocation–
becomes cause for a retaliation so extreme that murder itself is allowed. Faced with the
unknown and unknowable limits of the robber’s intentions, Locke in effect forces
determinacy through an act of maximal violence. In doing so, he takes this realm of the
highway–a zone of unstable power and unresolved governance–and then resolves its
instability in a way that not only precludes contracting but undermines any overture
towards civic engagement. In the process, he cordons the practice of contracting to
settled life and to conditions that are imbued with the power dynamics of the household.
Locke’s treatment of the highway interests me both for what it reveals about his
political vision, and for what it indicates about travel as a theme for politics beyond
Locke. I therefore propose to contrast his depiction of travel with two other texts:
Whitman’s poem, The Song of the Open Road, and Gandhi’s depictions of his own
experiences in transit in his Autobiography. Whitman, I argue, inverts Locke’s vision,
casting settled life as morally corrupting and the road as a symbol of regeneration and a
realm of social harmony. The resulting vision, however, bears no more political
dimension than does Locke’s highway. Gandhi also echoes Locke when he recognizes
the ambiguity of liminal spaces. But whereas Locke forecloses this ambiguity and its
generative potential, Gandhi embraces and channels it towards moral, and sometimes
political, ends.
The plan for this chapter is to first present a reading of Locke’s Second Treatise
that foregrounds the meaning of the highway. My argument in this section is that the
highway symbolizes a condition of political ambiguity for Locke, one that he resolves by
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asserting that these spaces are always already governed. Locke needs the highway;
once conceived, however, he cannot endure its openness. I will argue in the
subsequent sections that Whitman’s road is similarly closed off to politics in transit
because, for Whitman, roads symbolize a path towards grasping the unity of being.
Gandhi, on the other hand, makes no predeterminations about transitory spaces. Roads
and highways are subject to myriad forces, none of which are sovereign or indomitable.
By embracing the ambiguity of power relations in transit, Gandhi gives us the only
genuinely political depiction of the highway.

Consent and Open Space

The argument of this first section proceeds through four claims. The first is that
Locke produces open space as a condition for the legitimacy of consent. To this end,
open space must have certain features, among which are an ambiguity of power and an
indeterminacy of property claims. The ambiguity of power is achieved by the absence of
a sovereign; indeterminacy is achieved by the lack of clear property signs (“fences”). In
Locke’s tranquil open spaces, these factors do not necessarily produce conflict. On the
highway, however, these factors, combined with an expansive notion of property and an
absolute right to its defense, produce an inevitable and maximal form of violence that
precludes any possibility of social life. In effect, Locke requires an ambiguous and
undetermined open space for his doctrine of consent; in practice, highway travel shows
that space to be unattainable.

80

The first claim is that Locke requires open space as a condition for consent. At
first glance this might seem contrary to what the text tells us. In his justification of
consent as the foundation of legitimate political power, Locke makes no mention of
space. He writes,

Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal, independent, no one can
be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without
his own Consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his Natural
Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to
joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living
one amongst another, in secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater
Security against any that are not of it. (ST, s95)

According to this passage, the law of nature endows every man with the right to dispose
of his property, including himself, as he wishes and as limited by natural law; and to
adjudicate transgressions against his property according to his judgment. He may only
be deprived of this right if he has, by an act of express consent, implying both reason
and agency, divested a portion of these rights with other men to unite for the common
purpose of the protection of their property, broadly understood as a collection of both
material goods and formal rights.
Locke justifies this argument by asserting that all men are born into the state of
nature. In this pre-political state, each is endowed by God with common attributes,
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including the capacity to reason, and common entitlements, including an inalienable set
of rights. As he puts it,

To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must
consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons
as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the Will of any other Man. (ST, s4)

Locke then goes on to call it “A State also of Equality, wherein in the Power and
Jurisdiction is reciprocal”, with the consequence that all men “should also be equal one
amongst another without Subordination or Subjection” (ST, s4). In other words, the
conditions of equality and perfect freedom that define the state of nature constrain
political power from imposing itself upon its subjects. Political power can only justly
impose itself on its subjects when it honors those conditions of freedom and equality
that mark man’s natural condition. This constraint is only overcome through an
expression of intent to relinquish one’s natural rights and assume an enduring
obedience to authority.
Neither of the above passages refers to physical space, or to space as a
conditioning factor on the rights or obligations of individuals in the state of nature.
Rather, Locke describes the states of nature and of civil society as one would describe
ways of being in relation to other individuals, defined by varying degrees of
independence and obligation. When a group of individuals joins together to unite into a
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new community, there is no sense is which they also move. Rather, the implication is
that men who already live together choose to do so under different terms or under a
new set of laws. It is based on these passages that Simmons (1998) claims that the
contract is not an event but rather a change of relations between individuals, from a
condition of independence to a condition of submission to a common civil authority.
But as Franklin (1996) argues, this “relational” understanding of the contract fails
to capture the territorial dimension of the civil and political communities that it produces.
The constitution of civil society through the convention of the social contract also entails
the physical constitution of a commonwealth through the aggregation of the property of
the parties to the contract. Franklin cites this passage from Locke to support his point:

It is fit to consider, that every Man, when he, at first, incorporates himself into any
Commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits
to the Community those Possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not
already belong to any other Government. … By the same act, therefore, whereby
any one unites his Person, which was before free, to any Commonwealth; by the
same he unites his Possessions, which were before free, to it also… (s120)

In other words, Locke understands civil society as both a formal legal arrangement and
a material arrangement, one that entails the physical-material aggregation of the
property of the participants. Franklin sums it up like this:
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The territorial jurisdiction of the government arises automatically from the
agreement of the original founders to submit themselves to the society. Their
allegiance, in other words, entails submission of their properties. And this
explains why an original founder who gives express consent cannot have the
right to emigrate. Were he free to terminate his membership, he could remove his
property as well, and the state would be dismembered?43

In essence, jurisdiction over property necessarily follows from the jurisdiction over the
individual. The original contract is inherently territorial because it entails the aggregation
of the physical property of the consenting parties.
Franklin’s reading foregrounds the territorial dimension of Locke’s doctrine of
consent but does not bring us all the way to the main point. For Locke’s expressions of
consent to be valid and binding, they must also be freely given. And in order to meet
that standard, there must be the possibility of withholding consent. In the relational
understanding of Locke’s doctrine, this condition is easily met because there is no
physical or territorial dimension to the states of nature and civil society. The burden of
proof that consent is not coerced is easily cleared because dissent carries no physical
or territorial penalty. Dissent does not require movement or any other transaction cost.
But when the contract is understood to have a territorial dimension, then proving that
some act of consent is not coerced becomes more difficult. It requires proving that the
consenting individual could have gone somewhere else, could have departed the
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Franklin, 412.
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boundaries of the state’s jurisdiction, either to live in the state of nature or to make a
new contract on more agreeable terms.
The first point is this: Locke’s doctrine of consent implies freedom of movement
because the possibility of leaving is what makes choosing to stay a valid expression of
consent. But there is another, less obvious implication that stems from Franklin’s
territorial reading of Locke. The territorial dimension of civil society not only requires that
the consenting parties have the capacity to leave. It also requires that they have
somewhere to go. For mobility to have political meaning, Locke’s argument also
requires open space. For it is only in open space–unclaimed and ungoverned–that free
travelers can make new, original contracts. Klausen (2007), pursuing an argument
about Locke’s advocacy of imperialism, makes a related point. He writes,

The land of plenty, of always “still enough”–the vacuus locus of s121–is what
makes the settler a settler and not a foreigner, for a foreigner is one who has
come to a place where the land is already crowded with property and resides
under a government constituted to protect these conditions of crowded
possession–a government he does not himself constitute with others and to
which he has not yet incorporated himself since he only tacitly consents.44

If all land is claimed, if there is no open space, then consenters become “foreigners”
merely choosing between existing civil societies with their laws and modes of
governance. The freedom of the foreigner, the freedom to choose which society to join,
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Klausen, 766.
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is certainly better than bondage. Nevertheless, it fails to meet Locke’s own standards
because it compels us to choose among available options, even if none of those options
meets our own subjective criteria of good laws and governance.45 To become “settlers,”
on the other hand, there must be space to settle.
Klausen points to Locke’s idea of “America” as the archetypal open space. It is
ungoverned and unmarked by property claims. (Or, rather, the property claims of Native
Americans have no purchase because they are illegible to Englishmen.) It is a kind of
territorial tabula rasa, whose only inhabitants roam the landscape, nomadic figures of
unrealized political potential. The portrait is not only of an idyllic depiction of space, but
also of the freedom-seeking Englishman who leaves behind the qualified liberty of his
natal commonwealth to achieve purified liberty in a new, unmarked land. And its effect
is to treat this land as generative of politics itself, as though civil society could sprout
from the trees.
But this idyllic depiction of open space as both ungoverned and bountiful creates
new problems for Locke. He of course needs this open space to be maximally appealing
so that the choice to consent is a genuine expression of consent and not a coerced
expression of consent. Locke also, however, needs this same open space to be
unstable and for individuals in this space to live under the constant threat of property
violence. Otherwise, as noted above, men in the state of nature would have no incentive
to contract into new civic communities. They would merely reside in tranquil and
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Pitkin might have argued here that, in fact, Locke so thoroughly constrains the substance of law and
the practice of governance under the limits of what natural law allows that any valid civil society will
effectively have the same laws. The effect of which is to decouple consent from authority, and in the
process, obviate mobility from the question of political liberty, rendering Locke a kind of liberal
cosmopolitan (Pitkin, 1969).
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bountiful “America.” The balance is a difficult one to strike. Over the next several
paragraphs, I argue that that Locke’s efforts to maintain this dual vision of ungoverned
space ultimately unravels during an encounter with the highway robber. And with it goes
the possibility of new civic orders emerging out of some pre-political condition.

The Highway

The key passage occurs during the section on tyranny as Locke explains the
circumstances that would justify the use of force against a prince or a king. He argues
that force may be justly used when there is no opportunity to appeal to a higher power.
To illustrate the point, he asks the reader to imagine two thefts: in the first, a man takes
your possessions by force. In the second, a man to whom you have entrusted your
possessions refuses to return them and threatens force if you try to reclaim them. In the
first scenario, the use of force is justified: “This man,” Locke writes, “I may lawfully kill.”
Of the second thief, Locke writes that he “cannot so much as hurt lawfully” (s207). The
difference boils down to the opportunity to make an appeal. In the first theft, the violence
of the taking indicates a willingness by the thief to use violence more generally. The
victim of the theft observes this willingness but cannot know its limits: does he merely
mean to rob? Or enslave? Or murder? If I wait to find out, I risk death. And in death, I
lose the right to appeal the theft. As a result, the victim of violent theft, regardless of
what is taken or the amount of force used, may murder his thief. In the second scenario,
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by contrast, there is no immediate danger to the victim’s life. Because the victim has
time to appeal, the use of force against the thief would be unlawful.
Locke adds one more detail to his illustration: the violent thief in the first example
is a highway robber. At first glance, this detail has no significance to the argument. The
transitory nature of the highway neither facilitates nor constrains our ability to appeal.
Nor does the highway affect us as hypothetical victims. We do not seem to be more
vulnerable because we are in transit. There is no mention of the difference between
movable and fixed property or of how the former might make us easier to rob. This
indifference to the details of the space is consistent with the method of analysis
throughout. Locke is not making a historically, geographically, or spatially contingent
case for legitimate political power. The space in which we encounter the thief does not
determine the rightness of our use of force. It is the act of violence in the abstract, and
whether we are in a state of nature or civil society, that determines it.
Why introduce the figure of the highway robber to illustrate justifiable violence?
One reason is rhetorical, that is, to activate the latent anxiety in his readership.
According to Andrew Dilts, “The image [of the highway robber] would have easily
invoked [the] popular and well-known conception of the highway bandit, the exemplary
seventeenth-century ‘outlaw’ who preys upon victims precisely where, as Locke puts it,
there is ‘no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for relief’, (s19)” (Dilts, 64). By
borrowing this familiar trope for his example, Locke qualifies the violence of the theft in
a way that renders the confrontation familiar and viscerally terrifying and that hints to the
reader that the outcome will most likely not end in her favor. Locke also renders the
scene in a way that contrasts, on one hand, the non-threatening condition of the
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“passive” theft with, on the other, the life-threatening condition of the violent theft. He
pacifies the one theft to depict political society as a tranquil realm in which conflicts are
resolved peaceably.
A second reason for introducing the highway robber is argumentative. Locke
wishes to draw an equivalency between the thief who robs us in the highway and the
monarch who exceeds the powers vested in him by law. He seeks, in a sense, to
criminalize the king. Dilts puts it like this: “Being able to clearly substitute a king for a
criminal is at the heart of Locke’s justification for the prosecution and execution of actual
English Monarch” (71). Part of this substitution requires that Locke collapse spatial
difference and make the village seem just as vulnerable as the highway. Dilts quotes
Locke, who writes, “The Injury [of unlawful Force] and the Crime is equal… whether
committed by the wearer of a Crown, or some petty Villain. The Title of the Offender,
and the Number of his Followers make no difference in the Offense.” As Dilts
summarizes it, “The right to oppose a tyrant who lives outside the law is the same as
that which opposes ‘a Thief and a Robber’” (Dilts, 71, Locke s202). Locke in effect
transforms the illegitimate king into a mere thief. At the same time, he collapses the
difference between the realms of civil society and the highway and in doing so brings
the highway robber to the threshold of the home.
According to Dilts, Locke produces this figure of criminality–the highway robber–
as a negation of the citizen. The thief is coded as not only criminal, but irredeemably,
pathologically criminal, to mark a clear and immutable boundary with civilized man. In
the process of achieving this effect, however, Locke also codes this domain of the
highway as a space in which theft is more apt to be violent and, by extension, not only
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justifies but compels a violent response from the victim. Just as he produces a figure of
violent criminality, Locke also produces a space of violent criminality: the highway. The
reason is two-fold. First, the inability to completely know the intentions of the robber
puts us, the reader-traveler, in a state of epistemic indeterminacy. We do not know what
the robber intends to do. All we know is that he has shown a disregard for some piece
of our property. Second, we have no opportunity to appeal to a higher authority. The
highway sits beyond the practical jurisdiction of any state. Because we cannot appeal to
this higher authority, we ourselves must act. Locke’s argument that we cannot know the
intention of the thief forces us to act against him, to enter a state of war, and to kill the
thief. This uncertainty does not simply justify force; it compels force, it obligates to
murder. Though he presents it as a choice– “This man I may lawfully kill”–the force of
reason requires it. The assumption that Locke insists we make about the violent thief–
that the smallest transgression indicates a willingness to make any transgression–
imposes a kind of constraint upon us, the reader-traveler. It is not just that the highway
is a zone of insecurity and violence; the highway is a zone that is governed by the logic
of self-preservation against the pathological criminality of the stranger. It is a zone not
simply of violence but of necessary violence.
This construction of the highway as a zone of necessary and maximal violence
has consequences for Locke’s consent doctrine. Though he might challenge the
equivalency of the violent highway and tranquil open space of “America”, the two share
the common feature of being ungoverned. And in being ungoverned, they also share the
features of an ambiguity of power and indeterminacy of knowledge. By coding the
highway as violent, Locke takes this category of open and ungoverned space–vacuus
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locus–that previously guaranteed the validity of tacit consent, and effectively rules out
the kinds of free and open encounters that would allow new, contract-based societies to
form. Though Locke is writing about highway robbers, the elasticity of his understanding
of property, and the myriad ways in which one’s property might be threatened, transform
the merest transgression into a cause for violence. By coding highway violence as not
simply possible but inevitable, Locke compels the traveler to enter a state of war, and to
act upon the resultant insecurity of that state with maximal force. Insofar as the highway
proxies for life beyond the reach of any political authority, then Locke’s portrait is cause
for deep pessimism, both about the ability of individuals to form societies through
mutual consent, and about the legitimacy of any political authority that interprets staying
put as a voluntary expression of tacit consent.
My analysis here is deliberately reductive. The intent has not been to describe
actual encounters between strangers in transit, in all their richness and shades of
meaning, but rather to interpret Locke’s depiction of these encounters. As such, there is
little allowance of nuance or texture, either in my analysis or his. While this might yield
an impoverished view of the human experience, I have approached the topic in this way
because it provides us some insight into Locke’s method of theorizing and helps to
account for his solutions. Consider that, in order to justify the use of maximal force
against the highway robber, Locke requires us to make a leap of judgment. As far as
we–the reader–are aware, the highway robber has not put us in mortal danger. He has,
as his moniker implies, merely robbed us. Locke, however, wants us to interpret the
theft as a willingness to enact maximal violence: to enslave, to abuse, to murder. Locke
writes,
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He who would get me into his Power without my consent, would use me as he
pleased… and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it: for no body can desire
to have me in his Absolute Power, unless it be to compel me by force to that
which is against the Right of my Freedom, i.e. make me a Slave (s17)

In other words, we cannot know the limits of the thief’s criminality; his intentions are
illegible to the traveler. This presents an intractable problem for Locke because it
produces a kind of uncertainty in relation to one’s security and property. The thief may
take everything, including my property in my life. This uncertainty about the thief forces
us, according to Locke, to produce certainty, to force the thief into a maximalist position
for the sake of preserving our property. In this case, the maximalist position produces
the following train of reason: to rob is to deny one’s right to his property; because the
right to property is unitary, to deny any property right is to deny all property rights;
therefore, the thief intends to kill me. Because Locke has both an expansive
understanding of property, as a term that covers our possessions, our bodies, and our
rights, and a unitary understanding of property, meaning that any of these forms is a
proxy for the whole, a willingness to rob of us one piece of property is a willingness to
rob us of any of them. The smallest transgression takes on maximal significance and
justifies a maximal response.
The leap of judgment about the thief’s intentions points to the underlying
problem, which is Locke’s anxiety about epistemic insecurity. Travel, whether into the
tranquil open spaces of “America” or the dangerous spaces of the highway, brings us
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into situations where property signs are illegible. What is claimed and what is available
can be difficult to discern. This ambiguity is a side-effect of the availability of property,
which is itself a precondition for the emergence of new societies and contracts. But it is
an ambiguity that brings risk. In settled society, by contrast, property signs are clearer,
more legible. When disputes arise, an authorized arbiter intervenes to resolve them.
The illegibility of property signs outside civil society, on the other hand, means that we
cannot know with certainty what is free and claimed, just as we cannot know the limits
of the thief’s intentions. One solution to the illegibility of property rights is to put up
fences and, eventually, to contract into a society in which the power to execute the laws
of nature to preserve property is delegated to a third-party. A solution to the thief,
meanwhile, is to murder him. What these problems and their solutions have in common
is an intolerance for uncertainty, whether it is the ambiguity of property rights or the
ambiguity of a thief’s intensions. By this view, civil and political society are not merely
Locke’s solutions to the preservation of property; they are solutions to epistemic
indeterminacy. This may also be achieved on the highway, albeit at grave cost.

Open Roads

Locke’s treatment of the highway suggests pessimism about the state of nature
as a context for the practice of contracting. In the next two sections, I would like to
suggest that we may embrace Locke’s ambiguous open spaces without sharing his
pessimism. And when we do, the highway becomes a realm of ambiguity as well as
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possibility. And specifically, of the possibility for founding more egalitarian political
orders. In this latter half of the chapter, I want to consider what it would mean to rethink
the highway, and transitory spaces more generally, as realms of unresolved power.
How might thinking of these spaces in their ambiguity shape our normative political
vision? And if highways and spaces of transit can conjure new publics, how might the
political potential of these spaces ripple through our broader political imagination?
It is not particularly difficult to find authors and texts who celebrate the openness
of roads. It is true that Oedipus meets his father at a crossroads and murders him. But
Oedipus also meets Theseus on the highway outside Athens and the two form a
temporary alliance against Creon’s advancing army. When a wandering Abraham meets
Abimelech in Genesis, they do as men do throughout the Old Testament. They make a
covenant to mark the ground as Beersheba and initiate a rudimentary society between
strangers. Roads lead to violence with no more certainly than they lead to civil society.
In the American political and literary traditions, roads are frequently used to
symbolize spiritual renewal and moral authority. This is especially true for that coterie of
writers known as the Transcendentalists. Emerson and Thoreau both invoke the road in
their essays as a way of conveying their faith in the value of the individual as well as
their contempt for organized, institutionalized politics. In Civil Disobedience, Thoreau
famously describes his time in jail as a “night journey.” Likening the jail interior to the
exterior walls of Concord, he attains the vantage of the exile. He refers to himself as “a
foreigner to his fellow townspeople”, whom he casts as “Chinamen.” Wandering the
town as a visitor, he sees it anew and grasps its inner workings. From this perspective
of the wanderer, Thoreau sees through the machinations of governance, and grasps
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their contingency. He feels the past imposing itself upon the present and grasps the
slippery hold of this city’s political institutions on the morality of men.
In another essay, entitled On Walking, Thoreau advocates a practice of
enlightened sauntering as a way of cultivating rumination and forcing oneself to adopt
the position of the stranger and the outsider. He writes,

He who sits still in a house all the time may be the greatest vagrant of all; but the
saunterer, in the good sense, is no more vagrant than the meandering river,
which is all the while sedulously seeking the shortest course to the sea.

The broader argument of this essay, echoed in Civil Disobedience, is that situated life
produces a kind of vagrancy because it gives men the cover to live beneath laws and
within institutions to which they have delegated their moral judgment. As a result,
injustice flourishes because ordinary men lack the aptitude for independent thought as
well as the capacity to harness their inborn capacity for moral judgment. To live situated
lives habituates us to treating others venally and inhumanely. To walk, to extricate
ourselves from the comforts of settled life, to de-socialize ourselves through
displacement, awakens our moral intuition and gives courage to challenge conventional
thinking and moral cowardice that allows slavery to persist.
Walt Whitman is not generally regarded as a Transcendentalist. His poetry
nonetheless expresses many of the same ideas about the corrupting influence of
politics and the moral purity of the individual. Whitman shared Thoreau’s belief about
the corrupting effects of settled life and, like Thoreau, blamed the political impasse over
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slavery on moral complacency. Whitman believed that a new, democratic poetry could
awaken the nation from its moral slumber and resolve the intractable conflict over
slavery. This belief found expression in the metaphor of travel in The Song of the Open
Road.
It is a dubious exercise to summarize the meaning of a poem, much less boil it
down to an argument. What comes through, we might say, from experiencing The Song
of the Open Road is the idea of the road as a symbol of radical liberation. It offers
liberation not simply from material and social constraints. The liberation that Whitman
promises leads us to a kind of unity of being, a dissolution of difference and
radicalization of positive liberty. Considers these passages:

Afoot and light-hearted I take to the open road,
Healthy, free, the world before me,
The long brown path before me leading wherever I choose.

And a few stanzas down,

From this hour I ordain myself loos’d of limits and imaginary lines,
Going where I list, my own master total and absolute,
Listening to others, considering well what they say,
Pausing, searching, receiving, contemplating,
Gently, but with undeniable will, divesting myself of the holds that would hold me.
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It is not material freedom that he cares about, but spiritual. The goal is not movement,
but the obviation of it through the attainment of a species consciousness that dissolves
spatial difference:

Allons! To that which is endless as it was beginningless,
To undergo much, tramps of days, rests of nights,
To merge all in the travel they tend to, and the days and nights they tend to,
Again to merge them in the start of the superior journeys…

All culminating in revelation:

To know the universe itself as a road, as many roads, as roads for traveling
souls.

But the road is more than liberation or education. The road is also, because of these
reasons, a maximally democratic space. Whitman writes,

Here the profound lesson of reception, nor preference nor denial,
The black with his wooly head, the felon, the diseas’d, the illterate person, are
not denied;
…
They pass, I also pass, any thing passes, none can be indicted,
None but are accepted, none but shall be dear to me.
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Upon this road of radical liberation and equality, the interactions between travelers are
not simply pacific but infused with love. He writes,

I think whatever I shall meet on the road I shall like, and whoever beholds me
shall like me,
I think whoever I see must be happy.

What is the source of this comity in transit? He asks, “What is it I interchange so
suddenly with strangers? “The answer is the “efflux of happiness” pouring forth from the
soul, unleashed by the road:

It pervades the open air, waiting at all times,
Now it flows unto us, we are rightly charged.

This is a vision of a world delivered from the grievances of political parties and their
interest groups. It is a fantasy of renewal attained by leaving behind our affiliations and
the commitments of settled life and embarking on a metaphorical journey of the spirit.
Whitman promises social harmony through displacement. By uprooting ourselves
through poetry, by wresting ourselves from constraining habits of thought, by divesting
responsibilities of the household and social convention, we can release the longdormant happiness of the soul. Whereas Thoreau describes walking as a practice that
prepares men for politics, Whitman envisions something purer. The poetry of the road is
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not an education for politics; it is an education that obviates politics by bringing men
together in a way that dissolves conflict because it dissolves those differences that
would lead men into conflict in the first place.
But this purity of vision comes at a price. As Lawrence (1965) tartly puts it,
Whitman aspires to wisdom through sympathy but never quite escapes his own
perspective, evincing a kind of dilettantish Buddhism that embraces everything because
it erases difference. Whitman’s Open Road achieves the ungoverned quality that he and
writers like Thoreau seek, away from the infantilizing effects of political society. But in
Whitman’s case, this does not yield a space of indeterminacy occupied by potentially
knowable strangers. Instead, it yields a space of pure freedom occupied by alreadyknown strangers, known because the human condition can be distilled into something
that is intuitively grasped by all of us if we only look deeply enough into ourselves.
Through this self-directed inquiry, Whitman achieves neo-Lockean effects: abolishing
the independence–the strangeness–of the other so that she can be absorbed and
known, and through that knowledge, governed. Leaves of Grass is not a political text;
but to the extent that Whitman’s vision has a political dimension, his politics is Locke’s
by other means.

Violence to Solidarity

Thus far I have argued that, for Locke, the problem of the highway is not merely
that it sits beyond the reach of any adjudicating authority. It is that it brings strangers
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into conflict under conditions of illegibility and uncertainty. If I knew that the highway
robber only wanted my purse, I would not need to resort to murder. Because I do not
know–because I cannot know–I must adopt the most extreme position as a way of
erasing uncertainty. Beneath this logic resides the belief that enjoyment of my natural
rights hinges upon complete, epistemic certainty. I am at liberty to enjoy my property,
howsoever defined, when mine and yours are clearly marked, when my relationship to
the state is clearly spelled out, or when there exists some sovereign figure delegated
with the power to resolve disputes. In the absence of clarity, the traveler must produce
certainty by other means. It is this illegibility of life in transit, and specifically the inability
to read the signs, both external property signs and the internal psychological signs of
the intent of the stranger, that compels the traveler to adopt a defensive posture and to
act with maximal force. To enter civil society is, by contrast, to enter a legible realm, one
in which violence is averted because the signs – property, intentions – are more clearly
marked.
The contrasting depiction of the open road offered by Whitman and Thoreau
mitigates the violence of Locke’s highway but does so by Lockean methods. This is to
say that these writers produce the open road as a realm of comity and tranquility by
erasing distinctions between individuals and by foreclosing ambiguities of power and the
illegibility of signs. If Locke gives us a pre-political, pre-social depiction of the highway,
the Americans give us something that might be called post-political, or a-political,
insofar as it describes a society without conflict. In this final section, I would like to
explore the possibility that we might embrace the ambiguity of open space without
succumbing either to pessimism or utopianism. When we do, the “highway” becomes a
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realm of possibility for founding new and more egalitarian political orders. To see this
possibility, however, it helps to adopt another way of thinking about politics.
Gandhi offers a far less romantic account of the road, and one that more fully
departs from the Lockean mode of thought. In his Autobiography, Gandhi depicts
several voyages, first to England and then to South Africa. At each departure point, and
on each leg of a journey, he encounters some form of conflict or its anticipation. This is
due at times to the risky nature of intercontinental travel in the early twentieth century, at
other times to the temptations of foreign places, and at others to the more basic
dangers of being a stranger. Alongside his formal legal education attained abroad, his
travels provide a second education, frequently through the experience of xenophobia. In
his telling, this second education shapes his social and political views and yields a
program of action as he learns to channel outrage over racial injustice through a kind of
self-mastery.
One scene where the violence of travel bursts into view, however, is during his
journey from India to Pretoria on a stagecoach. At this point in his life, Gandhi is
practicing law and agrees to travel to South Africa to argue a case for an acquaintance.
As he nears his destination, however, he experiences increasingly extreme forms of
racial discrimination. In the first incident, he is ejected from a first-class train cabin. On
the subsequent leg of the journey, while aboard a stagecoach, he is physically
assaulted by the crew leader. Gandhi describes the incident in detail:

The leader desired to sit where I was seated, as he wanted to smoke and
possibly to have some fresh air. So he took a piece of dirty sack-cloth from the
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driver, spread it on the footboard and, addressing me said, ‘Sami, you sit on this,
I want to sit near the driver.’ The insult was more than I could bear. (Gandhi, 99)

After refusing the leader’s instructions, Gandhi describes the ensuing assault:

The man came down upon me and began heavily to box my ears. He seized me
by the arm and tried to drag me down. I clung to the brass rails of the coachbox
and was determined to keep my hold even at the risk of breaking my wrist bones.
… He was strong and I was weak. (Gandhi, 100)

But then something unexpected happens:

Some of the passengers were moved to pity and exclaimed [to the crew leader]:
‘Man, let him alone. Don’t beat him. He is not to blame. He is right. If he can’t
stay there, let him come and sit with us.’ (Gandhi, 100)

The expectation of the crew leader is that violence will resolve the conflict. Violence, in
this sense, operates as a kind of law that fixes the outcome of this routine conflict over a
seat. Moreover, because the crew leader is visibly stronger than his “weak” adversary,
violence should resolve the conflict swiftly. The fact that violence fails to achieve its
expected effect dilutes its status as a governing or regulating principle. A weak man
clinging to what little he has–in this case, a brass rail–can prolong conflict and thereby
erode the rule of force that governs conflict within this space. Through physical
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resistance, Gandhi rejects the premise that this realm of the stagecoach is governed by
violence alone. His resistance suggests, instead, that any principle of governance in this
space is indeterminate. Whether he overthrows the rule of force, or whether he merely
shows that it was never operative, the effect is the same: to render the space one of
ambiguous governance.
What fills this space is not more violence but something else entirely: solidarity
that emerges from the collective sense of pity aroused by the spectacle of a physically
stronger man imposing his will upon a physically weaker man. Some would say that this
is proof that Gandhi’s methods require an audience and that they are insufficient by
themselves. They require, moreover, an audience whose members already share a
commitment to liberal values. But this misses the point. Gandhi’s resistance does not
work when, or because, it yields pity. It works in that moment when it disrupts the
monopoly on power enjoyed by violence. And this is achieved not when the audience
recognizes injustice but when the one practicing resistance recognizes her capacity to
resist. The fact that solidarity rooted in pity and expressive of a recognizable principle of
justice emerges from active resistance indicates neither the rightness of his resistance
nor the fact that spaces of transit are inherently prone to justice and egalitarianism. It is
not an essentialist position; it does not impose a principle of rule upon the space.
Rather, it simply indicates that another outcome is possible when power in the realm of
transit remains undetermined. This possibility-in-ambiguity is what Gandhi
reveals/produces when he clings to the brass rail.
The vulnerability of power to resistance is of course true to some degree about
any realm. It is especially true of the realm of transit because the social institutions that
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organize power in settled life are less operable in transit. This is a truism since social
institutions are relational; to be among strangers is to lose those relations that govern
settled life. What Gandhi captures in the account of the stagecoach altercation is the
insecurity that materializes out of this ambiguity of being a stranger amongst strangers.
The crew leader realizes that his assertion of power through violence has backfired,
which is to say that he realizes that the institution of racism is less operable on the
stagecoach. When he says, in defiance, “Fear not,” he addresses not the passengers
who protest but an imaginary audience of like-minded racists. He conjures his own
imagined community to justify his violence. Ambiguity, in other words, produces both
responses: the moral outrage of the passengers as well as the desperate violence of
the crew leader.
The point is that there is nothing intrinsically uplifting or glamourous about the
ambiguity of travel. It makes men resort to violence as well as solidarity for the sake of
resolving that insecurity. Even Gandhi describes his relief at seeing “Indian faces” when
he finally disembarks at the next station. What we perceive to be the moral failure of the
crew leader is simply a consequence of the desire to find order. But for Gandhi, the
victim of racism, the ambiguity of the stagecoach must be activated and sustained so
that it might be productive of something new, so that this same insecurity might instead
draw people together against violence. Ambiguity is, in this sense, agnostic about
outcomes. The insecurity is never fully resolved, the space is not governed in any
sense, material or theoretical. Nor does he suggest that it ought to be. As Mehta (2010)
argues, the style of thought that would eternalize the present under abstract or universal
laws is absent in Gandhi’s account. The wish to extend some present circumstance
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forward in time, and to make that into a governing principle, does not shape his
judgment of the present, or future judgments of the past. The solidarity that crystallizes
against the insecurity of the present-in-transit is momentary; the only universal principle
in Gandhi’s Autobiography is the absolute contingency of the present.
The temporally limited nature of Gandhi’s thinking enables him to cast the road
as a space of indeterminacy and political resistance. It is also, ultimately, what
separates his thought from that of Locke and makes their political visions–if we can call
them that–irreconcilable. Locke can no more think the road in its ambiguity than Gandhi
can impose some universal principle or law upon the stagecoach and remain true to his
broader moral program. Unlike Gandhi, Locke aspires to write a normative political
theory that describes legitimate power in a universal sense. As a result, the ambiguity of
the road is not a quality to be sustained; it is a problem to be solved. Gandhi eschews
this entire mode of thought; the road–or any liminal space–is conducive to acts of
resistance because it is unconstrained–or at least less constrained–by institutions and
ossified structures of power, as well as abstract rules of power and laws of nature. The
problem, for Lockean theorists, is that maintaining this openness towards the road,
forestalling closure, requires eschewing a mode of thought that seeks universal rules for
politics. This is the key to the problem of the highway; not that it points to some
contradiction in Locke’s thought. Rather, it reveals the universalizing impulse in political
thought more generally, and in doing so constrains the very possibilities it seeks to
create. The solution to this is not a purer form of politics, cleansed of violence and
premised upon uncoerced consent. Rather, as Gandhi shows, the solution comes from
outside politics.
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Conclusion

The highway belongs to the realm of open space in Locke’s Second Treatise, a
realm of ambiguous power and undetermined property claims. When we enter this
realm, we reset the terms of equality and we shed the power arrangements of settled
life. This space is the natural site of the original social contract; civil society emerging
out of this condition promises a community where the inequalities of settled life, of the
household, of property, are not smuggled in by convention or habit. Locke creates this
space as a byproduct of his thinking but promptly erases its ambiguity and
indeterminacy through word choice and examples. We can, I think, envision the Second
Treatise with different words and metaphors, and thereby resolve this appearance of
inconsistency. It is more difficult, I think, to envision a Second Treatise that tolerates the
prolonged suspension of power and indeterminacy of knowledge.
To envision an alternative to Locke, we need a mode of thought that does not
attempt to delimit possibility through closure, whether it is the enclosure of land with
fences or the enclosure of knowledge through violence. Gandhi exemplifies this mode of
thought in his writing because he does not endeavor to impose formal principles of
governance over circumstances. The meaning of the road is its indeterminacy, a space
wherein strangers meet in conditions of relative equality and institutions exert a weaker
hold over them. The outcome of conflict is not prefigured by either reason or violence;
ambiguity reigns and order finds its own balance through conflict. Violence, for Gandhi,
does not de-legitimize or corrupt the outcome, as it would for Locke. To the contrary,
seeking to impose order through a priori principles would, according to Gandhi,
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constrain the very liberty that Locke believes to be elemental to the legitimacy of
political power.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BEGGAR-KINGS
THE TRAVELER AS REVOLUTIONARY

In the two previous chapters of this dissertation, I suggested that the method of
political philosophy practiced by Plato and Locke, a method that moves by abstraction
and conceptualization towards transhistorical truths, is troubled by figures and practices
of travel. As a result, these writers do not merely exclude or expunge the traveler from
their political orders; they pathologize travelers and spaces of travel, and they cast the
knowledge of travel as a kind virus, a corrupting influence on the body politic. But this
treatment of travel and travelers as not merely extraneous to but also dangerous for
politics belies a more foundational dependence upon figures, spaces, and effects of
travel for the creation of states and the maintenance of their legitimacy. In these ways,
the traveler symbolizes a kind of political excess that is also essential to political
stability.
In the last chapter, I argued that Gandhi offers an approach to thinking about
politics that does not follow the pattern set by Plato and Locke. Because he does not
proceed from abstractions to concepts to transhistorical truths, and because he does
not universalize his vision, Gandhi does not merely tolerate liminality and its attendant
qualities of ambiguity and indeterminacy. Rather, his willingness to think about spaces
and figures of liminality in their political dimension generates opportunities for more
egalitarian political orders. Gandhi achieves this not by trying to foreclose the
ambiguities of liminality, as Locke does, but rather by embracing those ambiguities and
making them central to the political experience.

108

In the spirit of Edward Said’s injunction to think contrapuntally, I would like to
follow Gandhi by going backwards. The poetry of Homer might seem far afield from a
figure most often identified with nonviolence. I will argue, however, that both authors
offer ways of approaching politics that do not oppose movement, liminality, and
indeterminacy, on one hand, to the attainment and legitimacy of political order, on the
other. Through a reading of Homer’s Odyssey, I offer a second example of how we
might think about politics without casting travel–and all its attendant ambiguities–as a
form of excess.
And indeed, the Odyssey would appear to be the ideal starting point for anyone
seeking to understand the relationship between travel and politics in the Greek
imagination. Here is a text whose protagonist is both traveler and king; surely these two
facets of his identity are mutually constitutive. On this question, however, the Odyssey
is stubbornly resistant. One reason for this is the text’s depiction of political life. Simply
put, there isn’t much of it. Or rather, there is not much that we would call politics. In the
Homeric imagination, by which I mean the stories of the Iliad and the Odyssey, political
power is personal; its locus is the king and its duties and privileges extend as far as his
household. Outside the king’s oikos lies a collection of households bound together by
little more than territorial borders. There are no institutions of governance beyond the
throne; no senate, no judiciary, no empowered demos. There is an Assembly of Lords
but it is little more than an adjunct of the throne.46 When Telemachus summons the
Assembly in Book Two, it is the first such convening since Odysseus departed for Troy.
It is not a stretch to say that the world of Odysseus is pre-political, closer to the era of
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If we believe Finley, even when Odysseus calls the Assembly, it is merely to receive opinions; he alone
holds the power to decide (Finley, 78).
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tribal rule than to Homer’s own Archaic time, in which the form of the polis was
emergent.47
Our distance from this world runs deeper than the dearth of political institutions.
The characters in Homer’s epics evince no sense of public life, no “political
consciousness,” to use Finley’s phrase.48 The conflicts that drive the narrative of the
Odyssey and the Iliad are of a private nature.49 To find evidence of an idea like justice,
which some scholars have tried to do, requires both a selective reading of the texts and
a good deal of squinting.50 Transgressions are, generally speaking, against individuals
or households, not against some notion of “the public” or its interest. Revenge is a
family affair.51 The only matter of clear public concern is war52 and only then because a
foreign invasion threatens the property of the nobles as well as the king. Finley speaks
for most scholars when he writes, “The return of Odysseus to the throne was just and
proper, but it was a matter of private action for personal interest, not the triumph of
righteousness in the public interest” (Finley, 97).53

Raaflaub, Kurt A. 1997. “Homeric Society.” In A New Companion to Homer. ed. Ian Morris and Barry
Powell. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
48 Writing about the Iliad, Finley finds “no responsibility other than familial, no obligation to anyone or
anything but one’s own prowess and one’s own drive to victory and power.” (Finley, 21)
49 Edmunds (1997) and Scully (1990) echo Finley on this point.
50 Finley for instance has pointed to the arguments that Telemachus makes to the assembly as
suggesting that there was a limited conception of a public interest mostly pertaining to the threat of war.
But Finley concludes that we should not read too far into this. He writes, “The king gave military
leadership and protection, and he gave little else, despite some hints of royal justice (and injustice)
scattered through the Odyssey…” (97).
51 See, for instance, the retort to the arguments of Telemachus by the suitors themselves, which, if we
judge by the events of Book Two, carry greater weight with the audience than those of the son. See also
Finley: “When criminal acts were involved, the family, not the class (or the community as a whole), was
charged with preserving the standards of conduct and with punishing any breach” (74).
52 This point is evident in the opening remarks of the Assembly, spoken by the elder nobleman,
Aegyptius. Finley also writes, “Primarily it was war, defensive in particular, which was an activity of the
community…” (81). He also writes, “Wars and raids for booty… were organized affairs, often involving a
combination of families, occasionally even of communities” (59).
53 Though Finley does acknowledge the existence of justice, he describes its appearance in the text as
“anachronistic,” belonging “not to the time of Odysseus but to the eight or seventh century B.C., when the
idea of a world ordered by divine justice had entered men’s minds” (97).
47
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But the challenges to an inquiry about travel and politics do not end here. In the
popular imagination, the Odyssey is an epic travel story. Yet little travel actually occurs
in the text. We do not even meet Odysseus until Book Five. At this point he is a captive
of Calypso, seven years into his exile on Ogygia. Athena appeals to Zeus who
subsequently commands his release. Odysseus sails to Scheria, spends one night
among the Phaeacians, and is ferried home to Ithaca the next day. Odysseus’ travels
are over by Book Thirteen; the next eleven books describe a revenge plot. What of the
Cyclops, Circe, the descent into Hades and the passage between Scylla and
Charybdis? We learn about them in Books Nine through Twelve, when Odysseus
recounts his adventures to the Phaeacians. We learn about them, that is, second-hand.
The Odyssey, it turns out, is not so much a travel story as a story about the telling of
travel stories.
To appeal to Homer’s Odyssey for insight into the link between travel and
politics, or between the identities of traveler and king, requires that we do so in spite of
the fact that travel and travelogue are not just entwined but frequently indistinguishable.
And it requires that we do so despite a socio-political landscape whose inhabitants lack
a “public consciousness” and who understand political power as private, familial, and
grounded in force. But while these may seem like impediments to insight, these caveats
are clues to the meaning of the relationship between travel and politics. What the
Odyssey suggests is that this relationship hinges, in part, on the traveler’s ability to
transport her audience through storytelling. Through the aesthetic experience of being
transported to some “elsewhere”, the listener’s tether to “home” is weakened and new
bonds are strung. Travel, understood as the twin practices of being in transit and
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describing one’s time in transit, bears a latent political dimension. This dimension is
rooted in the storyteller’s displacement of her audience and, through collective
displacement, the possibility of forging a new social unity with the storyteller.
In the case of Odysseus and his speech to the Phaeacians, that new social unity
is galvanized around his heroism. As a result, Odysseus not only displaces his
audience; his heroic performance, rendered in travelogue, produces a new unity with his
audience. Within the context of this unity, his heroism endows him with a measure of
power. But the kind of power that emerges within this context is political in a way that
traditional power is not. This is because his heroism is produced not by violence but by
charismatic speech. Though speech also acts as a kind of force, it is fundamentally
different from the performance of the heroic deed itself because it requires the
recognition of the audience for its completion. The audience must recognize and the
acknowledge both the deed as heroic, and the speaker as the owner of the deed. The
effects of which are both a kind bonding between speaker and audience, and a
flattening of status. Travel, in short, creates the conditions for the emergence of a
contingent and more egalitarian form of power, one that is opposed to Iliadic power, or
to power rooted in force and family. Though this progressive political vision is ultimately
discarded in favor of the older, Iliadic ideal, its presence in the text and its potency in the
Phaeacian episode suggest that we are glimpsing the first signs of a post-heroic political
order.
This is not a new argument. Numerous scholars have taken seriously the
evidence in the Odyssey pointing to a richer political dimension and have used this
evidence to argue that the poems of Homer express a coherent, and frequently
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progressive, political vision. Raaflaub (1997) and Giesecke (2003) have challenged the
status quo by arguing that the Iliad and Odyssey express political ideals that might have
been anachronistic to the Mycenean era in which these stories are set but that would
have been familiar and relevant to Homer’s audience. Raaflaub, for instance, finds
evidence of the rise of the polis as the predominant political unit, illustrated in the
depiction of the Phaeacians and the contrast drawn with the socio-political order of their
brethren, the Cyclops. Giesecke goes further, finding expression of a burgeoning
utopianism in the homecoming of Odysseus and the restoration of order to Ithaca. Other
scholars working in this vein have taken a darker view and read Odysseus’ wanderings
as a tacit endorsement of the colonizing practices of Greek city-states during Homer’s
era.54 Broadly speaking, I agree with this approach to the text. Homer’s Odyssey
expresses an emergent political orientation, the catalyst for which is the wandering of its
king. But whereas Raaflaub and Gisecke find either a nascent form of the polis, or even
a social utopian aspect in the text, I find something both progressive and nostalgic.
Giesecke has interpreted the Odyssey as a parable of humanity settling down after “a
decade’s worth of nomadism”.55 But Odysseus does not settle down and neither does
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Dean Hammer (2002) adds another dimension to this argument. He finds politics not in the text itself
but rather in the oral tradition. Hammer has argued that the bards tailored these stories to their audiences
to amplify the dramatic content. Despite the heavy reliance on repetition and the inclusion of well-known
tales like the adultery of Aphrodite and the revenge of Orestes, the bards shaped these poems so that
they might speak to the concerns of their audiences. In this sense, the performances were a form a
politics, an opportunity to entertain by reflecting back to the audience the concerns of the day. Because
the performance was itself a practice of politics, what Finley calls anachronisms might instead be thought
of as infiltrations of a late-Mycenean or early Archaic mode of thought into an Odyssean landscape as a
way of disposing the audience to a certain political opinion.
55 Giesecke, 205.
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humanity .56 The force of this story’s political vision is in its refashioning of monarchy for
an age of itinerancy.
I have organized this chapter around two claims about the relationship between
travel and political power, followed by an interpretation of the political vision that follows
from these claims. The claims are that travel dethrones Odysseus, and that Odysseus
recovers political power by delivering a travelogue to the Phaeacians. Dethronement
happens through a depletion of material resources, transforming Odysseus from a
marauding pirate-king with an acquisitive gaze to a tactful supplicant with the gaze of
the charity-seeker. His political status as a hero-king is reclaimed through storytelling,
and specifically storytelling about travel. This is not a traditional–or what I have been
calling Iliadic–form of political power, however, but a new, qualified form of power
premised on mutual recognition and greater social equality. It is the cornerstone of a
political vision untethered from either wealth or force, as well as familial and territorial
boundaries. Within this political vision, power can travel because speech can bind an
audience and forge a new, collective identity. Within the Phaeacian episode, Homer
asks his audience to embrace a source of political power that has its foundation in
something other than violence or kinship. In doing so, he depicts a form of politics
wherein the ability to attain and wield power exceeds the boundaries of home, and
which is therefore more conducive to a mobile way of life. It is also, incidentally, a world
in which a bard can become king.

On Greek colonialism, Cunliffe writes, “Many of the Greek cities had comparatively restricted fertile
hinterlands which were intensively cultivated, the more marginal tracts to the point of exhaustion. … In
consequence the Greek city states began to organize overseas colonial expedition.” Morrison (2003) also
references Greek colonialism.
56

114

Travel Dethrones the King

My first claim is that travel dethrones Odysseus. It comes, however, with a
caveat: political offices like the kingship are not clearly delineated in the text. Even
though lines of succession are generally agreed upon in the story, the title of king does
not confer any clear or fixed set of duties and privileges. This ambiguity undermines any
effort to definitively prove a change to political status. Finley writes, “A large measure of
informality, of fluidity and flexibility marked all the political institutions of the age. There
were lines of responsibility and power, and they were generally understood, but they
often crossed,” (Finley, 80). In other words, kings claim what power they can against
both challengers and a disgruntled noble class, and they hold that power as long as
they can defend it. Finley’s claim is supported by the absence of any clear or consistent
depiction of monarchical rule. Though Odysseus is routinely referred to as a king, there
are few indications of what powers this rank confers or what duties attend to it. Rarely, if
ever, do we see what it means to be a king and therefore what might indicate a loss or
attainment of that rank. To ask how or when Odysseus loses the throne is to treat the
issue with more certainty that it allows.
Despite this ambiguity, we can nevertheless say that Odysseus is king before the
Trojan war and that he maintains that status among his men during the war and for the
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three years between the end of the war and shipwreck. And we can say, with equal
confidence, that he is clearly not king when he returns to Ithaca. This is shown by the
fact that no one crowns him upon his return; he must forcefully reclaim both palace and
throne. Finley writes, “The fact is that when Odysseus returned there was no automatic
resumption of his royal position. He had to fight against heavy odds and with all his
powers of strength and guile to regain his throne,” (Finley, 84). Odysseus knows this as
well as anyone; hence his decision to conceal his identity from everyone he meets,
including his son and house servants.
Somewhere between Troy and Ithaca, in other words, Odysseus ceases to be
king. Based on this observation, we might conclude that this is the most important
consequence of travel for politics: that extended absence strips away one’s political
standing. Odysseus ceases to rule because he stops being at home. There is some
truth to this conclusion, which stems from the nature of political power in the Homeric
world. Simply put, political power is synonymous with ruling.57 From the standpoint of
the Ithacans, their king’s absence means that they are no longer beholden to his
authority. And even though there is a tradition of hereditary monarchy, there is no
principle binding the Ithacans to accept Telemachus’ right to inherit the throne.58 In the
meantime, the prolonged absence of Odysseus, coupled with a dearth of stories about

Finley notes the tendency in the text to equal rule with force. He writes, “To rule, after all, is to have
power, whether over things, over men, or over men and gods.” He continues, “In five instances anassein
[to rule] is qualified with the adverb iphi, ‘by might’, so that king’s rule becomes rule by might” (81). And a
few passages later, he writes, “’Rule by might,’ in other words, meant that a weak king was not a king,
that a king either had the might to rule or he did not rule at all” (82).
58 See, for instance, 1.392-3 in which Telemachus muses in a hypothetical tone on the benefits of being
king, a tone that would not be possible if he expected to be, or was about to become, king.
57
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his status abroad, leaves the throne unguarded and open to usurpation. Anyone who
can seize the throne may hold it.59
By this view, travel and politics come to seem opposed in the Odyssey because
travel produces a condition that is incompatible with the practice of politics. While this is
true as far it goes, by reducing travel to absence, we paint the picture too starkly. Within
the story there are shades of absence and a shifting political significance to this
absence. This is evident if we look at the Assembly scene in Book two. As we learn,
during the first ten years of his journey Odysseus’ claim to rule Ithaca has gone
unchallenged. It is only over the subsequent ten years, and only after reports of his
journey stop drifting home, that his status as king has fallen into doubt. The conflict
driving this Assembly scene is over the question of whether the Ithacans still owe
allegiance to their long-departed King. Halitherses, an ally of the king, argues that his
absence is in fact immaterial to this power. Foreseeing a triumphant return of Odysseus
(2.205), he argues that his claim to rule is undiminished by absence. Eurymachus on
the contrary declares the king dead despite Halitherses’ prophecy, and by extension
delegitimates any claim to rule. In his formulation, extended absence without any sign of
life is indistinguishable from death. When Mentor entreats the nobles to defend the
honor of their King, not least for his courage in war, Leocritus declares that, even if
Odysseus should return, any attempt to retake the throne will be met with deadly force
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Penelope complicates this story. She clearly wields some measure of power over Ithaca. The suitors
seeking her hand all wish to use her status to seize the throne for themselves, suggesting that she has
the power to crown but not to rule, nor even to choose to not choose. There seems to be no settled
agreement as to the source of this limited power. Finley (88) speculates that it is rooted in the lost
“prehistory” of the Odyssey.
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(2.277-279), thereby staking out a third position: if he lives, his absence means that he
no longer rules.
The argument closes without a clear resolution. Leocritus wins the day with a
threat of force, not with a persuasive argument. What we learn in this scene is that the
effects of travel on political standing are indeterminate. The absence of Odysseus has
done something to his status as king; but as the variety of opinions expressed in this
scene makes clear, what that effect is remains unresolved. If anything, the political
effects of travel evidenced by this scene are to produce new possible understandings of
his claim to the throne and to the obedience of his subjects. The arguments and action
of this scene depict the political standing of the king, in other words, as a quality
negotiated in a public setting. Absence opens the possibility for new claims about
political standing, suggesting that the duration of absence works upon political standing
both by gradually changing it, and by making possible a wider variety of political claims.
Another problem with reducing travel to absence, and thereby concluding that it
is opposed to politics and political standing, is that it leaves the traveler untouched by
the journey. To reduce the relationship to this basic opposition, we might also assume
that Odysseus could travel for thirty years and never lose the felt sense of being king.
But the text suggests otherwise: it suggests that travel diminishes Odysseus’ sense of
his political standing. Odysseus ceases to be king not only at home, among the
Ithacans, but in transit as well. Somewhere between Troy and Scheria, he slips from
king and conqueror to beggar. The assertiveness and acquisitiveness displayed in the
early encounters of his journey–among the Cicones, the Cyclops, and even King
Aeolus–reflect the attitude of a man who thinks and acts as a king. This attitude is

118

gradually replaced by one of supplication. Beginning with his return to Aeolus and
continuing through the Phaeacian episode, Odysseus is humbled by degrees. The
change affects his gaze, which transforms from that of one bent on conquest and
acquisition to one concerned with survival and charity.
How does Odysseus cease to be king in transit? This is the process that I want to
explore over the next few pages. In the first place, I think it helps to paint a richer picture
of the relationship between travel and politics. Additionally, it provides a more
compelling contrast to the process that I will explore in the second half of this chapter,
namely how, by and through speech about travel, he reclaims power.
I approach this question with evidence from two sources. The first is the set of
tactics that Odysseus uses in confrontation with those whom he encounters in transit.
The second is his gaze, how he sees and describes the lands that he visits and how he
surveys them, whether for exploitation, for war, or for some other purpose. The merits of
this approach, I think, are that they mitigate an essentially intractable problem. I do not
think that I can make the case that he ceases to be king in any final or definitive sense
because the status of king is only loosely defined in the text. The closest we can get is
to contrast how his behavior changes over the course of his travels, both outwardly,
through his actions towards others, and inwardly, via his descriptions of the lands that
he visits. Through these contrasts, I hope to persuade the reader that Odysseus
changes in ways that reflect a loss of the political standing of a king.
We begin on the shores of Troy. The war has ended, the city is sacked, and the
Achaean kings–Agamemnon, Menelaus, and the rest–set sail for home. Odysseus,
meanwhile, is driven off course by heavy winds and comes to rest at Ismarus,
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stronghold of the Cicones. He and his crew plunder the city but sustain heavy losses
after the Cicones rally for a counterattack. We may remember this episode, if we
remember it all, as the first in a series of piratical raids that culminate in the infamous
Cyclops scene. But the plunder of Ismarus is also notable because it depicts a version
of Odysseus both in transit and at full strength. He commands a flotilla of ships, heavily
armed, and bearing ample treasure from Troy. Though he is at sea, he enjoys
enormous advantages in combat. With his men and his ships, he is a traveling army, a
mobile kingdom. As a result of these advantages, Odysseus lands among the Cicones
less an arriving guest than a squadron leader still at war. He “sacked the city, killed the
men… and shared the [wives and plunder] round so no one, not on [his] account, would
go deprived of his fair share of spoils” (9.45-49). What we see in this short episode is
the extent to which Odysseus remains in a war posture. He attacks, pillages, and
shares the bounty with his men, presumably to maintain loyalty and forestall dissent.
Moreover, he thinks like a commander at war, anticipating a likely counterattack, as
when he urges his men “to cut and run, set sail” (9.50). In this early episode of his
travels, Odysseus is still very much an Achaean commander, at war with whomever he
encounters.
But he is also more than this: he is both war commander and king, as shown by a
scene a few passages later. After the Cicones run Odysseus and his men off Ismarus,
and after a brief stopover among the Lotus Eaters, they find themselves on the goat
island of the Cyclops. As on Ismarus, Odysseus acts the part of a warrior-hero, leading
his men into battle. But he also evinces the mindset of a king accustomed to ruling over
territory and population. We see this in his depiction of the Cyclops and their land, which
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he describes as “teem[ing] with all they need, wheat, barley and vines” (9.122-3). From
one view, Odysseus reiterates a thirst for conquest. But his interests exceed that which
can be seized and stolen. Rather, he describes the land in a way that points to ongoing
exploitation, and that suggests a colonizing enterprise capable of extracting wealth from
this land. The slothfulness of the cyclops only amplifies the promise of the island which,
with a bit of labor, could yield enough food to satisfy a great number of people.
Odysseus continues, describing the island’s topology and its unspoiled nature, and in
particular, its qualities conducive to agriculture:

The water-meadows along the low foaming shore
Run soft and moist, and your vines would never flag.
The land’s clear for plowing. Harvest on harvest,
A man could reap a healthy stand of grain- (9.144-7)

He concludes that, “Such artisans would have made this island too a decent place to
live… No mean spot, it could bear you any crop you like in season,” (9.142-143). He
views the island as unspoiled land, wasted by its current inhabitants, ripe for conquest
and cultivation. This is the gaze of someone with an eye towards not just acquisition but
settlement. It is the gaze of someone familiar with the challenges of governance and the
necessity of providing for his people, and also accustomed to the entitlements of
monarchy and of the accumulation of private wealth through the cultivation of land and
the collection of tithes.60 It is more than the gaze of a pirate, who would look for the sake

Finley again: “Then there were taxes and other dues to lords and kings, amends with a penal overtone”
(63). And elsewhere, he writes, “The base of royal wealth and power lay in the holdings in land and
60
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of theft; the king sees for the sake of development, for land that could be harvested year
after year. Though no sane traveler would seek confrontation with the cyclops, the
implication of this passage is that this is what awaits the voyager; land beyond the
known world is “empty of humankind”, “unplowed, unsown forever” (9.136) lying
dormant for anyone brave enough to seek it out. The gaze is proto-Lockean, making a
blank slate of the terrain that waits for the hand of some intelligent entrepreneur to
inscribe his name, through labor, upon its abundance.
These are salad days for Odysseus and his crew. Close to full strength, loaded
with treasure, and flush from victory at Troy, they seek out new conflicts by which to
enrich themselves, first in Ismarus, then among the Lotus Eaters, and again with the
cyclops, Polyphemus. Odysseus leads them both as a warrior-king and as a settlerking, seeking confrontation and spying new land for exploitation. But as their journey
continues, his fleet is decimated. At each encounter, the number of dead increases:
scores of men at Ismarus, ten more in Polyphemus’ cave, three to Circe, plus another
man, Elpenor, who drunkenly falls from the roof of her house. As the crew shrinks and
their resources–ships, weapons, treasure–dwindle, we can observe changes in
Odysseus. Not only does he become less bold in his ventures; his gaze changes as
well. He no longer spies new land for exploitation. Instead, he looks for something else:
security and charity.
The shift in gaze is first apparent when he and his men arrive at the land of the
Laestrygonians. Having narrowly survived their encounter with Polyphemus, having
squandered the winds of Aeolus, and having been rejected by the Aeolian king upon

cattle… While the king reigned he also had the use of a separate estate, called a temenos, which the
community placed at his disposal” (94).
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seeking further assistance, Odysseus’ gaze has narrowed from that of a commanderking bent upon conquest and exploitation to that of a humbled leader of a decimated
fleet. He sees purely through the lens of conflict, describing the harbor as “all walled
around by a great unbroken sweep of sky-scraping cliff”, and noting “two steep
headlands, fronting each other, close around the mouth so the passage in is cramped”
(10.95-8). He depicts the Laestrygonian port from the vantage point of battle and with
an eye towards maneuvering his crew into and out of a vulnerable tactical position. The
emphasis on the passage and its “cramped” quality foreshadows the difficulty of making
a quick exit in response to a surprise attack. In the end, his concern with security and
defense is vindicated. Set up upon by the monstrous Laestrygonians, his ship alone is
able to escape: “The rest went down en masse. Our squadron sank,” (10.145).
The transformation continues in the next scene. From the land of the
Laestrygonians, he and his crew come to the island of Aeaea, home of the sorceress,
Circe. The depiction of the island is different again from that of the cyclops’ as well as
the Laestrygonians’. Instead of gazing through the lens of settlement and cultivation,
Odysseus seeks a vantage point from which he might spot “some sign of human labor,
catch some human voices…” (10.160-1). Physical descriptions of the island are few: a
“commanding crag” (10.163), “entrancing glades” (10.305), emphasizing either the
island’s mystical qualities or its impenetrability. The land, in a sense, is beyond his view.
Instead of attending to the landscape and its fitness for battle or for plunder, Odysseus
focuses on finding assistance for his weakened, depleted crew. Their needs are
immediate and material: food and shelter. They lack the resources to fight, much less
plunder. They are men in need of charity, and the gaze of their commander, content to
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search out a sign of “chimney smoke”, conveys this need. In fact, for all the time spent
on Aeaea–more than a year–we learn almost nothing about its landscape. The entire
island is effectively reduced to the cottage of Circe, where Odysseus allows himself to
be lulled into a near-domestic complacency, as though the real spell is not transforming
his men into swine but changing Odysseus from a heroic king into an ordinary man.
As his gaze changes, so too does his mode of confrontation with those whom he
meets. The first sign of this occurs just before they arrive on Circe’s island. After
Odysseus and his men escape from the Cyclops’ cave, their next stop is the island of
Aeolia, home of Aeolus. Here they receive the “winds of Aeolus”, which power their
ships home in a brisk nine days. Nearing the shores of Ithaca, however, his men grow
curious and greedy, open the bag of winds and squander them. This is a pivotal scene;
shortly after the winds are lost, we see the first indications of a changed Odysseus.
Back at the halls of Aeolus, before king Aeolus, he “pleaded” (10.76) for further
assistance, making “gentle, humble appeals,” which the king refused. He departed,
pathetic and disgraced: “Groan as I did, his curses drove me from his halls” (10.84).
This is not the same man who arrived proudly at Aeolia only a few weeks before, and
who trounced his rivals en route. This is the first glimpse of the beggar-king, a figure we
will see more of as his story unfolds.
The transformation from marauding pirate to charity-seeker continues during the
scene on Aeaea, described above, and is completed by the time Odysseus awakens on
the Scherian shore. His crew is dead, his boats sunk, his treasure lost. Even his great
deeds are slipping from the memory of those he once ruled (2.260.262). His very
identity as a man, to say nothing of his status as a king, has been stripped from him.
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When he spies the princess, Nausicaa, and her maidens at play, he checks himself.
Instead of over-powering them or resorting to a physical display of desperation, for
example by “throwing himself” at Nausicaa’s feet, he uses speech to persuade the
princess to assist him. Suppressing his carnal impulses, he speaks with tact and grace,
“with a subtle, winning word… endearing, sly and suave” (6.160-162). A few passages
later, Odysseus finds himself in the court of the King and Queen. In deference to the
advice of the princess, he now “flung his arms around Arete’s knees” (7.178) and then
used speech to win “rapid convoy home” (7.179). Odysseus as warrior is replaced in
these passages by the supplicant, the charity-seeker, the deferential guest obedient to
the wishes and advice of his hosts.
The transformation is complete on the athletic field a few scenes later when
Odysseus is challenged by one of the young Phaeacians, Broadsea. “’I knew it!’”,
[Broadsea] says [to Odysseus], “’I never took you for someone skilled in games, the
kind that real men play throughout the world” (8.182-186). The scene draws its tension
from the reader’s knowledge of Odysseus as a hothead. But the conflict fizzles. Instead
of pummeling the boy, Odysseus launches a discus and disarms Broadsea in speech
(8.233.265). Though his words are backed by a show of strength, his relies on
persuasion, not force. It is words–firm but diplomatic–that silence his adversary (8.266267). Odysseus has, in effect, won his battle by eschewing violence. In doing so, he has
created the possibility for peaceful reconciliation. This is achieved later in the same
scene. After Odysseus recounts his adventures and, as I argue below, regains a
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measure of his lost standing, Broadsea makes a gift of a sword, both to express his
regret and to acknowledge the skill and courage of his guest.61
If we look back to the beginning of his journey, those scenes leading up to the
confrontation with Polyphemus suggest that to be in transit but in want of nothing is to
travel as though one has not left home; it is to recreate home, and the standing one
enjoys at home, while still in transit. As such, Odysseus can both feel and act as king
everywhere he goes. He can extend his dominion as King of Ithaca over all he
encounters. Implicit in this power of extension is a denial of plurality. Everything
Odysseus encounters falls, if he wishes to seize it, within the domain of his kingdom
and under his authority. What is significant about the cyclops episode is that it reveals
not just the intent to plunder but the assumption that Odysseus is entitled to what he
plunders, simply because he endeavors to seize it. This is the key to the early travels of
the Odyssey: that Odysseus views the world as his extended dominion, entitling him to
take what he wants on the principle that right follows might. He does not consider that
power might be limited by something other than the capacity to seize it. Odysseus
instead casts an acquisitive gaze over all he encounters. By the time he reaches the
Phaeacian island of Scheria, he has lost the trappings and privileges of the kingship,
and with them the king’s gaze. When he reclaims his heroism through speech, however,
and with it a measure of political standing, it will bring a new and more mobile form of
power.
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None of which is to say that travel changes Odysseus. I agree with Auerbach that Homeric character is
essentially fixed; neither time nor experience alter the essential natures of these characters. The most
that can be said is that time and experience, often during travel, reveal facets of character that were
previously undisclosed or undeveloped. Travel, in this sense, actualizes identity; it does not, however,
change it.
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Political Power Recovered

In the first section, I argued that we can observe the effects of travel on the
political status of Odysseus by tracing the changes to his gaze and tactics as he passes
through each destination. That argument is really two-fold: first, Odysseus ceases to
rule Ithaca in a trivial sense because political power is synonymous with actually ruling.
Extended absence erodes his standing as king simply because he stops being present.
But travel works in a second way to erode his political status. Over the course of the
journey Odysseus ceases to act as a king even while in exile. The focus of his gaze
moves from exploitation to defense to charity-seeking. And his bearing towards his
hosts changes from assertive, entitled, and self-assured to that of a deferential
supplicant. In all these ways, travel dissolves his kingship and transforms him from a
heroic warrior-king to a beggar.
The fact that the character of a king lurks within the guise of a beggar is the central
source of tension in the story. How he reclaims that identity is the focus of this next section.
The argument, briefly put, is that Odysseus’ political power depends upon his status a hero.
During his extended travels, his heroic deeds have been erased from the collective memory.
Through speech, Odysseus recreates his heroism and thereby reclaims the political standing
that attends to it. There is a twist, however. By recreating his heroism in speech, Odysseus
makes himself dependent upon his audience to both recognize and validate his claims to
heroism. Because the audience of Phaeacians is not limited to kings and nobles but includes
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commoners as well, the processes of recognition and validation have a flattening affecting on
the political standing of the social classes. In this way, Odysseus reclaims his political power
by also diminishing it.
The argument of the section proceeds through three steps. First, I argue that heroism
and political standing are entwined. Reclaiming the former is a means of acquiring the latter.
Next, I invoke the theory of the charismatic leader as described by Weber to interpret the form
of political power that emerges through Odysseus’ delivery of his travelogue. Third, I argue that
the Weberian reading suggests that, by reclaiming heroism through travelogue, Odysseus
changes the nature of the political power that attends to heroism. He flattens socio-political
distinctions between classes and thereby diminishes his own standing as hero-king by
elevating common men.
The Phaeacian episode begins in Book Six. At this point in the story, Odysseus
has been away from Ithaca for twenty years. Ten were spent at Troy, another three
were spent at sea, and the last seven have been spent on the island of Ogygia in the
company of the goddess, Calypso. After Athena persuades Zeus to command his
release, Odysseus builds a raft and sails for home. Poseidon spots him in transit and
whips up a storm that destroys the raft and nearly kills Odysseus. With the aid of a sea
nymph and a magical scarf, he survives the ordeal and arrives on the shore of Scheria,
where he takes refuge in a leaf pile. When he awakens, he befriends the princess
Nausicaa, who instructs him to seek the palace and ask the Queen for passage home.
The Queen agrees, and she and the King treat their stranger to food and shelter. When
they ask Odysseus for his story, however, he demurs and gives them only a partial
history, and does so without revealing his identity. The next day, however, when
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Odysseus silences the bard Demodicus during his song about the fallen soldiers of
Troy, King Alcinous at last impresses upon the stranger to say his name.
The substance of his speech to the Phaeacians is the sequence of events since
his departure from Troy. Describing these events, he puts special emphasis on the
myriad deadly encounters with gods, monsters, and other beasts. Though he
acknowledges his own bouts of stubbornness and misjudgment, the recurring theme of
his travelogue is his courage and his willingness to put himself in danger for the sake of
his men. On Ismarus, he leads his men to a rout of the Ciccones; in the cave of the
cyclops he conceives and executes a brilliant escape plan; on Aeaea, he confronts a
sorceress and rescues his men from animal penury; and even in defeat, against the twin
dangers of Scylla and Charybdis, he proceeds with a fearlessness unrivaled by his men.
His story to the Phaeacians is, in essence, a catalogue of heroism at sea.62
At the most basic level, the recitation of heroic deeds solves a practical problem
for Odysseus: he has no mortal witnesses to his heroism. Amongst the Phaeacians,
Odysseus is a hero without recognition. His great deeds, at least since Aeolia but
perhaps even earlier, have not been transmitted because the only witnesses–his crew–
have all perished. These deeds are lost to the mortal world,63 uninscribed on the mortal
ledger, so to speak. When he tells his story to the Phaeacians, Odysseus does not
simply satisfy the king’s demand to reveal his identity. He claims his past deeds as his
own and in doing so claims the identity of a heroic warrior. He becomes, through
storytelling, the hero that he has already proven himself to be through deed. He
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Olson (1995) goes further than this, arguing that it is an effort to absolve himself of guilt in the death of
this crew (43).
63 Mentor says to the Assembly of Ithaca, “Think: not one of the people whom he ruled remembers
Odysseus now, that godlike man” (2.260.262).
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consummates his heroism, as it were, makes it permanent, by making the audience of
Phaeacians witnesses to his heroism. Through speech and storytelling, he creates new
witnesses to these actions while also claiming those actions as his own. By recounting
the substance of his journey, he regains the heroic identity that he has lost in transit.
But heroism matters not just for its own sake. It is also critical for Odysseus
because it is the foundation of his political authority. This is not true for all of Homer’s
heroes. Heroism, understood as the performance of courage and bravery in battle64, is
an attribute of most kings but it is not evenly distributed among them. Nor do all heroes
enjoy political power, much less the standing of kings. Agamemnon, for one, is a king by
virtue of his inheritance of treasure rather than any conspicuous displays of courage or
bravery. Finley notes that he is King of Kings within the Achaean army because of the
size of his flotilla of ships, itself an indication for his extraordinary wealth. By contrast,
Odysseus leads a minor fleet, a mere seven or eight ships in total, a fact reflecting the
relative poverty of Ithaca.
While heroism is not a proxy or substitute for political power, it can underwrite the
political authority of a king, as it does in the case of Odysseus. We can infer this from
the ways in which the Ithacans themselves speak of their lost king, both those who
support his claim to the rule and those who reject it. Speaking to the Assembly of Lords,
Telemachus says to the crowd, “Trouble has struck my house–a double blow. First, I
have lost my noble father who ruled among you years ago, each of you here, and kindly
as a father to his children” (2.48-52). The elder Ithacan, Mentor, then addresses the
audience, “Think: not one of the people whom he ruled remembers Odysseus now, that

64

Finley, 71.
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godlike man” (2.260.262). What both speakers allude to is the idea that obedience is
owed to Odysseus not by virtue of his blood line or his wealth, but because of the way in
which he ruled, the way in which he performed his duties as king. It is the lapsing of
these memories of how Odysseus ruled that inspires the suitors to challenge the throne
and to speak with arrogance about his defeat, should he return. In Mentor’s passage,
we find some indication of the extent to which his standing as king, and therefore of the
limits of their obedience to him, depend on the persistence of memory not just of being
ruled, but of being ruled with well, “godlike” and as a father towards his children. What is
forgotten, both passages imply, is not that Odysseus ruled, but rather the way in which
he ruled.
Exactly how he performed as king is alluded to by Telemachus a few lines later in
the same speech. He asks the Assembly, do they “think my noble father Odysseus did
the Achaean army damage, deliberate harm?” (2.77-78). The question is rhetorical; it is
well-known that Odysseus was key to the victory over the Trojans. Telemachus
insinuates in these lines that Ithaca owes his father obedience because of Odysseus’
performance at Troy, which itself reflected upon Ithaca and served to elevate its status
and reputation among the Achaean states. To deny him obedience, in the form of
protecting his son and window, is, according to Telemachus, to deny the fact of his
father’s heroism on the battlefield.
As the memory of his heroism fades and as the witnesses to his heroism in
transit – namely, his crew – all perish, Odysseus loses the foundation of his political
authority as king. He loses the basis upon which he may justly command the obedience
of his subjects. To reclaim his political status, he must not simply seize back the throne,

131

which would grant him power but none of the legitimacy that he requires to rule. Rather,
he must also reclaim some of his lost heroism. However, as I will try to show, by doing
this in speech he modifies the political power that stems from his heroism. If the original
heroic deed was a feat of physical strength, the recreation of the deed by recitation is a
feat of rhetorical skill. It is a feat of persuasion by speech rather than force. While this
does not change the heroic deed itself, it does shift the power dynamic between the
audience and the heroic individual. Specifically, as a condition of his heroism, Odysseus
must also convince the audience that his acts have been heroic. Odysseus must not
only recount the events; he must persuade the Phaeacians to recognize him as a hero.
This elevation of the audience is significant in the first place because of the social
structure of the world that Homer depicts. Simply put, there is a chasm between kings
and commoners. We can look back to the Iliad for evidence of the clear and
unbridgeable distance separating men like Odysseus from ordinary soldiers. Homer
describes the gulf between kings and common soldiers in Book Two, saying, “Whenever
Odysseus met some man of rank, a king, he’d halt and hold him back with winning
words…” (2.218-200). Homer contrasts this with his treatment of soldiers a few lines
later: “When [Odysseus] caught some common soldier shouting out, he’d beat him with
the scepter, dress him down: ‘You fool–sit still! Obey the commands of others, your
superiors…’” (2.228-230). This rift between kings and soldiers is dramatized in a scene
of Book Two in which Odysseus reprimands Thersites for having the pique to challenge
to Agamemnon’s authority. Odysseus “cracked his scepter across [Thersites’] back and
shoulders” (2.309) for the offence of speaking against the leadership of Agamemnon,
despite that fact that his authority was also being challenged by Achilles. To publicly flog
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Thersites for expressing what men of a higher rank are also expressing is to effectively
put rank above substance, and to disqualify common men from participation in public
debate on the grounds of their social standing.
When Odysseus tells his story to the Phaeacians, however, he does not speak
just to the King and Queen, or to the noble class. His decision to postpone disclosure
means that when Odysseus finally speaks, he does so before an audience of
Phaeacians that includes the royal family as well as nobles and commoners. According
to Homer, “Poised in his majesty, Alcinous led the way to Phaeacia’s meeting grounds,
built for all beside the harbored ships” (8.4-6). And a few lines later: “Rousing their zeal,
their curiosity, each and every man, and soon enough the assembly seats were filled
with people thronging…” (8.16-18). Given the social diversity of the Phaeacian people,
alluded to by the princess when she instructs Odysseus to shroud himself when he
walks past the distrustful–i.e. xenophobic–sea laborers65, we can infer that the audience
of spectators includes men and women of all classes. As a result, the recognition that
Odysseus attains through his storytelling is not an Iliadic recognition between kings or
noblemen. Rather, it is a recognition between a hero-king and commoners, between
Odysseus the king and ordinary Phaeacians. To seek recognition as a condition of
one’s heroism, and by extension of one’s political standing, is to close the distance
between kings and commoners. It is to approach equality between the hero-king
speaker and his audience, and in doing so, both diminish the hero and elevate the
audience.

Describing these sailors, Nausicaa says, “We have our share of insolent types in town and one of the
coarser sort, spying us, might say, ‘Now who’s that tall, handsome stranger Nausicaa has in tow?
Where’d she light on him? Her husband-to-be, just wait! But who–some shipwrecked stray she’s taken up
with, some alien from abroad…” (6.301-306).
65
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The bond forged between Odysseus and his audience echoes the bond between
the charismatic leader and his subjects described by Weber in Economy and Society.
Weber distinguishes the charismatic leader from traditional leaders, like patriarchs, as
well as from rational leaders, like those who govern administrative states. Instead of
deriving authority from tradition or from the laws and policies that govern administrative
states, the charismatic leader claims authority through some exceptional quality or skill.
According to Weber, the charismatic leader “is considered extraordinary and treated as
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or
qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded
as of divine origin or as exemplary…” (Weber, 241). Though Weber does not mention
Odysseus, the Ithacan king fits the criteria. He is exemplary in his strength (as shown by
defeating the cyclops) and his cunning (as shown at Troy and with the goddess Circe);
he is capable of superhuman feats (as shown by descending into, and returning from,
the underworld); and he is clearly favored by the gods, to judge by his survival of these
many ordeals.
Because of his extended absence and the death of his men, Odysseus also fits
the Weberian mold in a second way: he needs the Phaeacians to recognize his heroic
achievements. In the Homeric landscape, heroic figures are Odysseus are exceptional
by their nature. Men like Achilles, Menalaus and Diomedes are not contingently great;
they require no external validation of their greatness. This is not incompatible with
Weber’s model because Weber is agnostic on the question of whether the charismatic
leader is truly exceptional. Where Weber is clear, and where Homer allows some
ambiguity, however, is the relationship between those exceptional qualities and the
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authority that attends to them. For Weber, it is the recognition from the audience, not
the innate qualities themselves, which produce the authority of the charismatic leader.
The audience both recognizes and affirms the extraordinary qualities of this figure, and
in doing so endows him with his authority and political power. Weber writes, “It is
recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of
charisma” (242). Applied here, Odysseus does not need the Phaeacians to prove his
heroism; he does however need the Phaeacians to recognize and validate his heroism
in order to claim authority based upon those heroic actions.
The recognition and validation by the Phaeacians have more overtly political
entailments as well. As noted above, recognition and validation enact a dependence on
the charismatic leader to his audience; this dependence binds speaker and audience in
a new community – a charismatic community – that the speaker and audience together
make possible. Through the formation of this new community, Weber’s charisma does
not simply produce a new form of domination wielded by the leader; it activates and
exercises a form of collective, democratic power in the people. More specifically, it
activates the capacity to reject one form of power– traditional, patriarchal–and replace it
with a new form, a disruptive, unruly, revolutionary form of power. It allows these
subjects to authorize a form of power that they themselves have validated and
consented to. One interpreter of Weber puts it like this; “For Weber, the locus of power
is in the led, who actively (if perhaps unconsciously) invest their leaders with social
authority” (Joosse, 271). This need not lead to any substantive participation in
governance; the people may remain just as distant from the exercise of power. What is
essential for Weber is that the power of the leader comes to depend upon the
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certification of the people, a reorientation towards the nature of authority that pivots us
away from tradition-based appeals to authority to consent-based appeals.
This empowerment of the people leads Weber to describe charisma as the main
source of revolutionary power, particularly in the age of kings. According to Weber, the
charismatic form of power can be understood in opposition to what he calls everyday
forms of traditional power, such as familial and patriarchal.66 These are rule-based,
following clearly established conventions, and limiting the felt sense of agency and
political capacity by those subject to this power. Against these forms, the charismatic
leader offers something close to revolutionary. Weber writes, “In traditional periods,
charisma is the great revolutionary force” (245, italics in the original). Later, he adds,
“Charismatic belief revolutionizes men ‘from within’…’” (1116). He means by this that
the charismatic individual may, through sharing experiences of suffering, or enthusiasm,
or conflict, change the hearts of his subjects and get them to see the world differently.
Through this internal reorientation, a change in social and material conditions follows. In
Weber’s terms, this is a “radical alteration of central attitudes” by which we come to see
both problems and solutions differently, and thereby allow new authorities–as the
sources of these solutions–to seize power.
A similar process of reorientation and alteration follows from the experience of
witnessing the travelogue of Odysseus. This happens in one sense when Odysseus
confronts his audience with the spectacular encounters with gods and monsters. These
encounters present the audience with conditions that exceed the “everyday” routines,
routines which the traditional, patriarchal form of authority of the king exists to meet.

Weber (1978) writes, “In its pure form, charismatic authority has a character specifically foreign to
everyday routine structures” (246).
66
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Odysseus, by contrast, embodies power for spectacular, exceptional circumstances: for
battling monsters and outwitting demigods. His leadership unavoidably runs into conflict
with the leadership of the patriarchal king of the Phaeacians, insofar as his duty as king
is to maintain order and see to the needs of his people. By presenting the Phaeacians
with the extraordinary adversity of his adventures, he shows them the inadequacy of the
prevailing source of authority – their king – and asserts his own claim to authority based
on his ability to master the circumstances that he has faced.
Weber notes in several places67 that the charismatic leader is a revolutionary
figure because he challenges and undermines other forms of political authority,
including traditional forms like patriarchal and familial. We can see something of this
revolutionary threat in the reaction of King Alcinous. When he demands that every
nobleman in the audience make a gift of golden scepters to Odysseus, he is, on one
hand, rewarding Odysseus for the labor of telling his story and also honoring his
heroism. But he is also reasserting his power as king, and specifically his power to
make binding claims upon his subjects. He does not give merely from his own treasure
but demands golden scepters from every nobleman in the audience. The gift-giving
ritual, according to Finley, was “an act through which status relations were created, and
what we would call political obligations” (Finley, 98). By this light, the nature of the gift
that he commands from his subjects serves a dual purpose, to both reassert his royal
status over his subjects, and to inure Odysseus to Alcinous, further strengthening the
Phaeacian king’s own power as a king among kings. Through this command to his
subjects, Alcinous shows himself equal to the stature of Odysseus in the size of the gift

He writes, “In traditionalist periods, charisma is the great revolutionary force” (245), also the section
entitled “The Revolutionary Nature of Charisma”, p 1115-1116.
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and equal of the Ithacan king. In the excessiveness of the gift, however, he also
suggests the extent to which his authority is threatened by Odysseus.
But Odysseus also affects a reorientation in a second way, and in a way that
complicates the neat Weberian mapping that I have thus far suggested. For Weber, the
archetypal charismatic leader is a kind of magician, someone who wins obedience
through the performance of tricks. This figure leads by virtue of some demonstrable link
to an extra-mortal, magical-irrational plane. With this understanding in mind, Weber
cites shamanistic figures and Old Testament prophets as exemplary of the type. And in
some respects, Odysseus fits this type. Though he is not a magician, per se, he
frequently speaks with the gods, occasionally sees them, and has even performed the
trick of descending into, and returning from, Hades. But the figure of the shamanmagician fails to capture the essence of Odysseus: namely, his cunning. Odysseus
survives because he is a tactical genius; he survives because of his capacity to reason.
When Odysseus effects a reorientation in his audience, it is not simply away from
the traditional authority of the king. Rather, what binds this new community between
Odysseus and his audience is not simply his extraordinary heroism but his genius for
evading and outsmarting monsters and divinities. The most dramatic instance is in the
cyclops’ cave where Odysseus hatches the plot to drug Polyphemus with wine and then
blind him with a sharpened stake. But his wits are once again on display in the
encounter with the goddess Circe. Odysseus anticipates her attack, albeit with the aid of
Hermes, and thwarts her. In doing so he both woos her and forces the liberation of his
men. And then again, one can point to the episode with the sirens. With rope and a
mast, Odysseus once again trespasses through the realm of gods and emerges
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unharmed. Nearly every episode of his story turns on some clever plan or some keen
insight that gives an advantage. It is this capacity for reason, rather than the more
conventional capacity for magic, that distinguishes Odysseus from other charismatic
leaders. And it is this capacity, recognized and validated by the audience, that forges
the charismatic community between them. The Phaeacians are smuggled, alongside his
crew, on the underbelly of sheep, entering this new community in a flourish of Odyssean
brilliance. The improbability of the outcomes joins them; it endows their new, shared
existence with a kind of wonder that makes it worth sustaining. This is social unity
galvanized around human ingenuity over the will of the gods and the power of monsters.
And it is galvanized against the rule- and tradition-based authority of kings. Insofar as
the Phaeacians recognize the charismatic quality of Odysseus and thereby validate
both that quality and the power that flows from it, they not only cast aside tribal bonds
and the traditional figures of authority. They also replace their supernatural myths with a
new origin story rooted in the rational–and essentially human–capacities of Odysseus.
And they replace a political authority rooted in unquestionable law with one rooted in
human ingenuity.
But if the Phaeacian episode complicates our understanding of charisma, it also
clarifies it. In the various references and allusions to the sources of charisma, Weber
suggests that the charismatic leader emerges in response to exceptional events, or to
conditions that exceed the everyday. Though he does not use this language, Weber
might have described these circumstances as emergencies, conditions that exceed and
threaten the normal life.68 But by his examples, Weber also suggests that charismatic

Weber (1978), 246, cited above. He also describes charisma as “foreign to economic considerations”,
by which he means everyday economics of the household. He still allows for the financial interests of
68
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leaders arise from within; they are old medieval monarchs69, or they are robber-pirates
leading bands of thieves70, or they are the Old Testament prophets.71 Each of these
examples describes a leader who emerges from within, capturing the obedience of
subjects through magic, and doing so upon or within the context of an existing
community of which the leader herself is a member. She would emerge from the
existing community to lead it through some extraordinary external threat. But she herself
was an insider, already a member, already known.
In the Phaeacian episode, however, the situation is reversed. It is the outsider–
the traveler–who both destabilizes the community and then provides the means to its
restabilization. Odysseus himself, by transporting his audience through travelogue,
temporarily upends the stability of their everyday lives. He exposes them to the mortal
dangers of heroic travel, bringing them to the very edge of disaster before showing them
the means to its resolution. For the duration of the narrative, he draws his audience into
a state of emergency, reveals the inadequacy of the everyday authority of patriarchal

thieves and pirates who seek enrichment through “booty” and extortion (244-245). Conversely, he writes,
“All extraordinary needs, i.e. those which transcend the sphere of everyday economic routines, have
always been satisfied an entirely heterogeneous manner: on a charismatic basis” (1111).
69 Weber (1978) writes about “old Germanic kings” (242-243), about “the Chinese emperor” (1114), and
warlords of both “Teutonic or American Indian tribes” (1118). Each example refers to a figure who is
already a member of the group, an insider rather than a stranger.
70 The example of the robber-pirate echoes depiction of the bandit in Eric Hobsbawm’s study of the figure
who lives on the margins of the settled society, eschewing its trappings of regularized income and family.
If Weber is correct that figures like Achilles and some Spartan warriors (1120 fit this mold, it echoes
Hobsbawm’s interpretation of this figure as a response to deeper transformations in the socio-economic
order.
71 On the Old Testament prophets as models for charismatic leaders, Weber cites Rudolf Sohm , a
Lutheran jurist credited with reintroducing the concept of the charismatic leader into Christian thought in
the late 19th century. The appeal the charismatic leader to Sohm was its anti-revolutionary potential as a
bulwark against the growing storm of “social and democratic reforms” gathering at the time (Joosse, 269).
This conservative orientation yielded an understanding of charisma that skewed towards the classical
view that it was a divine gift, exemplified by the Old Testament prophets. Though Weber’s understanding
of charisma differed from Sohm’s on key points, he shared Sohm’s interest in Old Testament prophets
like Amos and Jeremiah (Adair-Toteff, 12). According to biographer Marianne Weber, the fascination with
these figures stemmed from the fact that they tended to emerge when “whenever great powers
threatened their homeland” (M. Weber, 1926: 604, quoted in Adair-Toteff, 12).
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kings like Alcinous, and makes the case for the exceptional authority of himself. This
authority rests not in his ability to shore up the walls of Scheria but to knock them down
and build new ones. And his appeal is not in the preservation of the old, traditional
model but rather in the prospect of joining a people together in a new community and in
defiance of old gods and fathers.
Indeed, if we imagine Odysseus relaying his travelogue to the Ithacans, the
political stakes quickly diminish. To judge by the speeches from the Assembly scene in
Book Two (quoted above on pages 117-118), Odysseus already enjoys an exceptional
status among Ithacans. Moreover, even though his claim to the throne is contested, to
reclaim it is an affirmation of the old model of power. For a hypothetical audience of
Ithacans to hear and validate his heroism would merely reaffirm their bond and loyalty to
their king. While they would fulfill one half of the role played by the Phaeacians, namely,
playing spectator to his heroic deeds, in doing so they would also affirm what they
already know, namely, that their king is exceptional and that he enjoys the favor of the
gods. This is not the stuff of revolution; it is what quells dissent. What distinguishes
speech to the Phaeacians from the same speech to the Ithacans is the strangeness of
the speaker, or more generally, the strangeness of the traveler. This strangeness
makes his charismatic show of heroism not merely compelling drama but politically
destabilizing – revolutionary even. His strangeness, which itself expresses the
essentially unknowable identity of the traveler, creates boundless possibilities for the
creation of a new identity with the Phaeacians; it leaves Odysseus unconstrained by
history and allows him to forge, through speech, an identity with and for the Phaeacians.
And it allows the Phaeacians, in turn, to reimagine themselves in the image of this
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charismatic leader. The very attribute that distances him, that makes him risky, namely,
his unknowability, is what enables him to practice this kind of mythmaking, to annihilate
the identity of his audience and replace it with something new, with his own identity. It is
the blankness, the mystery, the infinite possibilities embodied by the traveler, it is the
abyss of identity that makes it maximally generative of the kind of bonds that can
displace existing bonds of kinship and produce new bonds out of aesthetic experience.
This is the key to the relationship between travel and politics in this story. The
experience of the travelogue forges a temporary unity between storyteller and audience
that produces a provisional solidarity. In the case of Odysseus and the Phaeacians, his
heroism is of such a magnitude as to bind the audience to him, to endow him with a
measure of power over them, a power that flows from a heroism that is capable of
displacing traditional political authority with a new authority premised on courage and
cunning and demonstrated in speech. Community between speaker and listener
congeals around this Odyssean form of heroism. This form is less than Iliadic because it
is constrained but also more than Iliadic because it belongs firmly in the realm of
mortals and thereby displaces the authority of gods and kings alike.

Conclusion

What is the meaning of travel for politics in the Odyssey? It is that travel brings
us low, reduces us to mere existence, and compels us to seek charity and hospitality. In
doing so, it produces a pluralistic orientation towards the world that begets political, or at
142

least civic, community. At the same time, however, it destabilizes political orders, brings
violent conflict and the constant risk of death. The solace of the Odyssey comes from
the belief that the world contains, or once contained, super-men who could overcome
the indignities of travel and restore order to the world. If we accept Raaflaub’s argument
that Homer was writing at a time of the emergence of the city-state and the polis, and of
democratic politics as the political form emergent within this context, we could infer that
travel will of necessity destabilize hereditary monarchies, but that great men remain
capable of producing new orders. The vision is a cautionary one, however. Speech is
prone to manipulation, and the public square is capable of being overrun by strongmen
and opportunists. People are easily swayed and, generally speaking, lack the capacity
for political judgment. By this light, Homer’s text is forward-looking in its
acknowledgement of how men live and of how trade and commerce will expand the
practice of travel, creating more of these encounters and confrontations with plurality. It
is also nostalgic because it suggests that men require not more political agency but
less, not more speech-based politics but rather stronger leaders, men capable of
overcoming plurality and insufficiency through new unities.
The Odyssey is, in the final analysis, about the triumph of heroes in an age of
diminishing heroism. Nestled within the broader arc of this story, is the strange episode
in which Homer lets his protagonist recount his heroism for an audience of Phaeacians.
In the process, he shows us something that we might recognize as the emergence of a
post-tribal civic community. Its emergence is rooted in aesthetic experience; it happens
because Odysseus tells a great story. Civic community, when it emerges and inevitably
displaces the rule of heroic kings, will appear because men will tell compelling stories.
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And not just men but travelers, men who unravel the bonds of kinship by compelling
their audience to journey with them, and who compel their audience to form bonds with
them, bonds that disrupt those of family and tribe because they are bonds with
charismatic strangers.
The fate of the Phaeacians advises, however, a cautionary view of what we are
calling civic community. Not only do the Phaeacians violate Poseidon’s curse by
agreeing to carry Odysseus home; they also reward him for his actions72, including
blinding the sea god’s progeny, Polyphemus. This enrages Poseidon, who dashes the
convoy of ships on the rocks and seals off the Phaeacian port with an immovable
boulder (13:180-200). If we wish to read their obliteration as the consummation of the
bond with Odysseus, we might go so far as to say that the new public is consummated
not simply in the decision to ferry home Odysseus, but in sharing the curse of Poseidon.
In doing so, the curse of Odysseus becomes the curse of his saviors, the Phaeacians,
who are subsequently destroyed as a people; their identity as seafarers is obliterated
when they lose access to the water. In this moment, we see both the power of the
traveler’s speech to forge new publics and create the conditions for political life. We also
see its destructive consequences. The traveler is, almost by definition, unknowable. His
identity is beyond verification. To enter political life with him is to do so with a stranger,
and to bear the consequences, which may in fact cast one into the same obscurity from
the which the traveler himself just emerged.
In the end, Homer indicts not only the practice of making politics with travelers
but of making politics in a plurality. To make public life with someone outside the group,

Poseidon says, “’[The Phaeacians] loaded the man with boundless gifts… more plunder than he could
ever have won from Troy if Odysseus had returned intact with his fair share.’” (13:155-158.)
72
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to leave the tribe, is to expose oneself to risk. This, ironically, is the message we are left
with by the plot: that the traveler presents a risk, that his speech has the power to
obliterate the host, to wipe an entire people off the map. The message is not that
speech-based politics is more stable than monarchy, but rather that it is more potent,
capable of overthrowing the very monarchies that defined traditional, Iliadic political
power. Who comes after Odysseus? Not those unexceptional men like Telemachus, the
sons of kings who fail to grow up. Rather, it is the storytellers like Homer who will inherit
the throne.
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